Narrative:

I was the F/east on flight from denver to san diego on 9/90. The aircraft originally scheduled had a mechanical problem and was replaced by aircraft which had been out of service for a gearbox problem. Although scheduled for a xa:30 local departure, the aircraft was position from the hangar to the gate at about xa:35, prepared for flight and pushed off at xb:03. Even though the tempo of operations was brisk, all facets of preflight and pre/post start appeared to me to be normal and in accordance with applicable procedures. At about xb:18 we were cleared for takeoff. As I was finishing my F/east panel scan during the engine run-up and shifting my attention to the forward panel, one of the pilots stated that the EPR on the #2 engine was low, and that they were aborting the takeoff. I immediately checked the first officer's airspeed indicator which appeared to be barely off the zero position, certainly well below 60 KTS. We informed the tower and cabin as we cleared the runway at the first turn off. We then completed all applicable checklists, checked the brake cooling chart, and immediately discovered that all 3 of the engine anti-ice switches were in the on position. We informed the company which reported back that we would be allowed another attempt after performing a successful engine run-up on the runway. This was completed and we proceeded uneventfully to san diego. Possible contributing factors. Aircraft is one of a few aircraft with some significant cockpit differences. Although the captain on this particular flight impressed me by his professionalism, he stated that due to their location, the actual position (ie on or off) of the engine anti-ice switches was more difficult to discern from his side of the cockpit than on most of the rest of the fleet. I would recommend that a heightened effort of cockpit standardization be investigated. Supplemental information from acn 157068. After several departures we were cleared into position to hold. With all checklists complete we were cleared for takeoff. Since this was my leg to fly, I advanced the power and immediately noticed that the #2 engine was slightly below scheduled takeoff EPR. I called this out and retarded the throttles. The aircraft had just started to toll and the crew conducted the rejected takeoff procedure. Crew was 12 hours into the duty day (with long situation time). The last min aircraft substitution caused a hurry up situation. The sun was low on the horizon causing shadows across the overhead panel. Aircraft has non-standard switch position on the overhead and other panels. When factor #4 was combined with factors #1, #2 and #3 there was a potential for error. Supplemental information from acn 152201. Recommend moving the wing and engine anti-ice panel to the standard position, and replacing the pitot heat panel with the standard panel and placing it in the standard position.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT ABORTS TKFO AS #2 ENGINE DOES NOT INDICATE SCHEDULED EPR.

Narrative: I WAS THE F/E ON FLT FROM DENVER TO SAN DIEGO ON 9/90. THE ACFT ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED HAD A MECHANICAL PROB AND WAS REPLACED BY ACFT WHICH HAD BEEN OUT OF SVC FOR A GEARBOX PROB. ALTHOUGH SCHEDULED FOR A XA:30 LCL DEP, THE ACFT WAS POS FROM THE HANGAR TO THE GATE AT ABOUT XA:35, PREPARED FOR FLT AND PUSHED OFF AT XB:03. EVEN THOUGH THE TEMPO OF OPS WAS BRISK, ALL FACETS OF PREFLT AND PRE/POST START APPEARED TO ME TO BE NORMAL AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE PROCS. AT ABOUT XB:18 WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. AS I WAS FINISHING MY F/E PANEL SCAN DURING THE ENG RUN-UP AND SHIFTING MY ATTN TO THE FORWARD PANEL, ONE OF THE PLTS STATED THAT THE EPR ON THE #2 ENG WAS LOW, AND THAT THEY WERE ABORTING THE TKOF. I IMMEDIATELY CHKED THE F/O'S AIRSPD INDICATOR WHICH APPEARED TO BE BARELY OFF THE ZERO POS, CERTAINLY WELL BELOW 60 KTS. WE INFORMED THE TWR AND CABIN AS WE CLRED THE RWY AT THE FIRST TURN OFF. WE THEN COMPLETED ALL APPLICABLE CHKLISTS, CHKED THE BRAKE COOLING CHART, AND IMMEDIATELY DISCOVERED THAT ALL 3 OF THE ENG ANTI-ICE SWITCHES WERE IN THE ON POS. WE INFORMED THE COMPANY WHICH RPTED BACK THAT WE WOULD BE ALLOWED ANOTHER ATTEMPT AFTER PERFORMING A SUCCESSFUL ENG RUN-UP ON THE RWY. THIS WAS COMPLETED AND WE PROCEEDED UNEVENTFULLY TO SAN DIEGO. POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. ACFT IS ONE OF A FEW ACFT WITH SOME SIGNIFICANT COCKPIT DIFFERENCES. ALTHOUGH THE CAPT ON THIS PARTICULAR FLT IMPRESSED ME BY HIS PROFESSIONALISM, HE STATED THAT DUE TO THEIR LOCATION, THE ACTUAL POS (IE ON OR OFF) OF THE ENG ANTI-ICE SWITCHES WAS MORE DIFFICULT TO DISCERN FROM HIS SIDE OF THE COCKPIT THAN ON MOST OF THE REST OF THE FLEET. I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT A HEIGHTENED EFFORT OF COCKPIT STANDARDIZATION BE INVESTIGATED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 157068. AFTER SEVERAL DEPS WE WERE CLRED INTO POS TO HOLD. WITH ALL CHKLISTS COMPLETE WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. SINCE THIS WAS MY LEG TO FLY, I ADVANCED THE PWR AND IMMEDIATELY NOTICED THAT THE #2 ENG WAS SLIGHTLY BELOW SCHEDULED TKOF EPR. I CALLED THIS OUT AND RETARDED THE THROTTLES. THE ACFT HAD JUST STARTED TO TOLL AND THE CREW CONDUCTED THE REJECTED TKOF PROC. CREW WAS 12 HRS INTO THE DUTY DAY (WITH LONG SIT TIME). THE LAST MIN ACFT SUBSTITUTION CAUSED A HURRY UP SITUATION. THE SUN WAS LOW ON THE HORIZON CAUSING SHADOWS ACROSS THE OVERHEAD PANEL. ACFT HAS NON-STANDARD SWITCH POS ON THE OVERHEAD AND OTHER PANELS. WHEN FACTOR #4 WAS COMBINED WITH FACTORS #1, #2 AND #3 THERE WAS A POTENTIAL FOR ERROR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 152201. RECOMMEND MOVING THE WING AND ENG ANTI-ICE PANEL TO THE STANDARD POS, AND REPLACING THE PITOT HEAT PANEL WITH THE STANDARD PANEL AND PLACING IT IN THE STANDARD POS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.