Narrative:

This was a flap/slat overspeed in the go-around phase during a moderate to severe wind shear encounter between 2;000 and 1;500 feet AGL.contributing factors: unexpected strong wind shear; moderate or greater turbulence at times during the encounter at go-around phase; night time; mountainous terrain; and IMC conditions once we climbed back during the go-around. We were fully configured for a full flap landing; having just entered the final segment and cleared to land on runway 08R from the RNAV visual into las with the preceding aircraft in sight. The tower reported wind 050 at 30 gusting 51. The winds previously reported were mostly aligned with the runway at 7 knots. We decided that a go-around was in order with those winds and the captain called out correctly go-around toga; go-around climb; go-around flaps and I responded appropriately toga (takeoff/go-around) set; climb set; and flaps 3 respectively; then I having said positive rate he called for the gear up which I did. It was at this time that we encountered the wind shear with a 60 knot gain and moderate or greater turbulence. The aircraft rocked left and right; and bucked with the turbulence. I distinctively recall hearing the dishes crashing down on the galley floor and the captain saying we were in an escape maneuver.accordingly; no further configuration changes were made at that time. I reported to ATC our go-around and they instructed us to fly runway heading and maintain 7;000 feet and I set that on FCU's (flight control unit) altitude select; and heading select. With the thrust levers at toga it didn't take long to near that altitude but we were very much still experiencing the same wind shear and the captain knowing the terrain around us instructed me to ask for higher; we were given 9;000 feet I believe. Runway heading would have eventually put us into a massive storm eventually so we asked for a heading but couldn't get a hold of the approach control momentarily.I believe at some point here he brought the power back to climb again but shortly after we experienced turbulence and wind shear again to the same level as before so I remembered he placed the tl (thrust levers) back into toga and instructed me to get a higher altitude as we began to turn to the southwest where we had arrived from; knowing there was no weather in that quadrant because we had just been vectored by approach over this area during the arrival. I think at that point although not voiced out loud; in our minds we went back to a wind shear escape mindset. Since he wanted yet higher I set 13;000 feet; the MSA (minimum safe altitude). The captain again asked me to find him a frequency to get a hold of dispatch and I did comply; while trying to raise ATC which I was finally successful at. When they asked say intentions the captain said we are going to divert; but that we wanted a few vectors first to contact dispatch. It was during this time that I remember thinking I needed to raise the flaps so I went to the next flap setting; flaps 1. Then got busy again looking for a working frequency and setting up the number 2 radio exercising care not to cut out ATC which I was still communicating with in the heat of the moment.I believe we had reached or were about to reach 13;000 feet when it occurred to me to do an after takeoff checklist and then at that time raised the raised of the flaps. It seems like slow motion now that I remember it however it all happened too fast during the moment. I strongly believe that due to the severity of the wind shear and the turbulence our minds reverted to the fight or fly mindset and even though the aircraft's wind shear warning never went off; in our minds; the whole time we were in a wind shear escape maneuver until we leveled at 13;000 feet; the MSA and were able to feel safe from the terrain threat; since we were in IMC; night time; mountainous terrain area. This was the worst weather encounter of my career thus far; having flown almost 10;000 hours. I believe the captain said something similar. We were definitely a little overloaded trying to stay safe and this partially contributed to an inadvertent flap over-speed.I researched our flight track. It showed us well clear of the storm cells that we received good vectors around but it looked like we had arrived at the same time as one of those storms that take place in the southwest; that storm had surface winds of 71 knots according to the news and caused numerous damages on the ground. The aircraft preceding us on the approach went around as well as the aircraft behind us. Then a [company] flight made it in and then another one after him went around as well. We briefly considered our alternate of phx but ZZZ1 was closer and it didn't entail flying around the weather so accordingly we diverted.we received numerous comments of appreciation from the passengers for keeping them safe. The flight attendants said that many people were scared and that a commuting pilot was reassuring them in the back. The flight attendants too said that was one of the worst turbulence encounters they had experienced. As for me as it relates to the over-speed; rather than being so concerned with accommodating the captain's requests for getting a hold of dispatch; I should have had been more concerned with monitoring the instruments; then I could have backed up the captain as the flying pilot better and call out flap retraction; we did a good job at navigating because our first and foremost concern was to climb and steer clear of terrain; especially with the wind shear; night time; IMC; and terrain in the area. From that perspective; it was a job well done since we were aware of and mitigated the worse of the threats.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A321 First Officer reported windshear escape maneuver resulting in a flap over-speed event.

Narrative: This was a flap/slat overspeed in the go-around phase during a moderate to severe wind shear encounter between 2;000 and 1;500 feet AGL.Contributing factors: Unexpected strong wind shear; moderate or greater turbulence at times during the encounter at go-around phase; night time; mountainous terrain; and IMC conditions once we climbed back during the go-around. We were fully configured for a full flap landing; having just entered the final segment and cleared to land on Runway 08R from the RNAV visual into LAS with the preceding aircraft in sight. The Tower reported wind 050 at 30 gusting 51. The winds previously reported were mostly aligned with the runway at 7 knots. We decided that a go-around was in order with those winds and the Captain called out correctly go-around TOGA; go-around climb; go-around flaps and I responded appropriately TOGA (takeoff/Go-around) set; climb set; and flaps 3 respectively; then I having said positive rate he called for the gear up which I did. It was at this time that we encountered the wind shear with a 60 knot gain and moderate or greater turbulence. The aircraft rocked left and right; and bucked with the turbulence. I distinctively recall hearing the dishes crashing down on the galley floor and the Captain saying we were in an escape maneuver.Accordingly; no further configuration changes were made at that time. I reported to ATC our go-around and they instructed us to fly runway heading and maintain 7;000 feet and I set that on FCU's (Flight Control Unit) altitude select; and heading select. With the thrust levers at TOGA it didn't take long to near that altitude but we were very much still experiencing the same wind shear and the Captain knowing the terrain around us instructed me to ask for higher; we were given 9;000 feet I believe. Runway heading would have eventually put us into a massive storm eventually so we asked for a heading but couldn't get a hold of the Approach Control momentarily.I believe at some point here he brought the power back to climb again but shortly after we experienced turbulence and wind shear again to the same level as before so I remembered he placed the TL (thrust levers) back into TOGA and instructed me to get a higher altitude as we began to turn to the southwest where we had arrived from; knowing there was no weather in that quadrant because we had just been vectored by Approach over this area during the arrival. I think at that point although not voiced out loud; in our minds we went back to a wind shear escape mindset. Since he wanted yet higher I set 13;000 feet; the MSA (Minimum Safe Altitude). The Captain again asked me to find him a frequency to get a hold of dispatch and I did comply; while trying to raise ATC which I was finally successful at. When they asked say intentions the Captain said we are going to divert; but that we wanted a few vectors first to contact Dispatch. It was during this time that I remember thinking I needed to raise the flaps so I went to the next flap setting; flaps 1. Then got busy again looking for a working frequency and setting up the number 2 radio exercising care not to cut out ATC which I was still communicating with in the heat of the moment.I believe we had reached or were about to reach 13;000 feet when it occurred to me to do an after takeoff checklist and then at that time raised the raised of the flaps. It seems like slow motion now that I remember it however it all happened too fast during the moment. I strongly believe that due to the severity of the wind shear and the turbulence our minds reverted to the fight or fly mindset and even though the aircraft's wind shear warning never went off; in our minds; the whole time we were in a wind shear escape maneuver until we leveled at 13;000 feet; the MSA and were able to feel safe from the terrain threat; since we were in IMC; night time; mountainous terrain area. This was the worst weather encounter of my career thus far; having flown almost 10;000 hours. I believe the Captain said something similar. We were definitely a little overloaded trying to stay safe and this partially contributed to an inadvertent flap over-speed.I researched our flight track. It showed us well clear of the storm cells that we received good vectors around but it looked like we had arrived at the same time as one of those storms that take place in the Southwest; that storm had surface winds of 71 knots according to the news and caused numerous damages on the ground. The aircraft preceding us on the approach went around as well as the aircraft behind us. Then a [company] flight made it in and then another one after him went around as well. We briefly considered our alternate of PHX but ZZZ1 was closer and it didn't entail flying around the weather so accordingly we diverted.We received numerous comments of appreciation from the passengers for keeping them safe. The flight attendants said that many people were scared and that a commuting pilot was reassuring them in the back. The flight attendants too said that was one of the worst turbulence encounters they had experienced. As for me as it relates to the over-speed; rather than being so concerned with accommodating the Captain's requests for getting a hold of Dispatch; I should have had been more concerned with monitoring the instruments; then I could have backed up the Captain as the flying pilot better and call out flap retraction; we did a good job at navigating because our first and foremost concern was to climb and steer clear of terrain; especially with the wind shear; night time; IMC; and terrain in the area. From that perspective; it was a job well done since we were aware of and mitigated the worse of the threats.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.