Narrative:

We were being vectored for a visibility approach (34R sea-tac) and given maintain 3000' till 7 DME, cleared for visibility approach. We had (what we thought) the airport (beacon and runway lights) in sight. Navaids tuned: #1 to ILS 34R, #2 to sea VORTAC, ADF to dondo beacon. As we passed abeam airport downwind, I didn't think ADF was pointing in right direction, and started flipping through charts (quickly) looking at VOR 16L/right and inadvertently came up with the idea that the VOR was 6 mi north of airport and we needed to maintain our 3000' till 13 DME (7 mi out). It was late (early am), been up for 22 hours, body clock on 4 am, vision on charts not up to PAR (an eye examination 2 days later revealed the need for reading glasses). This misinfo reinforced our mistake of starting to let down as we were turning in on 34 at auburn. Contributing factors: fatigue (we were all very tired). Captain not questioning VOR location information. First officer not x-chking captain's INS/indications joining visibility final. Second officer not in loop with situation up front. Auburn airport not shown in plan view of sea 34R chart. Not resolving original question of ADF pointer information. How discovered: as we were turning toward final and starting letdown, picture did not look right to me. At same time captain asked for approach lights to be turned up. When we did not see lights brightening and knew something wrong, the same moment approach said climb and fly heading 280 degrees to join final. They had a low altitude alert on us. In just a few seconds we had runway 34R at sea in sight and continued to normal landing west/O further incident. Correction actions: put auburn on sea 34R plan view. Better x-chking/situational awareness (particularly when tired). Avoid visibility approachs at night unless positive of area, landmarks, airports, etc. Supplemental information from acn 153559: contributing factors: it had been a long day for all of us since it is not easy to rest during day hours if you are not used to it. We were tired and our concentration was not the best at that time of the night. Willingness to shoot a visibility approach to cooperate with ATC sep, neglecting at the same time what the INS were showing. As an F/east on his first approach to seat, I was trying to look outside and I never became fully acquainted with what the full localizer approach was about (G/south OTS). I erroneously assumed that the pilots up front were very familiar with the area. Corrective actions: as an F/east, I am planning to get more involved in what the pilots are doing west/O making any assumptions. When upgrading to first officer, avoiding visibility approachs as much as I can until I am completely reassured of my position with reference of my INS.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT FLT CREW ON VISUAL APCH INTO SEA SIGHTS WRONG ARPT AND STARTS DESCENT FOR APCH TOO EARLY AND IN THE WRONG DIRECTION. FLT CREW WAS VERY FATIGUED.

Narrative: WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR A VIS APCH (34R SEA-TAC) AND GIVEN MAINTAIN 3000' TILL 7 DME, CLRED FOR VIS APCH. WE HAD (WHAT WE THOUGHT) THE ARPT (BEACON AND RWY LIGHTS) IN SIGHT. NAVAIDS TUNED: #1 TO ILS 34R, #2 TO SEA VORTAC, ADF TO DONDO BEACON. AS WE PASSED ABEAM ARPT DOWNWIND, I DIDN'T THINK ADF WAS POINTING IN RIGHT DIRECTION, AND STARTED FLIPPING THROUGH CHARTS (QUICKLY) LOOKING AT VOR 16L/R AND INADVERTENTLY CAME UP WITH THE IDEA THAT THE VOR WAS 6 MI N OF ARPT AND WE NEEDED TO MAINTAIN OUR 3000' TILL 13 DME (7 MI OUT). IT WAS LATE (EARLY AM), BEEN UP FOR 22 HRS, BODY CLOCK ON 4 AM, VISION ON CHARTS NOT UP TO PAR (AN EYE EXAM 2 DAYS LATER REVEALED THE NEED FOR READING GLASSES). THIS MISINFO REINFORCED OUR MISTAKE OF STARTING TO LET DOWN AS WE WERE TURNING IN ON 34 AT AUBURN. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: FATIGUE (WE WERE ALL VERY TIRED). CAPT NOT QUESTIONING VOR LOCATION INFO. F/O NOT X-CHKING CAPT'S INS/INDICATIONS JOINING VIS FINAL. S/O NOT IN LOOP WITH SITUATION UP FRONT. AUBURN ARPT NOT SHOWN IN PLAN VIEW OF SEA 34R CHART. NOT RESOLVING ORIGINAL QUESTION OF ADF POINTER INFO. HOW DISCOVERED: AS WE WERE TURNING TOWARD FINAL AND STARTING LETDOWN, PICTURE DID NOT LOOK RIGHT TO ME. AT SAME TIME CAPT ASKED FOR APCH LIGHTS TO BE TURNED UP. WHEN WE DID NOT SEE LIGHTS BRIGHTENING AND KNEW SOMETHING WRONG, THE SAME MOMENT APCH SAID CLB AND FLY HDG 280 DEGS TO JOIN FINAL. THEY HAD A LOW ALT ALERT ON US. IN JUST A FEW SECS WE HAD RWY 34R AT SEA IN SIGHT AND CONTINUED TO NORMAL LNDG W/O FURTHER INCIDENT. CORRECTION ACTIONS: PUT AUBURN ON SEA 34R PLAN VIEW. BETTER X-CHKING/SITUATIONAL AWARENESS (PARTICULARLY WHEN TIRED). AVOID VIS APCHS AT NIGHT UNLESS POSITIVE OF AREA, LANDMARKS, ARPTS, ETC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 153559: CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: IT HAD BEEN A LONG DAY FOR ALL OF US SINCE IT IS NOT EASY TO REST DURING DAY HRS IF YOU ARE NOT USED TO IT. WE WERE TIRED AND OUR CONCENTRATION WAS NOT THE BEST AT THAT TIME OF THE NIGHT. WILLINGNESS TO SHOOT A VIS APCH TO COOPERATE WITH ATC SEP, NEGLECTING AT THE SAME TIME WHAT THE INS WERE SHOWING. AS AN F/E ON HIS FIRST APCH TO SEAT, I WAS TRYING TO LOOK OUTSIDE AND I NEVER BECAME FULLY ACQUAINTED WITH WHAT THE FULL LOC APCH WAS ABOUT (G/S OTS). I ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED THAT THE PLTS UP FRONT WERE VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE AREA. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: AS AN F/E, I AM PLANNING TO GET MORE INVOLVED IN WHAT THE PLTS ARE DOING W/O MAKING ANY ASSUMPTIONS. WHEN UPGRADING TO F/O, AVOIDING VIS APCHS AS MUCH AS I CAN UNTIL I AM COMPLETELY REASSURED OF MY POS WITH REF OF MY INS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.