Narrative:

APU was MEL inoperative so external air was required for engine start. We asked the ramp personnel (no maintenance at this station available) which engine they'd like us to start and if they would like to start both or just one followed by a xbleed start. They said start #1 first then we'll see how much air the bottle has left. After a successful start on #1, we asked ramp how air bottle looked for #2. However, rampers had already disconnect their headset from aircraft disconnected their external air and were rolling up the air hose. This was dangerous on their part as the poh states that both engine bleed air and bleed air isolation value shall be closed prior to external air disconnect. Fortunately no one was hurt. We then decided a xbleed start would be necessary and contacted ground to request permission. Ground advised us that they were unable to see the area behind us. Since we had 3 ramp personnel watching the area, the captain decided to do the xbleed start at the gate. There again appeared to be some confusion on the rampers part as evidenced by 2 rampers giving us a clear on #2 hand signal, and the other giving us hand signals for a right turn to taxi as we advanced the power on #1 for the xbleed start. Just prior to takeoff clearance, an aircraft requested our flight number from ground/tower. We were then cleared to takeoff but prior to takeoff we asked tower if someone had a problem due to our xbleed start. Tower queried the aircraft to why they wanted our flight number and they said we blew a bag off a baggage cart. We sincerely apologized and said that we had 3 ground personnel checking to see if the area behind us was clear. We then called company to explain the importance of good communication and the requirement of assuring a clear area behind the aircraft prior to a xbleed start. This could have been avoided if we would have delayed engine start until clear from the gate where ground could see behind us (except that the thrust from single engine taxi may have yielded the same result). If stations personnel had a better understanding of xbleed and external air engine starts. Communications between cockpit and ramp personnel were better.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG BLEW BAGGAGE OFF A BAGGAGE CART MAKING A CROSS BLEED START.

Narrative: APU WAS MEL INOPERATIVE SO EXTERNAL AIR WAS REQUIRED FOR ENG START. WE ASKED THE RAMP PERSONNEL (NO MAINT AT THIS STATION AVAILABLE) WHICH ENG THEY'D LIKE US TO START AND IF THEY WOULD LIKE TO START BOTH OR JUST ONE FOLLOWED BY A XBLEED START. THEY SAID START #1 FIRST THEN WE'LL SEE HOW MUCH AIR THE BOTTLE HAS LEFT. AFTER A SUCCESSFUL START ON #1, WE ASKED RAMP HOW AIR BOTTLE LOOKED FOR #2. HOWEVER, RAMPERS HAD ALREADY DISCONNECT THEIR HEADSET FROM ACFT DISCONNECTED THEIR EXTERNAL AIR AND WERE ROLLING UP THE AIR HOSE. THIS WAS DANGEROUS ON THEIR PART AS THE POH STATES THAT BOTH ENG BLEED AIR AND BLEED AIR ISOLATION VALUE SHALL BE CLOSED PRIOR TO EXTERNAL AIR DISCONNECT. FORTUNATELY NO ONE WAS HURT. WE THEN DECIDED A XBLEED START WOULD BE NECESSARY AND CONTACTED GND TO REQUEST PERMISSION. GND ADVISED US THAT THEY WERE UNABLE TO SEE THE AREA BEHIND US. SINCE WE HAD 3 RAMP PERSONNEL WATCHING THE AREA, THE CAPT DECIDED TO DO THE XBLEED START AT THE GATE. THERE AGAIN APPEARED TO BE SOME CONFUSION ON THE RAMPERS PART AS EVIDENCED BY 2 RAMPERS GIVING US A CLR ON #2 HAND SIGNAL, AND THE OTHER GIVING US HAND SIGNALS FOR A R TURN TO TAXI AS WE ADVANCED THE PWR ON #1 FOR THE XBLEED START. JUST PRIOR TO TKOF CLRNC, AN ACFT REQUESTED OUR FLT NUMBER FROM GND/TWR. WE WERE THEN CLRED TO TKOF BUT PRIOR TO TKOF WE ASKED TWR IF SOMEONE HAD A PROB DUE TO OUR XBLEED START. TWR QUERIED THE ACFT TO WHY THEY WANTED OUR FLT NUMBER AND THEY SAID WE BLEW A BAG OFF A BAGGAGE CART. WE SINCERELY APOLOGIZED AND SAID THAT WE HAD 3 GND PERSONNEL CHKING TO SEE IF THE AREA BEHIND US WAS CLR. WE THEN CALLED COMPANY TO EXPLAIN THE IMPORTANCE OF GOOD COM AND THE REQUIREMENT OF ASSURING A CLR AREA BEHIND THE ACFT PRIOR TO A XBLEED START. THIS COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF WE WOULD HAVE DELAYED ENG START UNTIL CLR FROM THE GATE WHERE GND COULD SEE BEHIND US (EXCEPT THAT THE THRUST FROM SINGLE ENG TAXI MAY HAVE YIELDED THE SAME RESULT). IF STATIONS PERSONNEL HAD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF XBLEED AND EXTERNAL AIR ENG STARTS. COMS BTWN COCKPIT AND RAMP PERSONNEL WERE BETTER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.