Narrative:

Upon reviewing the ATIS prior to the TOD; ZZZ was calling winds 230/07 and arrival ILS runway xxl/xxr. The changeover report advised of gate xy; therefore; the crew elected to fly a visual approach backed up by the ILS xxl and briefed the approach. While on the descent via the zzzzzx arrival; approach advised of weather along the route of flight and authorized deviation right of course and to fly direct ZZZZZ1 ( IAF for ILS xxl) when able and to descend to 4;000 feet. At approximately 8-10 miles from ZZZZZ1 (IAF); approach advised to now expect xxr at ZZZ. The ca changed the approach from ILS xxl to xxr while the first officer briefed the approach plate; landing runway and expected taxi route to the gate. Roughly one minute after the ILS xxr brief; approach then changed the landing runway to xxl. The ca quickly re-inserted ILS xxl and the first officer (PF) gave him the ILS baro minimums and the ca activated the new approach. The first officer briefed xxl approach; slowed to 210; asked for flaps 1; and coming up on ZZZZZ1 (IAF) queried the ca to ask approach for lower due to the aircrafts position at 4;000 (when it should have been descending to 2;500). Approach apologized for their delay and asked if we wanted to continue the approach for xxl.the ca advised approach that the aircraft would be able to get down and were then swapped over to ZZZ tower. The first officer immediately requested gear down; which the ca promptly did. As it became apparent that the aircraft was too high on the approach; the first officer queried the ca that the aircraft was too high on the glide slope and discussed the possibility of a go-around at that time. The ca noted the concern and advised to continue as is. As it became apparent that the aircraft was too high for normal bracketing maneuvers the ca then agreed that a go-around was necessary. The first officer immediately executed go-around procedures and the ca advised tower of missed approach. Following the missed approach; ZZZ tower directed the aircraft to turn to a heading of 095; climb to 2;000 and to contact approach control. The first officer responded to the radio transmission; as the ca was making a PA announcement to the passengers. After the frequency change; approach gave a heading of 360 and then a downwind heading of 260. The ca quickly re-inserted ILS xxl back into the FMS and initiated the descent checklist. On downwind; the first officer set speed 210 and requested flaps 1 again; which the pm did. Due to sequencing of company traffic; approach directed a left-hand turn to a heading of 180 and cleared the aircraft for a visual approach to runway xxl. The first officer pressed the apr pb and AP1 and called for gear down and slowed to 180 kts. The first officer also pressed for managed speed; but quickly returned to selected speed when speed began to increase. The first officer then disconnected the ap after the ca noted the angle to intercept the localizer was insufficient for the dogleg; so the PF hand flew the localizer to xxl. At this time; the first officer advised the ca that the new approach had not been activated and attempted to slow the aircraft with the speed brake as flaps 3 and 4 were already out with an upward trend vector on the airspeed indicator. However; the PF never requested flaps 3 or 4; which created ambiguity in the cockpit during an already task saturated time. Additionally; the ap disconnect was present on the ECAM which created a challenge to finish the before landing checklist. Therefore; the aircraft was momentarily high on the approach. However; at no time do I feel that the passengers; crew or aircraft were at risk from a safety perspective and ultimately; we ended with a safe and stable landing. Upon reflection; if I find myself in the exact situation again; I would slow everything down from the initial descent of 4;000 feet. I would also call for the go-around early and not discuss it. To increase situational awareness and decrease task saturation I would have advised approach that we needed an extended downwind or vectors. I believe the main contributing factors were 1) combined total hours of less than 140 between the first officer/ca and 2) lack of proficiency due to the current covid-climate flight scheduling and 3) large gaps between flights (i.e.; not flying for 45 consecutive days despite proffering; calling scheduling to flight time; etc) 4) we were held high on descent due to the tower forgetting about us.1) not placing two 'new to that aircraft' pilots in the same cockpit 2) force scheduling for reserve pilots to fly every 2 weeks for proficiency. 3) most importantly; requiring that all new captains changing over from an X type aircraft be required to have the minimum 100 hours if flying with a new first officer.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier First Officer reported they were given multiple runway changes resulting in an unstabilized approach and go-around.

Narrative: Upon reviewing the ATIS prior to the TOD; ZZZ was calling winds 230/07 and Arrival ILS Runway XXL/XXR. The changeover report advised of gate XY; therefore; the crew elected to fly a visual approach backed up by the ILS XXL and briefed the approach. While on the descent via the ZZZZZX arrival; Approach advised of weather along the route of flight and authorized deviation right of course and to fly direct ZZZZZ1 ( IAF For ILS XXL) when able and to descend to 4;000 feet. At approximately 8-10 miles from ZZZZZ1 (IAF); Approach advised to now expect XXR at ZZZ. The CA changed the approach from ILS XXL to XXR while the FO briefed the approach plate; landing runway and expected taxi route to the gate. Roughly one minute after the ILS XXR brief; Approach then changed the landing Runway to XXL. The CA quickly re-inserted ILS XXL and the FO (PF) gave him the ILS BARO minimums and the CA activated the new approach. The FO briefed XXL approach; slowed to 210; asked for flaps 1; and coming up on ZZZZZ1 (IAF) queried the CA to ask approach for lower due to the aircrafts position at 4;000 (when it should have been descending to 2;500). Approach apologized for their delay and asked if we wanted to continue the approach for XXL.The CA advised Approach that the aircraft would be able to get down and were then swapped over to ZZZ Tower. The FO immediately requested gear down; which the CA promptly did. As it became apparent that the aircraft was too high on the approach; the FO queried the CA that the aircraft was too high on the glide slope and discussed the possibility of a go-around at that time. The CA noted the concern and advised to continue as is. As it became apparent that the aircraft was too high for normal bracketing maneuvers the CA then agreed that a go-around was necessary. The FO immediately executed go-around procedures and the CA advised tower of missed approach. Following the missed approach; ZZZ Tower directed the aircraft to turn to a heading of 095; climb to 2;000 and to contact Approach Control. The FO responded to the radio transmission; as the CA was making a PA announcement to the passengers. After the frequency change; approach gave a heading of 360 and then a downwind heading of 260. The CA quickly re-inserted ILS XXL back into the FMS and initiated the Descent Checklist. On downwind; the FO set speed 210 and requested flaps 1 again; which the PM did. Due to sequencing of company traffic; approach directed a left-hand turn to a heading of 180 and cleared the aircraft for a visual approach to Runway XXL. The FO pressed the APR pb and AP1 and called for gear down and slowed to 180 kts. The FO also pressed for managed speed; but quickly returned to selected speed when speed began to increase. The FO then disconnected the AP after the CA noted the angle to intercept the LOC was insufficient for the dogleg; so the PF hand flew the LOC to XXL. At this time; the FO advised the CA that the new approach had not been activated and attempted to slow the aircraft with the speed brake as FLAPs 3 and 4 were already out with an upward trend vector on the airspeed indicator. However; the PF never requested flaps 3 or 4; which created ambiguity in the cockpit during an already task saturated time. Additionally; the AP Disconnect was present on the ECAM which created a challenge to finish the Before Landing checklist. Therefore; the aircraft was momentarily high on the approach. However; at no time do I feel that the passengers; crew or aircraft were at risk from a safety perspective and ultimately; we ended with a safe and stable landing. Upon reflection; if I find myself in the exact situation again; I would slow everything down from the initial descent of 4;000 feet. I would also call for the go-around early and not discuss it. To increase situational awareness and decrease task saturation I would have advised approach that we needed an extended downwind or vectors. I believe the main contributing factors were 1) combined total hours of less than 140 between the FO/CA and 2) lack of proficiency due to the current COVID-climate flight scheduling and 3) large gaps between flights (i.e.; not flying for 45 consecutive days despite proffering; calling scheduling to flight time; etc) 4) we were held high on descent due to the Tower forgetting about us.1) Not placing two 'new to that aircraft' pilots in the same cockpit 2) Force scheduling for reserve pilots to fly every 2 weeks for proficiency. 3) most importantly; requiring that all new captains changing over from an X type aircraft be required to have the minimum 100 hours if flying with a new FO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.