Narrative:

After pushback from the gate, we started #3 engine, during which we were told more bags would be coming. The #2 engine was then started followed by a brief discussion of taxiing with just 2 engines because of possible departure delays. This also included a comment amongst us about hydraulic brake pressure with only 1 a-pump operating. The captain then requested a-pumps on and taxi clearance which was soon received after another aircraft passed by. We then began to taxi, but stopped after moving about 1' after the mechanic still on the ground interphone commanded us to stop. What resulted was the aircraft striking a baggage belt loader at the forward cargo pit, which punctured a 5' diameter hole in the leading edge of the right wing fairing. The baggage loader had no significant damage and there was no personnel injuries. This incident seems to have occurred because of some individually minor distrs adding up to cause a disruption in the usual routine of events. Prior to and while pushing back, attention was given to a VOR problem. With that, plus the previously mentioned engine starting/taxi discussions, the almost casual report of more bags to be loaded became lost in the hustle and bustle of subsequent events. After what was several moments since the captain saw the tug/towbar return to the terminal, he thought he had also received the accompanying salute and release from guidance. Since standard operating procedures don't fully address a break occurring in those procedures, a pitfall was set up. That is, even though the forward cargo door light was illuminated, the F/east failed to see it since he was involved in after engine start procedures. In this case, the 1 oversight of a proper taxi clearance was not discovered because a lack of any backup procedures for non-routine situations. To prevent future events like this, more emphasis needs to be placed on being aware of any item which breaks the routine and then all crew members assessing the situation and possibly reassigning priorities. By focusing each crew member's attention on a new variable (e.g., baggage door), a brief amount of time may be lost, but in favor of a safe operation. In regards to SOP/checklist use, perhaps whenever a previously accomplished checklist item gets undone (door reopened), the checklist covering that item should be taken out and subsequently repeated. Overall, there are critical times (e.g., taxiing) that are not time critical phases where it can be counterproductive to have too much of a division of duties among crew members which then eliminates the benefit of the whole crew backing up each other and reinforcing important actions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT STARTED TO TAXI WITHOUT CGP CLRNC AND HIT A BAGGAGE LOADING CART DAMAGING THE WING.

Narrative: AFTER PUSHBACK FROM THE GATE, WE STARTED #3 ENG, DURING WHICH WE WERE TOLD MORE BAGS WOULD BE COMING. THE #2 ENG WAS THEN STARTED FOLLOWED BY A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF TAXIING WITH JUST 2 ENGS BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE DEP DELAYS. THIS ALSO INCLUDED A COMMENT AMONGST US ABOUT HYD BRAKE PRESSURE WITH ONLY 1 A-PUMP OPERATING. THE CAPT THEN REQUESTED A-PUMPS ON AND TAXI CLRNC WHICH WAS SOON RECEIVED AFTER ANOTHER ACFT PASSED BY. WE THEN BEGAN TO TAXI, BUT STOPPED AFTER MOVING ABOUT 1' AFTER THE MECH STILL ON THE GND INTERPHONE COMMANDED US TO STOP. WHAT RESULTED WAS THE ACFT STRIKING A BAGGAGE BELT LOADER AT THE FORWARD CARGO PIT, WHICH PUNCTURED A 5' DIAMETER HOLE IN THE LEADING EDGE OF THE RIGHT WING FAIRING. THE BAGGAGE LOADER HAD NO SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE AND THERE WAS NO PERSONNEL INJURIES. THIS INCIDENT SEEMS TO HAVE OCCURRED BECAUSE OF SOME INDIVIDUALLY MINOR DISTRS ADDING UP TO CAUSE A DISRUPTION IN THE USUAL ROUTINE OF EVENTS. PRIOR TO AND WHILE PUSHING BACK, ATTN WAS GIVEN TO A VOR PROB. WITH THAT, PLUS THE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED ENG STARTING/TAXI DISCUSSIONS, THE ALMOST CASUAL RPT OF MORE BAGS TO BE LOADED BECAME LOST IN THE HUSTLE AND BUSTLE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS. AFTER WHAT WAS SEVERAL MOMENTS SINCE THE CAPT SAW THE TUG/TOWBAR RETURN TO THE TERMINAL, HE THOUGHT HE HAD ALSO RECEIVED THE ACCOMPANYING SALUTE AND RELEASE FROM GUIDANCE. SINCE STANDARD OPERATING PROCS DON'T FULLY ADDRESS A BREAK OCCURRING IN THOSE PROCS, A PITFALL WAS SET UP. THAT IS, EVEN THOUGH THE FORWARD CARGO DOOR LIGHT WAS ILLUMINATED, THE F/E FAILED TO SEE IT SINCE HE WAS INVOLVED IN AFTER ENG START PROCS. IN THIS CASE, THE 1 OVERSIGHT OF A PROPER TAXI CLRNC WAS NOT DISCOVERED BECAUSE A LACK OF ANY BACKUP PROCS FOR NON-ROUTINE SITUATIONS. TO PREVENT FUTURE EVENTS LIKE THIS, MORE EMPHASIS NEEDS TO BE PLACED ON BEING AWARE OF ANY ITEM WHICH BREAKS THE ROUTINE AND THEN ALL CREW MEMBERS ASSESSING THE SITUATION AND POSSIBLY REASSIGNING PRIORITIES. BY FOCUSING EACH CREW MEMBER'S ATTN ON A NEW VARIABLE (E.G., BAGGAGE DOOR), A BRIEF AMOUNT OF TIME MAY BE LOST, BUT IN FAVOR OF A SAFE OPERATION. IN REGARDS TO SOP/CHKLIST USE, PERHAPS WHENEVER A PREVIOUSLY ACCOMPLISHED CHKLIST ITEM GETS UNDONE (DOOR REOPENED), THE CHKLIST COVERING THAT ITEM SHOULD BE TAKEN OUT AND SUBSEQUENTLY REPEATED. OVERALL, THERE ARE CRITICAL TIMES (E.G., TAXIING) THAT ARE NOT TIME CRITICAL PHASES WHERE IT CAN BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO HAVE TOO MUCH OF A DIVISION OF DUTIES AMONG CREW MEMBERS WHICH THEN ELIMINATES THE BENEFIT OF THE WHOLE CREW BACKING UP EACH OTHER AND REINFORCING IMPORTANT ACTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.