Narrative:

Was training my trainee; miami south departure sector during the morning departure bank. 1h was split off. Aircraft X was a helicopter orbiting 4nm south east at 035 in front of all our departures who were stopped at 030. There was 15 nm out our south; and the jump airspace was active along with both other skydivers up. My trainee was working heavy southbound traffic off both mia and fll going out mnate not getting the miles he needed off of mia due to the supervisor telling the tower; 'he's ready for certification; flog him.' then he decides to close 1h and combine the position to us because 1h suddenly had no traffic; and to assign that controller elms - electronic learning classes. I objected and he insisted. First; my trainee is nowhere near ready for certification; and considering all the obstacles and complex factors going on; it was creating an undue dangerous situation. We were already at frequency saturation and complexity saturation; any traffic entering that sector would put us at 110%; immediately upon combining; two VFR's pop off; one for practice approaches; another for flight following. My trainee continued to work the position as best he could combined. Eventually he gets aircraft Y from the north west inbound and issues him a 130 heading to intercept the localizer and a descent to 020. Shortly thereafter aircraft Z departs VFR looking for an IFR popup. My trainee issues the clearance with a vector to 270 and a climb to 160 to keep clear of traffic. Aircraft Z read back both the left to heading 270 and climb to 160. Around heading 320 aircraft Z stops his turn and climb at 025 unsure of what the heading was; converging at the aircraft a. At the same time; the aircraft a gets an RA due to VFR traffic maneuvering north west of aircraft Z that we did not have time to issue because we were too busy vectoring for space out mnate and having to call on all handoffs because of inadequate spacing out the gate. My trainee saw the conflict and gave immediate turns and altitude restrictions to both aircraft to separate them. Aircraft Z continues to read back instructions correctly but not adhere to; and question them. I demanded we get off position immediately due to a possible loss of separation; aircraft Z misread his heading and altitudes a half dozen times and more than once turned the wrong way nor maintained his altitude assigned. It took [the] supervisor 10 minutes to get us relief because of controllers doing electronic learning.I understand the idea of trying to create complex/busy traffic for better training; however this should not be done at the expense of safety. The volume with which that sector was pushed to was beyond my own abilities as a trainer; and i've been there when the center says; ''spin the departures; no more.'' we did not have time or space for that. That sector could have been worked combined had the tower been told to adhere to the appropriate departure spacing; which would have caused [center] to take handoffs. The entire situation would have been exacerbated however if 1h was kept open because they would have dealt with both the departure and the aircraft a and been able to provide them both with appropriate advisories; not to mention better service than we could have combined.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MIA TRACON Controller reported during training session in heavy complex traffic; an operational error occurred as pilot failed to follow a clearance. Staffing issues were cited as contributing factors.

Narrative: Was training my trainee; Miami South Departure sector during the morning departure bank. 1h was split off. Aircraft X was a helicopter orbiting 4nm South East at 035 in front of all our departures who were stopped at 030. There was 15 nm out our South; and the jump airspace was active along with both other skydivers up. My trainee was working heavy southbound traffic off both MIA and FLL going out MNATE not getting the miles he needed off of MIA due to the Supervisor telling the tower; 'he's ready for certification; flog him.' Then he decides to close 1h and combine the position to us because 1h suddenly had no traffic; and to assign that controller ELMS - electronic learning classes. I objected and he insisted. First; my trainee is nowhere near ready for certification; and considering all the obstacles and complex factors going on; it was creating an undue dangerous situation. We were already at frequency saturation and complexity saturation; any traffic entering that sector would put us at 110%; immediately upon combining; two VFR's pop off; one for practice approaches; another for flight following. My trainee continued to work the position as best he could combined. Eventually he gets Aircraft Y from the North West inbound and issues him a 130 heading to intercept the localizer and a descent to 020. Shortly thereafter Aircraft Z departs VFR looking for an IFR popup. My trainee issues the clearance with a vector to 270 and a climb to 160 to keep clear of traffic. Aircraft Z read back both the left to heading 270 and climb to 160. Around heading 320 Aircraft Z stops his turn and climb at 025 unsure of what the heading was; converging at the Aircraft A. At the same time; the Aircraft A gets an RA due to VFR traffic maneuvering North West of Aircraft Z that we did not have time to issue because we were too busy vectoring for space out MNATE and having to call on all handoffs because of inadequate spacing out the gate. My trainee saw the conflict and gave immediate turns and altitude restrictions to both aircraft to separate them. Aircraft Z continues to read back instructions correctly but not adhere to; and question them. I demanded we get off position immediately due to a possible loss of separation; Aircraft Z misread his heading and altitudes a half dozen times and more than once turned the wrong way nor maintained his altitude assigned. It took [the] Supervisor 10 minutes to get us relief because of controllers doing electronic learning.I understand the idea of trying to create complex/busy traffic for better training; however this should not be done at the expense of safety. The volume with which that sector was pushed to was beyond my own abilities as a trainer; and i've been there when the center says; ''spin the departures; no more.'' we did not have time or space for that. That sector could have been worked combined had the tower been told to adhere to the appropriate departure spacing; which would have caused [Center] to take handoffs. The entire situation would have been exacerbated however if 1h was kept open because they would have dealt with both the departure and the Aircraft A and been able to provide them both with appropriate advisories; not to mention better service than we could have combined.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.