Narrative:

At first waypoint after top of climb fuel indicated 2;200 lbs below planned. We were 6;000 pounds under our planned weight at takeoff and had direct routings after departure so this immediately caught our attention. We began to review all pertinent inputs to the FMS; reviewed fuel upload; and started tracking our fuel burned vs tank quantities. At the next waypoint check our fuel was down 4;000 lbs from planned. Around this time we got the 'fuel qty/used check' alert with consequence 'possible fuel leak'. We began to run the appropriate checklists which eventually led us to determining an abnormal leak from number 2 engine. The 'fuel qty/used chk' procedure directs manual and isolating tank to engine where we noted an abnormal decrease in number 2 tank. The next step isolates the leak to that specific tank or that engine. While executing this procedure the tank 2 pumps switch was mistakenly selected off with the cross feed still closed causing the engine to roll back. We restarted via QRH. The first officer was recalled from rest while we continued coordinating with company via ACARS; satcom and ATC radio. We reviewed engine out altitude capability; notified center; notified company and developed game plan for return [to airport]. After checking and determining our mistake we decided to again fully run the QRH procedure and with all 3 crew present and in concurrence we determined an abnormal loss isolated to number 2 engine and shut it down as directed via QRH. We also coordinated and executed a fuel dump procedure of approximately 19;000 lbs to get below max landing. Returned to [the airport] and performed engine out ILS approach and landing without further incident.while running the initial QRH procedure we had an inadvertent fuel starvation of number 2 engine. While we were diligent and careful in reading and executing the steps we somehow still momentarily selected the wrong switch(s). Contributing factors included distraction with concern over possible cause of the abnormal fuel burn; possibility of impending engine fire; fatigue due to circadian disruption; night time environment; concern over lack of divert airports and need to possibly shutdown/divert to distant unfamiliar airport.if a third crew member is available have them present before any significant QRH activity is run. A third set of eyes may have prevented our error.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD11 flight crew reported a fuel leak discovered at the top of climbout. Crew elected to return to departure airport.

Narrative: At first waypoint after top of climb fuel indicated 2;200 lbs below planned. We were 6;000 pounds under our planned weight at takeoff and had direct routings after departure so this immediately caught our attention. We began to review all pertinent inputs to the FMS; reviewed fuel upload; and started tracking our fuel burned vs tank quantities. At the next waypoint check our fuel was down 4;000 lbs from planned. Around this time we got the 'FUEL QTY/USED CHK' alert with consequence 'Possible Fuel Leak'. We began to run the appropriate checklists which eventually led us to determining an abnormal leak from Number 2 engine. The 'fuel qty/used chk' procedure directs Manual and isolating tank to engine where we noted an abnormal decrease in Number 2 tank. The next step isolates the leak to that specific tank OR that engine. While executing this procedure the tank 2 pumps switch was mistakenly selected off with the cross feed still closed causing the engine to roll back. We restarted via QRH. The FO was recalled from rest while we continued coordinating with company via ACARS; SATCOM and ATC radio. We reviewed engine out altitude capability; notified center; notified company and developed game plan for return [to airport]. After checking and determining our mistake we decided to again fully run the QRH procedure and with all 3 crew present and in concurrence we determined an abnormal loss isolated to Number 2 engine and shut it down as directed via QRH. We also coordinated and executed a fuel dump procedure of approximately 19;000 lbs to get below max landing. Returned to [the airport] and performed engine out ILS approach and landing without further incident.While running the initial QRH procedure we had an inadvertent fuel starvation of Number 2 engine. While we were diligent and careful in reading and executing the steps we somehow still momentarily selected the wrong switch(s). Contributing factors included distraction with concern over possible cause of the abnormal fuel burn; possibility of impending engine fire; fatigue due to circadian disruption; night time environment; concern over lack of divert airports and need to possibly shutdown/divert to distant unfamiliar airport.If a third crew member is available have them present BEFORE ANY significant QRH activity is run. A Third set of eyes may have prevented our error.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.