37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1546909 |
Time | |
Date | 201805 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | SEA.Airport |
State Reference | WA |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Final Approach |
Route In Use | Visual Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200 Flight Crew Total 14700 Flight Crew Type 6500 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach |
Narrative:
At the end of a long duty day; I felt capable since I had 9 hours of sleep the night before and felt rested. But we took off 25 minutes before our out of duty time due to maintenance issues. At no time did I feel fatigued during this flight but looking back; fatigue played a part in this problem. We departed late due to a maintenance issue. We departed directly behind a company 757 flight and got vectored behind them multiple times enroute to destination. On final approach; the aircraft ahead of the 757 had a nose gear steering failure and could not turn off the runway. Tower then told the company 757 to go around and offered us a runway change. At that point we both began laughing about the 757 having to go around and we were going to land ahead of them.the point that I normally would configure is when we were offered the runway change. I then directed the first officer to disregard attempting to load the runway change into the FMGC (flight management guidance computer) and told him I would fly the approach visually. I knew that center runway touchdown zone was closer to me than left and began to descend at a more rapid rate to make the PAPI (precision approach path indicator) look correct. My attention was channelized on the acquisition of the proper glide path of the new runway. I really felt I was doing a great job at this until the master caution and associated warning bells began to ring around 600 feet. I immediately knew what I had done wrong and began the go around. The airplane configuration at the point of the master caution was only flaps 2 with gear up. I can honestly say that if not for this gear warning system tonight; I would have landed gear up. I was so concentrated on making this runway change and landing that I forgot to properly configure the aircraft. The go around was expertly assisted by the first officer and I needed the help to ensure proper aircraft operation because I was stuck back at the point of the error in disbelief that I could do something that stupid. The go around was eventually executed properly and the following landing was normal and uneventful. Fatigue was unrecognized tonight but played a factor since I would have been able to direct the proper configuration had this been the first flight of the day.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: An Airbus Captain reported initiating a go-around after receiving a Master Caution and realizing the landing gear had not been lowered.
Narrative: At the end of a long duty day; I felt capable since I had 9 hours of sleep the night before and felt rested. But we took off 25 minutes before our Out of Duty time due to maintenance issues. At no time did I feel fatigued during this flight but looking back; fatigue played a part in this problem. We departed late due to a maintenance issue. We departed directly behind a company 757 flight and got vectored behind them multiple times enroute to destination. On final approach; the aircraft ahead of the 757 had a nose gear steering failure and could not turn off the runway. Tower then told the company 757 to go around and offered us a runway change. At that point we both began laughing about the 757 having to go around and we were going to land ahead of them.The point that I normally would configure is when we were offered the runway change. I then directed the First Officer to disregard attempting to load the runway change into the FMGC (Flight Management Guidance Computer) and told him I would fly the approach visually. I knew that center runway touchdown zone was closer to me than left and began to descend at a more rapid rate to make the PAPI (Precision Approach Path Indicator) look correct. My attention was channelized on the acquisition of the proper glide path of the new runway. I really felt I was doing a great job at this until the Master Caution and associated warning bells began to ring around 600 feet. I immediately knew what I had done wrong and began the go around. The airplane configuration at the point of the Master Caution was only Flaps 2 with gear up. I can honestly say that if not for this gear warning system tonight; I would have landed gear up. I was so concentrated on making this runway change and landing that I forgot to properly configure the aircraft. The go around was expertly assisted by the First Officer and I needed the help to ensure proper aircraft operation because I was stuck back at the point of the error in disbelief that I could do something that stupid. The go around was eventually executed properly and the following landing was normal and uneventful. Fatigue was unrecognized tonight but played a factor since I would have been able to direct the proper configuration had this been the first flight of the day.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.