Narrative:

Visibility 3-4 mi all morning, very hazy. Cps is VFR tower not even a BRITE. Sequencing and sep was difficult due to visibility. Decision was being made as to whether the weather was IFR or VFR due to visibility. Traffic was an small aircraft inbound from practice area (south) an small aircraft departing to practice area, and an small aircraft on parallel runway doing touch and goes. Departure was advised field would probably be IFR by the time he returned; he elected to remain in pattern. Another small aircraft X called inbound from northeast with 'neg ATIS.' I read him as 'current' WX a visibility of 2 3/4 fh. He requested SVFR. I told him to report 5 northeast (at edge of control zone) for further instructions. When small aircraft X reported 5 northeast, there were 3 VFR small aircraft's in pattern to land. I gave small aircraft X VFR instructions to report 2 northeast (for left base runway 12L). Unknown to me, at that time ATIS broadcast had been on air for less than 1 min with 2 3/4 visibility; WX report was taken about 5 mins before that. All 4 aircraft landed west/O incident. Safety was never an issue. Cps letter of agreement with stl ATCT states, in part, that when cps control zone is in effect (IFR conditions) there can only be one aircraft within control zone at a time. The sequence of events was uncovered while listening to the tape for a subsequent pilot deviation which is to be forwarded to FSDO. I was playing a word game with small aircraft X, as often happens to 'make it right' on the tapes. I didn't want to declare the field IFR until the 3 small aircraft's were on the ground and it seemed pointless to issue VFR instructions to small transport X when I knew it would be 'officially' IFR by the time he reported at 2 mi. I was primarily concerned with providing a service to the aircraft, getting them the lndgs they wanted as much as possible and as expeditiously as possible. I had forgotten that I had already issued IFR WX to small aircraft X and therefore never told him either that the field was still VFR or issue him a SVFR clearance. As a very experienced controller at this particular facility, as well as an experienced flight instrument, I have a history of bending over backwards to help the pilots get as much out of their flight as they request, sometimes to the point of hurting myself as a controller while I help them as pilots. A more careful coordination with the flight data person taking the WX as to exactly at what point the field would be IFR, and also less effort in expediting aircraft when my traffic picture dictates a delay, would both have decreased the chance that this would have happened. Also ATC equipment developed in this century would help. I have been hearing 'BRITE scope next yr' every yr since I've been here (1982). We had 3 'firm' dates for installation in late 1989 and early 1990. For several reasons, had I been able to see or locate aircraft (all morning) with a BRITE, none of this would have happened. I controled inappropriately, I don't deny, inadvertent though it was. Nevertheless, the FAA treats VFR towers with no respect or regard it is not uncommon to have 10 aircraft using 2 runways at once here with no aid of BRITE. Additionally, the tower is short and there are trees which obliterate view of left base for runway 30 left and right. Will it take an accident here for FAA to give us the help we need to function?

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ARPT BECOMES IFR WITH ACFT IN THE TRAFFIC PATTERN TRAINING. CTLR IS RELUCTANT TO STOP TRAINING.

Narrative: VISIBILITY 3-4 MI ALL MORNING, VERY HAZY. CPS IS VFR TWR NOT EVEN A BRITE. SEQUENCING AND SEP WAS DIFFICULT DUE TO VISIBILITY. DECISION WAS BEING MADE AS TO WHETHER THE WEATHER WAS IFR OR VFR DUE TO VISIBILITY. TFC WAS AN SMA INBND FROM PRACTICE AREA (S) AN SMA DEPARTING TO PRACTICE AREA, AND AN SMA ON PARALLEL RWY DOING TOUCH AND GOES. DEP WAS ADVISED FIELD WOULD PROBABLY BE IFR BY THE TIME HE RETURNED; HE ELECTED TO REMAIN IN PATTERN. ANOTHER SMA X CALLED INBND FROM NE WITH 'NEG ATIS.' I READ HIM AS 'CURRENT' WX A VISIBILITY OF 2 3/4 FH. HE REQUESTED SVFR. I TOLD HIM TO RPT 5 NE (AT EDGE OF CTL ZONE) FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. WHEN SMA X RPTED 5 NE, THERE WERE 3 VFR SMA'S IN PATTERN TO LAND. I GAVE SMA X VFR INSTRUCTIONS TO RPT 2 NE (FOR L BASE RWY 12L). UNKNOWN TO ME, AT THAT TIME ATIS BROADCAST HAD BEEN ON AIR FOR LESS THAN 1 MIN WITH 2 3/4 VISIBILITY; WX RPT WAS TAKEN ABOUT 5 MINS BEFORE THAT. ALL 4 ACFT LANDED W/O INCIDENT. SAFETY WAS NEVER AN ISSUE. CPS LETTER OF AGREEMENT WITH STL ATCT STATES, IN PART, THAT WHEN CPS CTL ZONE IS IN EFFECT (IFR CONDITIONS) THERE CAN ONLY BE ONE ACFT WITHIN CTL ZONE AT A TIME. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WAS UNCOVERED WHILE LISTENING TO THE TAPE FOR A SUBSEQUENT PLT DEV WHICH IS TO BE FORWARDED TO FSDO. I WAS PLAYING A WORD GAME WITH SMA X, AS OFTEN HAPPENS TO 'MAKE IT RIGHT' ON THE TAPES. I DIDN'T WANT TO DECLARE THE FIELD IFR UNTIL THE 3 SMA'S WERE ON THE GND AND IT SEEMED POINTLESS TO ISSUE VFR INSTRUCTIONS TO SMT X WHEN I KNEW IT WOULD BE 'OFFICIALLY' IFR BY THE TIME HE RPTED AT 2 MI. I WAS PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH PROVIDING A SVC TO THE ACFT, GETTING THEM THE LNDGS THEY WANTED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AND AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE. I HAD FORGOTTEN THAT I HAD ALREADY ISSUED IFR WX TO SMA X AND THEREFORE NEVER TOLD HIM EITHER THAT THE FIELD WAS STILL VFR OR ISSUE HIM A SVFR CLRNC. AS A VERY EXPERIENCED CTLR AT THIS PARTICULAR FAC, AS WELL AS AN EXPERIENCED FLT INSTR, I HAVE A HISTORY OF BENDING OVER BACKWARDS TO HELP THE PLTS GET AS MUCH OUT OF THEIR FLT AS THEY REQUEST, SOMETIMES TO THE POINT OF HURTING MYSELF AS A CTLR WHILE I HELP THEM AS PLTS. A MORE CAREFUL COORD WITH THE FLT DATA PERSON TAKING THE WX AS TO EXACTLY AT WHAT POINT THE FIELD WOULD BE IFR, AND ALSO LESS EFFORT IN EXPEDITING ACFT WHEN MY TFC PICTURE DICTATES A DELAY, WOULD BOTH HAVE DECREASED THE CHANCE THAT THIS WOULD HAVE HAPPENED. ALSO ATC EQUIP DEVELOPED IN THIS CENTURY WOULD HELP. I HAVE BEEN HEARING 'BRITE SCOPE NEXT YR' EVERY YR SINCE I'VE BEEN HERE (1982). WE HAD 3 'FIRM' DATES FOR INSTALLATION IN LATE 1989 AND EARLY 1990. FOR SEVERAL REASONS, HAD I BEEN ABLE TO SEE OR LOCATE ACFT (ALL MORNING) WITH A BRITE, NONE OF THIS WOULD HAVE HAPPENED. I CTLED INAPPROPRIATELY, I DON'T DENY, INADVERTENT THOUGH IT WAS. NEVERTHELESS, THE FAA TREATS VFR TWRS WITH NO RESPECT OR REGARD IT IS NOT UNCOMMON TO HAVE 10 ACFT USING 2 RWYS AT ONCE HERE WITH NO AID OF BRITE. ADDITIONALLY, THE TWR IS SHORT AND THERE ARE TREES WHICH OBLITERATE VIEW OF L BASE FOR RWY 30 L AND R. WILL IT TAKE AN ACCIDENT HERE FOR FAA TO GIVE US THE HELP WE NEED TO FUNCTION?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.