Narrative:

Approximately 45 minutes after departing ZZZ; the R1 gen failed. The completion of the QRH checklist required the use of the APU for the duration of the flight. After consultation with dispatch and maintenance; we came to the following conclusions. We were planned to arrive with fuel on deck (FOD) 15.9 and taking into account an APU burn of 3.3; we predicted a FOD of 12.4. Min planned reserve and alternative fuel was 11.6. We communicated with dispatch that we would continue with the flight instead of diverting back to ZZZ; however we would be in close contact and a contingency of reevaluating the fuel with options to make a fuel stop in ZZZZ1 or ZZZZ2 were made.we operated at recommended altitude and [cruise setting] and were ahead of planned burn; with an arrival fuel of 15.2. As we continued to within 2 hours of arrival; our FMC predicted FOD 14.2. In ZZZZ airspace we were given a R6 offset; which is the management of arrival traffic. In addition we were given an early descent at a high rate requiring speed brakes and a subsequent lower altitude. This had the effect of deteriorating our FOD to 11.8. In addition; the weather was deteriorating to moderate rain; ceiling below 700 feet; and reduced visibility at ZZZZ. In my years of experience flying into ZZZZ; I have observed that these conditions would delay our arrival and the ability to receive a timely clearance to an alternate might be compromised.in order to communicate in advance with ZZZZ control north of zzzzz intersection; I informed them that we were approaching our minimum fuel. They asked twice if we were 'emergency fuel' and I clearly stated 'negative emergency fuel.' it appeared that ZZZZ afforded us expedited arrival; thereby reducing our landing time and increasing our arrival fuel. Our landing fuel was 12.2 and arrival 11.9.we were detained at the gate and then subsequently in the terminal for by the [local aviation authorities]. [Two company employees] were on hand attempting to interpret the myriad of questions and requests. Essentially the [aviation authorities] wanted information on our generator failure; flight operating manuals; our definition of minimum fuel; and captain's authority. The [aviation authorities] asked the same questions repeatedly and wanted pictures of [our] medical and certificate. I was instructed to give them a written statement; which I complied with in a brief manner. Later they wanted a more detailed explanation and I stated that we were tired and they could receive additional information from our dispatcher and the chief pilot on duty. I [was advised to report that the company] would provide the information for the [aviation authorities].upon arrival at our hotel; the desk manager said that [the local company representative] needed pictures of the certificate and medical of our [relief pilots].our flight crew did a great job throughout the flight and ensuing detention at the airport. Communication with the [foreign] ATC is the determining factor and I strongly recommend we establish dialogue with improving the situation with them. We also need to develop a plan to support our flight crews in dealing with this type of situation.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier flight crew reported priority handling for a fuel concern led to questions from the foreign authorities after landing.

Narrative: Approximately 45 minutes after departing ZZZ; the R1 GEN failed. The completion of the QRH checklist required the use of the APU for the duration of the flight. After consultation with dispatch and maintenance; we came to the following conclusions. We were planned to arrive with Fuel on Deck (FOD) 15.9 and taking into account an APU burn of 3.3; we predicted a FOD of 12.4. Min planned Reserve and Alternative fuel was 11.6. We communicated with dispatch that we would continue with the flight instead of diverting back to ZZZ; however we would be in close contact and a contingency of reevaluating the fuel with options to make a fuel stop in ZZZZ1 or ZZZZ2 were made.We operated at recommended altitude and [cruise setting] and were ahead of planned burn; with an arrival fuel of 15.2. As we continued to within 2 hours of arrival; our FMC predicted FOD 14.2. In ZZZZ airspace we were given a R6 offset; which is the management of arrival traffic. In addition we were given an early descent at a high rate requiring speed brakes and a subsequent lower altitude. This had the effect of deteriorating our FOD to 11.8. In addition; the weather was deteriorating to moderate rain; ceiling below 700 feet; and reduced visibility at ZZZZ. In my years of experience flying into ZZZZ; I have observed that these conditions would delay our arrival and the ability to receive a timely clearance to an alternate might be compromised.In order to communicate in advance with ZZZZ control north of ZZZZZ intersection; I informed them that we were approaching our minimum fuel. They asked twice if we were 'emergency fuel' and I clearly stated 'negative emergency fuel.' It appeared that ZZZZ afforded us expedited arrival; thereby reducing our landing time and increasing our arrival fuel. Our landing fuel was 12.2 and arrival 11.9.We were detained at the gate and then subsequently in the terminal for by the [Local Aviation Authorities]. [Two company employees] were on hand attempting to interpret the myriad of questions and requests. Essentially the [Aviation Authorities] wanted information on our generator failure; flight operating manuals; our definition of minimum fuel; and Captain's authority. The [Aviation Authorities] asked the same questions repeatedly and wanted pictures of [our] medical and certificate. I was instructed to give them a written statement; which I complied with in a brief manner. Later they wanted a more detailed explanation and I stated that we were tired and they could receive additional information from our dispatcher and the Chief Pilot on duty. I [was advised to report that the company] would provide the information for the [Aviation Authorities].Upon arrival at our hotel; the desk manager said that [the local company representative] needed pictures of the certificate and medical of our [relief pilots].Our flight crew did a great job throughout the flight and ensuing detention at the airport. Communication with the [foreign] ATC is the determining factor and I strongly recommend we establish dialogue with improving the situation with them. We also need to develop a plan to support our flight crews in dealing with this type of situation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.