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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1554599 |
Time | |
Date | 201806 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.TRACON |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Cessna Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Route In Use | Direct |
Flight Plan | None |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Electrical Power |
Person 1 | |
Function | Single Pilot Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Commercial Flight Crew Multiengine |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 144 Flight Crew Total 1342 Flight Crew Type 382 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing |
Narrative:
Approximately 20 minutes into the flight I observed a low volt annunciator. Ten seconds after the annunciator light illuminated; the aircraft had a complete electrical failure. I appropriately dealt with the electrical failure by accomplishing the procedures for dealing with an electrical system emergency procedures alternator failure (dual). Upon completing the completing the checklist I still did not receive any power in either alternator or battery. I knew the landing gear would not extend because the gear is electrically actuated. Still circling; I reviewed the checklist for situations where the landing gear will not extend hydraulically. While reviewing this checklist; I brought a passenger from the back of the plane to assist with reading the checklist. After completing the checklist and accomplishing the procedure; the landing gear still seemed to be in the up and locked position. I then contacted a [company] pilot and mechanic via cell phone and had them contact ZZZ; so I could perform a low pass in order to determine if the gear was extended. After the low pass; the gear was still retracted. Once again; I performed the landing gear will not extend hydraulically checklist. At this point I had to attempt to lower the gear via of the T handle. I knew the T handle was difficult to pull; nonetheless; I tried pulling it as hard as I could. I knew that the gear was still not extended but I decided to do one low pass over ZZZ to see if the gear was extended. Unfortunately it was not. After the second low pass and knowing the T handle was broken I knew the only option was to fly back to [departure airport] and try to get the electrical system back online. As I was flying I briefed the passengers on the circumstances that had arisen. When I returned to [departure airport] I decided to circle for another hour and thirty minutes since the aircraft had extra fuel to burn off and was attempting to troubleshoot the complete electrical failure (dual). While performing this procedure I noticed a slight output in the right alternator of 5 amps. Not knowing the exact amount of fuel at this point in the flight; I was subjectively conservative concerning the amount of fuel burned. I made the decision to go in and land because the amount of power out to the right alternator was insufficient. At this point; I again briefed the passengers that we would do one low pass then come around and land with the gear retracted. I also briefed; with the passenger sitting next to me; the emergency landing procedures forced landing (complete power loss) checklist I would be using to perform the belly-up landing as since I was going to be shutting down both engines. After the low pass; I came around and performed the emergency landing procedure forced landing (complete loss) checklist and landed the plane safely on runway. Once the plane came to a complete stop I got out of the plane and escorted my passengers immediately away from the plane.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Twin Cessna pilot reported a complete electrical system failure and the inability to extend the landing gear led to a gear up landing.
Narrative: Approximately 20 minutes into the flight I observed a low volt annunciator. Ten seconds after the annunciator light illuminated; the aircraft had a complete electrical failure. I appropriately dealt with the electrical failure by accomplishing the procedures for dealing with an electrical system emergency procedures alternator failure (dual). Upon completing the completing the checklist I still did not receive any power in either alternator or battery. I knew the landing gear would not extend because the gear is electrically actuated. Still circling; I reviewed the checklist for situations where the landing gear will not extend hydraulically. While reviewing this checklist; I brought a passenger from the back of the plane to assist with reading the checklist. After completing the checklist and accomplishing the procedure; the landing gear still seemed to be in the up and locked position. I then contacted a [company] pilot and mechanic via cell phone and had them contact ZZZ; so I could perform a low pass in order to determine if the gear was extended. After the low pass; the gear was still retracted. Once again; I performed the landing gear will not extend hydraulically checklist. At this point I had to attempt to lower the gear via of the T handle. I knew the T handle was difficult to pull; nonetheless; I tried pulling it as hard as I could. I Knew that the gear was still not extended but I decided to do one low pass over ZZZ to see if the gear was extended. Unfortunately it was not. After the second low pass and knowing the T handle was broken I knew the only option was to fly back to [departure airport] and try to get the electrical system back online. As I was flying I briefed the passengers on the circumstances that had arisen. When I returned to [departure airport] I decided to circle for another hour and thirty minutes since the aircraft had extra fuel to burn off and was attempting to troubleshoot the complete electrical failure (dual). While performing this procedure I noticed a slight output in the right alternator of 5 amps. Not knowing the exact amount of fuel at this point in the flight; I was subjectively conservative concerning the amount of fuel burned. I made the decision to go in and land because the amount of power out to the right alternator was insufficient. At this point; I again briefed the passengers that we would do one low pass then come around and land with the gear retracted. I also briefed; with the passenger sitting next to me; the emergency landing procedures forced landing (complete power loss) checklist I would be using to perform the belly-up landing as since I was going to be shutting down both engines. After the low pass; I came around and performed the emergency landing procedure forced landing (complete loss) checklist and landed the plane safely on runway. Once the plane came to a complete stop I got out of the plane and escorted my passengers immediately away from the plane.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.