Narrative:

At nrt airport in japan, our crew aborted takeoff on runway 16 prior to V1 due to a 'red' gear door warning light illuminating on the pilot's forward instrument panel. The abort was successfully completed with no blown fuse plugs or tires, or any injuries. The crews judgement was challenged by the company and given a check ride the following day. I feel that we acted properly and within established procedures in initiating the abort. If the illumination of this light is of little importance, as was and is the company's position, then I feel that this lights color should be changed to something other than red. Supplemental information from acn 154069. A malfunctioning proximity switch was found and replaced. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. Reporter said that the light came on about 5-6 KTS prior to V1, and that the captain acted immediately to abort. The aircraft was stopped well short of the runway end. The flight was unable to continue because the brakes needed one hour to cool and nrt had a curfew that went into effect shortly after the incident. The company contended that the gear door light was insufficient reason to abort at that speed. They checked the captain out the next day and counseled the flight crew on the manner in which the factors that affect a decision to abort change as the aircraft rolls faster and faster down the runway. Company check airman provided the crew with a number of printed articles on the topic. Reporter says they took it as a learning experience because it was good information, but points out that his airline's manuals do not promote the same philosophy on takeoff aborts. He said that he stands by the captain's decision because the light came on so close to V1 that the captain did not have time to evaluate what degree of importance it represented.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF ACR WDB ABORTS TKOF FROM NRT IN JAPAN DUE TO RED WARNING LIGHT THAT CAME ON JUST BEFORE V1. COMPANY CLAIMS THAT ABORT WAS UNNECESSARY.

Narrative: AT NRT ARPT IN JAPAN, OUR CREW ABORTED TKOF ON RWY 16 PRIOR TO V1 DUE TO A 'RED' GEAR DOOR WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATING ON THE PLT'S FORWARD INSTRUMENT PANEL. THE ABORT WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED WITH NO BLOWN FUSE PLUGS OR TIRES, OR ANY INJURIES. THE CREWS JUDGEMENT WAS CHALLENGED BY THE COMPANY AND GIVEN A CHK RIDE THE FOLLOWING DAY. I FEEL THAT WE ACTED PROPERLY AND WITHIN ESTABLISHED PROCS IN INITIATING THE ABORT. IF THE ILLUMINATION OF THIS LIGHT IS OF LITTLE IMPORTANCE, AS WAS AND IS THE COMPANY'S POS, THEN I FEEL THAT THIS LIGHTS COLOR SHOULD BE CHANGED TO SOMETHING OTHER THAN RED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 154069. A MALFUNCTIONING PROX SWITCH WAS FOUND AND REPLACED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. RPTR SAID THAT THE LIGHT CAME ON ABOUT 5-6 KTS PRIOR TO V1, AND THAT THE CAPT ACTED IMMEDIATELY TO ABORT. THE ACFT WAS STOPPED WELL SHORT OF THE RWY END. THE FLT WAS UNABLE TO CONTINUE BECAUSE THE BRAKES NEEDED ONE HR TO COOL AND NRT HAD A CURFEW THAT WENT INTO EFFECT SHORTLY AFTER THE INCIDENT. THE COMPANY CONTENDED THAT THE GEAR DOOR LIGHT WAS INSUFFICIENT REASON TO ABORT AT THAT SPD. THEY CHKED THE CAPT OUT THE NEXT DAY AND COUNSELED THE FLC ON THE MANNER IN WHICH THE FACTORS THAT AFFECT A DECISION TO ABORT CHANGE AS THE ACFT ROLLS FASTER AND FASTER DOWN THE RWY. COMPANY CHK AIRMAN PROVIDED THE CREW WITH A NUMBER OF PRINTED ARTICLES ON THE TOPIC. RPTR SAYS THEY TOOK IT AS A LEARNING EXPERIENCE BECAUSE IT WAS GOOD INFO, BUT POINTS OUT THAT HIS AIRLINE'S MANUALS DO NOT PROMOTE THE SAME PHILOSOPHY ON TKOF ABORTS. HE SAID THAT HE STANDS BY THE CAPT'S DECISION BECAUSE THE LIGHT CAME ON SO CLOSE TO V1 THAT THE CAPT DID NOT HAVE TIME TO EVALUATE WHAT DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE IT REPRESENTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.