Narrative:

After refueling in cll I picked up my IFR clearance while taxiing out. My departure instructions called for a left turn after takeoff to cll VOR. This left turn which I executed put me on a collision course, same altitude, with an small transport that was inbound. Fortunately the small transport spotted me and was able to pass directly beneath me. This is when I saw him. It shocked me to see him so close. The small transport was also concerned about this near miss and stated that they were going to talk to departure control about it. This occurred within 1000' AGL. Tower handed me off to center. I reported climbing to 3000'. ATC then cleared me to 8000' and handed me off. When I checked in they immediately changed my clearance to direct jct. This caught me off guard. I was not prepared for that route. I was prepared for what I was told to expect when I was on the ground. As I looked on my charts for a correct heading I wondered why ATC did not issue me a heading like they normally do. I blew through my altitude and was already correcting when ATC asked me what altitude I was at. ATC then cleared me to 10000'. At this point I determined the heading I needed for direct jct. In the process of turning to his heading and still climbing I overshot my altitude again. Again I initiated a correction prior to ATC's query of 'state your altitude.' en route to elp, ATC changed my clearance 2 more times. Each time I got handed off, the next controller would ask me what my clearance was. (They were asking other aircraft also.) there seemed to be a lot of confusion within ATC about the clrncs issued. I feel there are 3 separate problems involved. There seems to be a lack of coordination/communication. They cleared me to make a left turn into oncoming traffic, which they had been handling. A near miss is a life threatening situation and can make anyone uptight. It is a factor which immediately affects the quality of a pilot's performance until the proximity of the situation has passed. The second problem is multiple clearance changes, especially right after takeoff. The tie to prepare for a clearance change is on the ground or in level cruise, especially if there is planning or frequency verification involved. It seems apparent to me that ATC never intended me to fly my original clearance. They had this prior knowledge, but did not give me this information until after takeoff. Giving an unexpected route change immediately after takeoff, close to the ground, or after several frequency changes during initial climb out, or after a near miss is asking for mistakes to be made. Climb out for a pilot is a critical time, and a busy time in any kind of aircraft. IFR conditions just compound the workload. The third problem was non standard phraseology and general confusion about clrncs issued within ATC. The standard phraseology should have been 'heading 262 degrees, when able direct jct,' not 'direct jct.' this comes down to inaction from ATC not issuing a heading, and inaction form myself because I failed to ask for a heading. During the last part of this flight ATC seemed unsure of the clrncs of the aircraft they were handling. ATC had to keep asking the pilots what their clrncs were. Blatant confusion like this is enough to put doubt in anyone's mind about the ability of ATC to control their aircraft. In retrospect, it seems we need more effective ways of dealing with the age old problems of communicating, coordinating and timing. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter states he usually has good ATC handling, this is why the situation was especially frustrating. Changes started coming immediately after takeoff and continued the entire trip. Reporter discussed this with an instrument who also thought this was unusual handling. He has determined that he will always ask controller for heading rather than trying to spread out 2 charts on his lap to try and determine direct routing for himself. What really made this so frustrating was that at each handoff he was asked what his clearance was, as if the controller was not aware of clearance. He would be vectored off arwys to fly direct and next controller would say 'we can't do that,' and vector him back to the arwy. Seemed there was just not much coordination.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMT HAS NMAC WITH ANOTHER SMT JUST AFTER TKOF.

Narrative: AFTER REFUELING IN CLL I PICKED UP MY IFR CLRNC WHILE TAXIING OUT. MY DEP INSTRUCTIONS CALLED FOR A LEFT TURN AFTER TKOF TO CLL VOR. THIS LEFT TURN WHICH I EXECUTED PUT ME ON A COLLISION COURSE, SAME ALT, WITH AN SMT THAT WAS INBND. FORTUNATELY THE SMT SPOTTED ME AND WAS ABLE TO PASS DIRECTLY BENEATH ME. THIS IS WHEN I SAW HIM. IT SHOCKED ME TO SEE HIM SO CLOSE. THE SMT WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THIS NEAR MISS AND STATED THAT THEY WERE GOING TO TALK TO DEP CTL ABOUT IT. THIS OCCURRED WITHIN 1000' AGL. TWR HANDED ME OFF TO CENTER. I RPTED CLBING TO 3000'. ATC THEN CLRED ME TO 8000' AND HANDED ME OFF. WHEN I CHKED IN THEY IMMEDIATELY CHANGED MY CLRNC TO DIRECT JCT. THIS CAUGHT ME OFF GUARD. I WAS NOT PREPARED FOR THAT RTE. I WAS PREPARED FOR WHAT I WAS TOLD TO EXPECT WHEN I WAS ON THE GND. AS I LOOKED ON MY CHARTS FOR A CORRECT HDG I WONDERED WHY ATC DID NOT ISSUE ME A HDG LIKE THEY NORMALLY DO. I BLEW THROUGH MY ALT AND WAS ALREADY CORRECTING WHEN ATC ASKED ME WHAT ALT I WAS AT. ATC THEN CLRED ME TO 10000'. AT THIS POINT I DETERMINED THE HDG I NEEDED FOR DIRECT JCT. IN THE PROCESS OF TURNING TO HIS HDG AND STILL CLBING I OVERSHOT MY ALT AGAIN. AGAIN I INITIATED A CORRECTION PRIOR TO ATC'S QUERY OF 'STATE YOUR ALT.' ENRTE TO ELP, ATC CHANGED MY CLRNC 2 MORE TIMES. EACH TIME I GOT HANDED OFF, THE NEXT CTLR WOULD ASK ME WHAT MY CLRNC WAS. (THEY WERE ASKING OTHER ACFT ALSO.) THERE SEEMED TO BE A LOT OF CONFUSION WITHIN ATC ABOUT THE CLRNCS ISSUED. I FEEL THERE ARE 3 SEPARATE PROBS INVOLVED. THERE SEEMS TO BE A LACK OF COORD/COM. THEY CLRED ME TO MAKE A LEFT TURN INTO ONCOMING TFC, WHICH THEY HAD BEEN HANDLING. A NEAR MISS IS A LIFE THREATENING SITUATION AND CAN MAKE ANYONE UPTIGHT. IT IS A FACTOR WHICH IMMEDIATELY AFFECTS THE QUALITY OF A PLT'S PERFORMANCE UNTIL THE PROX OF THE SITUATION HAS PASSED. THE SECOND PROB IS MULTIPLE CLRNC CHANGES, ESPECIALLY RIGHT AFTER TKOF. THE TIE TO PREPARE FOR A CLRNC CHANGE IS ON THE GND OR IN LEVEL CRUISE, ESPECIALLY IF THERE IS PLANNING OR FREQ VERIFICATION INVOLVED. IT SEEMS APPARENT TO ME THAT ATC NEVER INTENDED ME TO FLY MY ORIGINAL CLRNC. THEY HAD THIS PRIOR KNOWLEDGE, BUT DID NOT GIVE ME THIS INFO UNTIL AFTER TKOF. GIVING AN UNEXPECTED RTE CHANGE IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF, CLOSE TO THE GND, OR AFTER SEVERAL FREQ CHANGES DURING INITIAL CLBOUT, OR AFTER A NEAR MISS IS ASKING FOR MISTAKES TO BE MADE. CLBOUT FOR A PLT IS A CRITICAL TIME, AND A BUSY TIME IN ANY KIND OF ACFT. IFR CONDITIONS JUST COMPOUND THE WORKLOAD. THE THIRD PROB WAS NON STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY AND GENERAL CONFUSION ABOUT CLRNCS ISSUED WITHIN ATC. THE STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY SHOULD HAVE BEEN 'HDG 262 DEGS, WHEN ABLE DIRECT JCT,' NOT 'DIRECT JCT.' THIS COMES DOWN TO INACTION FROM ATC NOT ISSUING A HDG, AND INACTION FORM MYSELF BECAUSE I FAILED TO ASK FOR A HDG. DURING THE LAST PART OF THIS FLT ATC SEEMED UNSURE OF THE CLRNCS OF THE ACFT THEY WERE HANDLING. ATC HAD TO KEEP ASKING THE PLTS WHAT THEIR CLRNCS WERE. BLATANT CONFUSION LIKE THIS IS ENOUGH TO PUT DOUBT IN ANYONE'S MIND ABOUT THE ABILITY OF ATC TO CTL THEIR ACFT. IN RETROSPECT, IT SEEMS WE NEED MORE EFFECTIVE WAYS OF DEALING WITH THE AGE OLD PROBS OF COMMUNICATING, COORDINATING AND TIMING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR STATES HE USUALLY HAS GOOD ATC HANDLING, THIS IS WHY THE SITUATION WAS ESPECIALLY FRUSTRATING. CHANGES STARTED COMING IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF AND CONTINUED THE ENTIRE TRIP. RPTR DISCUSSED THIS WITH AN INSTR WHO ALSO THOUGHT THIS WAS UNUSUAL HANDLING. HE HAS DETERMINED THAT HE WILL ALWAYS ASK CTLR FOR HDG RATHER THAN TRYING TO SPREAD OUT 2 CHARTS ON HIS LAP TO TRY AND DETERMINE DIRECT RTING FOR HIMSELF. WHAT REALLY MADE THIS SO FRUSTRATING WAS THAT AT EACH HDOF HE WAS ASKED WHAT HIS CLRNC WAS, AS IF THE CTLR WAS NOT AWARE OF CLRNC. HE WOULD BE VECTORED OFF ARWYS TO FLY DIRECT AND NEXT CTLR WOULD SAY 'WE CAN'T DO THAT,' AND VECTOR HIM BACK TO THE ARWY. SEEMED THERE WAS JUST NOT MUCH COORD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.