Narrative:

I have experienced several instances recently of control towers rattling off instructions while we are on the landing rollout. Most of these involved requests to expedite or taxi instructions to follow after clearing the runway. These would be fairly innocuous if they did not come at a time when both crew members are busy with speed callout, reverse setting callouts, etc, and in the case of an first officer landing, the xfer of control of the aircraft to the captain. My response in most cases has been to ignore this chatter until we have the aircraft down to taxi speed and then to ask for repetition of any taxi instructions given. But this latest incident is the worst yet. During rollout at gso, runway 23, at about 100 KTS, we were told to hold short of runway 32, which crosses runway 23 at its south end. Since we were very busy at that moment I did not respond, but I did notice an aircraft on short final for runway 32 in my subsequent discussion with the tower they said that they would have sent the other aircraft around if I had responded in the negative. However, my silence was taken as an agreement to hold short! This looks like a case of some dangerous assumptions being made by gso tower about aircraft performance and even the possibility of us receiving and understanding their xmissions. Tower controllers need to be made more aware of what transpires in the cockpits of different airliners and aircraft and leave all instructions to flight phases before short final and after runway turnoff.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATC INSTRUCTIONS WERE ISSUED DURING CRITICAL LNDG PHASE.

Narrative: I HAVE EXPERIENCED SEVERAL INSTANCES RECENTLY OF CTL TWRS RATTLING OFF INSTRUCTIONS WHILE WE ARE ON THE LNDG ROLLOUT. MOST OF THESE INVOLVED REQUESTS TO EXPEDITE OR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS TO FOLLOW AFTER CLRING THE RWY. THESE WOULD BE FAIRLY INNOCUOUS IF THEY DID NOT COME AT A TIME WHEN BOTH CREW MEMBERS ARE BUSY WITH SPD CALLOUT, REVERSE SETTING CALLOUTS, ETC, AND IN THE CASE OF AN F/O LNDG, THE XFER OF CTL OF THE ACFT TO THE CAPT. MY RESPONSE IN MOST CASES HAS BEEN TO IGNORE THIS CHATTER UNTIL WE HAVE THE ACFT DOWN TO TAXI SPD AND THEN TO ASK FOR REPETITION OF ANY TAXI INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN. BUT THIS LATEST INCIDENT IS THE WORST YET. DURING ROLLOUT AT GSO, RWY 23, AT ABOUT 100 KTS, WE WERE TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 32, WHICH CROSSES RWY 23 AT ITS S END. SINCE WE WERE VERY BUSY AT THAT MOMENT I DID NOT RESPOND, BUT I DID NOTICE AN ACFT ON SHORT FINAL FOR RWY 32 IN MY SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH THE TWR THEY SAID THAT THEY WOULD HAVE SENT THE OTHER ACFT AROUND IF I HAD RESPONDED IN THE NEGATIVE. HOWEVER, MY SILENCE WAS TAKEN AS AN AGREEMENT TO HOLD SHORT! THIS LOOKS LIKE A CASE OF SOME DANGEROUS ASSUMPTIONS BEING MADE BY GSO TWR ABOUT ACFT PERFORMANCE AND EVEN THE POSSIBILITY OF US RECEIVING AND UNDERSTANDING THEIR XMISSIONS. TWR CTLRS NEED TO BE MADE MORE AWARE OF WHAT TRANSPIRES IN THE COCKPITS OF DIFFERENT AIRLINERS AND ACFT AND LEAVE ALL INSTRUCTIONS TO FLT PHASES BEFORE SHORT FINAL AND AFTER RWY TURNOFF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.