Narrative:

During descent and approach for landing spdbrakes were deployed by PF large transport to facilitate altitude loss and speed reduction. Aircraft had been vectored to an approximately mid field position on down wind leg at approximately 7000' AGL. Heading vectors, descent altitudes and speed reductions were being issued by approach control. Prior to turning a base leg PF called for flap extension while spdbrakes were deployed. After initial flap deployment, warning horn began sounding. Horn didn't begin sounding with simultaneous movement of flap lever; and I believe this contributed to crew being unable to immediately recognize its source. This substantiated by fact that when horn began sounding, no crew member at that time associated it with being a spdbrake/flap warning horn. Attempts in identifying source of warning while continuing approach were unsuccessful. It became necessary to silence warning horn with C/B. An approximately 5 mi final approach utilizing ILS G/south and localizer information was flown. It was noted by crew that aircraft attitude was slightly higher than normal, as well as fuel flow. Aircraft buffet similar to that experienced in light turbulence was also noted. All normal procedure checklists were completed with crew agreement that aircraft was properly configured for landing though source of warning horn could not be determined. On landing rollout PF noted spdbrake handle had not been stowed during the approach. Handle had been at the mid travel position throughout the approach. I believe the significant contributing factors were crew fatigue aggravated by the time of day. The captain and second officer had been on duty for 10 hours. The time of day for the captain and first officer was xd:00 am, for the second officer it was xc:00 am. The cockpit lighting was rigged for night flying and the spdbrake lever could easily be overlooked. Supplemental information from acn 154466. Flew all nighter from slc to atl, departing approximately sf:30 am to arrive in atl about xa:00 am (EDT). Until the approach the flight was routine and uneventful. The most difficult task to this point was trying to stay awake. At approximately 10000' MSL (9000' AGL) further descent clearance was received and the captain extended the spdbrakes to lose airspeed and altitude. As airspeed slowed he called for flaps which I extended. Neither of us realized he still had the spdbrakes out as the flap warning horn sounded. The captain directed the second officer to pull the aural warning C/B and we continued the approach thinking it was a faulty warning. Nothing else seemed unusual to me except on short final we seemed to have a high nose attitude. The landing was uneventful until the captain reached for the spdbrake handle after T/D and then found them already extended. I believe the main reason for this sequence of errors and questionable decisions was the fatigue of the entire crew. Supplemental information from acn 154264. Situation arose during the final leg of a 3 leg night trip. During confign for landing warning horn sounded. I pulled the cut-out lever and hit the altitude warning silence button to no avail. Captain told me to pull the C/B which did silence the horn. During completion of landing checklist captain, first officer and I noticed unusual buffet and a nose high final approach attitude. All crew members rechked the landing checklist and I verified proper led extension lights. Although attitude and buffet were unusual, aircraft was completely ctlable and the approach was continued to a landing. Immediately after T/D, captain discovered the spdbrake handle out of the detent. Contributing factors. Fatigue, xc:00 body time. Difficult to adjust to a night schedule. Time compression, large descent in-close to field to facilitate visual approach rushed us in completion of approach and landing checklists in conjunction with approach/landing tasks. Darkness hampered our ability to see the south.B. Handle out of the detent. Recognition, failed to recognize the symptoms. Fully investigate the cause of any warnings, such as the horn, buffet and nose high attitude. If it occurs during landing, go around if more time is needed. Be especially cautious at night or when fatigued as it often takes longer to sort things out. Callback conversation with reporter revealedthe following: callback 154025. Reporter explained why fatigue was a contributing factor in this incident. He did mention that he gave control of the aircraft to his first officer during approach while he adjusted his seat and then continued with the approach and landing. Callback 154264. This callback revealed that the second officer is new to airline flying and new to the large transport. He said that, in the future, he would be much more insistent that a go-around be performed although he admitted he was unsure of how the aircraft might perform the go-around with the spoilers deployed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT WAS LANDED WITH THE SPEED BRAKES PARTIALLY EXTENDED.

Narrative: DURING DSNT AND APCH FOR LNDG SPDBRAKES WERE DEPLOYED BY PF LGT TO FACILITATE ALT LOSS AND SPD REDUCTION. ACFT HAD BEEN VECTORED TO AN APPROX MID FIELD POS ON DOWN WIND LEG AT APPROX 7000' AGL. HDG VECTORS, DSNT ALTS AND SPD REDUCTIONS WERE BEING ISSUED BY APCH CTL. PRIOR TO TURNING A BASE LEG PF CALLED FOR FLAP EXTENSION WHILE SPDBRAKES WERE DEPLOYED. AFTER INITIAL FLAP DEPLOYMENT, WARNING HORN BEGAN SOUNDING. HORN DIDN'T BEGIN SOUNDING WITH SIMULTANEOUS MOVEMENT OF FLAP LEVER; AND I BELIEVE THIS CONTRIBUTED TO CREW BEING UNABLE TO IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZE ITS SOURCE. THIS SUBSTANTIATED BY FACT THAT WHEN HORN BEGAN SOUNDING, NO CREW MEMBER AT THAT TIME ASSOCIATED IT WITH BEING A SPDBRAKE/FLAP WARNING HORN. ATTEMPTS IN IDENTIFYING SOURCE OF WARNING WHILE CONTINUING APCH WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. IT BECAME NECESSARY TO SILENCE WARNING HORN WITH C/B. AN APPROX 5 MI FINAL APCH UTILIZING ILS G/S AND LOC INFO WAS FLOWN. IT WAS NOTED BY CREW THAT ACFT ATTITUDE WAS SLIGHTLY HIGHER THAN NORMAL, AS WELL AS FUEL FLOW. ACFT BUFFET SIMILAR TO THAT EXPERIENCED IN LIGHT TURB WAS ALSO NOTED. ALL NORMAL PROC CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED WITH CREW AGREEMENT THAT ACFT WAS PROPERLY CONFIGURED FOR LNDG THOUGH SOURCE OF WARNING HORN COULD NOT BE DETERMINED. ON LNDG ROLLOUT PF NOTED SPDBRAKE HANDLE HAD NOT BEEN STOWED DURING THE APCH. HANDLE HAD BEEN AT THE MID TRAVEL POS THROUGHOUT THE APCH. I BELIEVE THE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE CREW FATIGUE AGGRAVATED BY THE TIME OF DAY. THE CAPT AND S/O HAD BEEN ON DUTY FOR 10 HRS. THE TIME OF DAY FOR THE CAPT AND F/O WAS XD:00 AM, FOR THE S/O IT WAS XC:00 AM. THE COCKPIT LIGHTING WAS RIGGED FOR NIGHT FLYING AND THE SPDBRAKE LEVER COULD EASILY BE OVERLOOKED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 154466. FLEW ALL NIGHTER FROM SLC TO ATL, DEPARTING APPROX SF:30 AM TO ARRIVE IN ATL ABOUT XA:00 AM (EDT). UNTIL THE APCH THE FLT WAS ROUTINE AND UNEVENTFUL. THE MOST DIFFICULT TASK TO THIS POINT WAS TRYING TO STAY AWAKE. AT APPROX 10000' MSL (9000' AGL) FURTHER DSNT CLRNC WAS RECEIVED AND THE CAPT EXTENDED THE SPDBRAKES TO LOSE AIRSPD AND ALT. AS AIRSPD SLOWED HE CALLED FOR FLAPS WHICH I EXTENDED. NEITHER OF US REALIZED HE STILL HAD THE SPDBRAKES OUT AS THE FLAP WARNING HORN SOUNDED. THE CAPT DIRECTED THE S/O TO PULL THE AURAL WARNING C/B AND WE CONTINUED THE APCH THINKING IT WAS A FAULTY WARNING. NOTHING ELSE SEEMED UNUSUAL TO ME EXCEPT ON SHORT FINAL WE SEEMED TO HAVE A HIGH NOSE ATTITUDE. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL UNTIL THE CAPT REACHED FOR THE SPDBRAKE HANDLE AFTER T/D AND THEN FOUND THEM ALREADY EXTENDED. I BELIEVE THE MAIN REASON FOR THIS SEQUENCE OF ERRORS AND QUESTIONABLE DECISIONS WAS THE FATIGUE OF THE ENTIRE CREW. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 154264. SITUATION AROSE DURING THE FINAL LEG OF A 3 LEG NIGHT TRIP. DURING CONFIGN FOR LNDG WARNING HORN SOUNDED. I PULLED THE CUT-OUT LEVER AND HIT THE ALT WARNING SILENCE BUTTON TO NO AVAIL. CAPT TOLD ME TO PULL THE C/B WHICH DID SILENCE THE HORN. DURING COMPLETION OF LNDG CHKLIST CAPT, F/O AND I NOTICED UNUSUAL BUFFET AND A NOSE HIGH FINAL APCH ATTITUDE. ALL CREW MEMBERS RECHKED THE LNDG CHKLIST AND I VERIFIED PROPER LED EXTENSION LIGHTS. ALTHOUGH ATTITUDE AND BUFFET WERE UNUSUAL, ACFT WAS COMPLETELY CTLABLE AND THE APCH WAS CONTINUED TO A LNDG. IMMEDIATELY AFTER T/D, CAPT DISCOVERED THE SPDBRAKE HANDLE OUT OF THE DETENT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. FATIGUE, XC:00 BODY TIME. DIFFICULT TO ADJUST TO A NIGHT SCHEDULE. TIME COMPRESSION, LARGE DSNT IN-CLOSE TO FIELD TO FACILITATE VISUAL APCH RUSHED US IN COMPLETION OF APCH AND LNDG CHKLISTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH APCH/LNDG TASKS. DARKNESS HAMPERED OUR ABILITY TO SEE THE S.B. HANDLE OUT OF THE DETENT. RECOGNITION, FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE SYMPTOMS. FULLY INVESTIGATE THE CAUSE OF ANY WARNINGS, SUCH AS THE HORN, BUFFET AND NOSE HIGH ATTITUDE. IF IT OCCURS DURING LNDG, GO AROUND IF MORE TIME IS NEEDED. BE ESPECIALLY CAUTIOUS AT NIGHT OR WHEN FATIGUED AS IT OFTEN TAKES LONGER TO SORT THINGS OUT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALEDTHE FOLLOWING: CALLBACK 154025. RPTR EXPLAINED WHY FATIGUE WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN THIS INCIDENT. HE DID MENTION THAT HE GAVE CTL OF THE ACFT TO HIS F/O DURING APCH WHILE HE ADJUSTED HIS SEAT AND THEN CONTINUED WITH THE APCH AND LNDG. CALLBACK 154264. THIS CALLBACK REVEALED THAT THE S/O IS NEW TO AIRLINE FLYING AND NEW TO THE LGT. HE SAID THAT, IN THE FUTURE, HE WOULD BE MUCH MORE INSISTENT THAT A GO-AROUND BE PERFORMED ALTHOUGH HE ADMITTED HE WAS UNSURE OF HOW THE ACFT MIGHT PERFORM THE GO-AROUND WITH THE SPOILERS DEPLOYED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.