Narrative:

This is not a single incident but a recurring situation that is counterintuitive to safe practices. With multiple reroutes given to aircrews starting 200 miles from iah as a destination; our computers become more of a hindrance the closer we get to iah and the descent profile is abandoned to recalculate both vertical and horizontal connections to aircraft position. It is not uncommon to experience at least 5 arrival and runway changes at any point during the arrival. This is complicated by some arrivals having different bottom 'cleared to' altitudes depending on which runway will be used when ATC has no idea which runway it will end up flying us to. When asking the controller which transition to expect; I was told to just guess. When referencing the zeekk arrival and told to descend via; we should not be cleared past bluuz while we are given no guidance beforehand on which transition to expect but have already been given the 'descend via' clearance. All points past bluuz should not be tangled with the arrival in our FMC but instead be attached to the approach to be flown because when the reroute occurs; it takes too long for the programming to occur and affect the current position of the aircraft in reference to the arrival. There is no legal way that ATC can assign a 'descend via' clearance with the current setup.now let's digest the actual operation we now fly from transition to touch down that is counterintuitive to our safe practices and training. These arrivals ending at altitudes above the missed approach altitude for any approach; leads us to ignore the altitude warnings on the glideslope and consequently trains the aircrew to pause; ignore/confuse; proper guidance from past practices. We should not have any normal procedures that train us to ignore warnings; but we now encounter this on every IFR or VFR approach when we abide by our ILS procedures that have us select the missed approach altitude in the altitude window on the MCP (mode control panel) at or below our intercepting altitude. Each of our fleets have varying software generations that preclude us from treating them all the same; yet our current practice is to fit square pegs into round holes when trying to force all fleets to have the same standard practices.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 Captain reported safety concern with the current ATC procedures regarding 'Descend Via' clearances without transition; approach or runway information.

Narrative: This is not a single incident but a recurring situation that is counterintuitive to safe practices. With multiple reroutes given to aircrews starting 200 miles from IAH as a destination; our computers become more of a hindrance the closer we get to IAH and the descent profile is abandoned to recalculate both vertical and horizontal connections to aircraft position. It is not uncommon to experience at least 5 arrival and runway changes at any point during the arrival. This is complicated by some arrivals having different bottom 'Cleared to' altitudes depending on which runway will be used when ATC has NO IDEA which runway it will end up flying us to. When asking the Controller which transition to expect; I was told to just guess. When referencing the ZEEKK arrival and told to descend via; we should not be cleared past BLUUZ while we are given no guidance beforehand on which transition to expect but have already been given the 'Descend Via' clearance. All points past BLUUZ should not be tangled with the arrival in our FMC but instead be attached to the approach to be flown because when the reroute occurs; it takes too long for the programming to occur and affect the current position of the aircraft in reference to the arrival. There is NO legal way that ATC can assign a 'Descend Via' clearance with the current setup.Now let's digest the actual operation we now fly from transition to touch down that is counterintuitive to our SAFE practices and training. These arrivals ending at altitudes above the missed approach altitude for any approach; leads us to IGNORE the ALTITUDE WARNINGS on the glideslope and consequently TRAINS the aircrew to pause; ignore/confuse; proper guidance from past practices. We should not have any normal procedures that train us to ignore warnings; but we now encounter this on every IFR or VFR approach when we abide by our ILS procedures that have us select the missed approach altitude in the altitude window on the MCP (Mode Control Panel) at or below our intercepting altitude. Each of our fleets have varying software generations that preclude us from treating them all the same; yet our current practice is to fit square pegs into round holes when trying to force all fleets to have the same standard practices.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.