Narrative:

Aircraft X departed southeast bound. I instructed the aircraft to identify but two aircraft flashed identification simultaneously; one in my airspace and one in the adjacent departure controller's airspace. I had to wait for all the identing to stop and have aircraft X identify again to establish radar contact. Aircraft X is a C172; an aircraft type known to be unable to fly over the atlantic ocean. The airport is 3NM from the shoreline and it took longer than three flying miles to identify the aircraft and provide alternate instructions to get them back over land. It took unnecessary focus on one aircraft to complete the radar identification process because of constraints in the 7110.65 and local requirements.during a recent external compliance verification (ecv) the TRACON was found non-compliant with respect to radar identification methods; specifically departures. The vast majority of our traffic remains in our local practice areas or with our satellite towers; all of which are assigned beacon codes from our local subset that do not generate fdio (flight data input/output) flight progress strips (fps).our current procedure requires our local controllers to ensure departure aircraft have the correct auto-acquired data block information associated with the radar target prior to switching communications to departure. Although this is 100% safe and there is no question about radar identification; our procedure was ruled out of compliance with jo 7110.65 paragraph 5-3-2(a). The following addition to paragraph 5-3-2 would resolve the problem. 'Tower controllers with ctrds (certified tower radar displays) ensure that auto-acquired data block information corresponds with the radar target of the departure aircraft. Procedures for this method must be outlined in a local facility directive or LOA.'with the above addition; local control knows which radar target is which departure aircraft and if the correct data block information is displayed; there can be no confusion on the part of the departure controller as to which aircraft is which. Since the facility has decommissioned our manual drop tubes; we have run operations without ever having our procedures questioned. The method is sound and our track record demonstrates such. The mitigation contained in a notice as a result of our noncompliance introduces unnecessary risk into our airspace without a change to the 7110.65. Identification remains in the data block for 20 seconds; which is not site adaptable. If the departure corridor is shared between two controllers and two aircraft identify simultaneously; radar identification is questionable given our current procedures because we have to play ignorant; disregarding the correct data block information attached to the correct radar target. This forces the departure controller(s) to stare at departure data blocks for idents; taking focus away from the rest of the airspace. Even with a standalone departure controller; identify drastically slows down the ability to identification aircraft and reduces the efficiency of the system.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DAB TRACON Controller reported new radar identification rules delayed the ability to identify an aircraft for service as the aircraft flew more than 3 miles offshore.

Narrative: Aircraft X departed southeast bound. I instructed the aircraft to IDENT but two aircraft flashed ID simultaneously; one in my airspace and one in the adjacent departure controller's airspace. I had to wait for all the IDENTing to stop and have Aircraft X IDENT again to establish radar contact. Aircraft X is a C172; an aircraft type known to be unable to fly over the Atlantic Ocean. The airport is 3NM from the shoreline and it took longer than three flying miles to identify the aircraft and provide alternate instructions to get them back over land. It took unnecessary focus on one aircraft to complete the radar identification process because of constraints in the 7110.65 and local requirements.During a recent External Compliance Verification (ECV) the TRACON was found non-compliant with respect to radar identification methods; specifically departures. The vast majority of our traffic remains in our local practice areas or with our satellite towers; all of which are assigned beacon codes from our local subset that do not generate FDIO (Flight Data Input/Output) Flight Progress Strips (FPS).Our current procedure requires our local controllers to ensure departure aircraft have the correct auto-acquired data block information associated with the radar target prior to switching communications to departure. Although this is 100% safe and there is no question about radar identification; our procedure was ruled out of compliance with JO 7110.65 paragraph 5-3-2(a). The following addition to paragraph 5-3-2 would resolve the problem. 'Tower controllers with CTRDs (Certified Tower Radar Displays) ensure that auto-acquired data block information corresponds with the radar target of the departure aircraft. Procedures for this method must be outlined in a local facility directive or LOA.'With the above addition; local control knows which radar target is which departure aircraft and if the correct data block information is displayed; there can be no confusion on the part of the departure controller as to which aircraft is which. Since the facility has decommissioned our manual drop tubes; we have run operations without ever having our procedures questioned. The method is sound and our track record demonstrates such. The mitigation contained in a notice as a result of our noncompliance introduces unnecessary risk into our airspace without a change to the 7110.65. ID remains in the data block for 20 seconds; which is not site adaptable. If the departure corridor is shared between two controllers and two aircraft IDENT simultaneously; radar identification is questionable given our current procedures because we have to play ignorant; disregarding the correct data block information attached to the correct radar target. This forces the departure controller(s) to stare at departure data blocks for IDENTs; taking focus away from the rest of the airspace. Even with a standalone departure controller; IDENT drastically slows down the ability to ID aircraft and reduces the efficiency of the system.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.