Narrative:

I was first officer on flight dal-hou (captain flying) night VMC takeoff runway 31R at dal. Approaching thunderstorm approximately 6 mi on radar off departure end (large, contouring). We were cleared for takeoff if we could hold off our turn to the north until 5 DME off dal VOR. I expressed my concern that it would be awfully tight to comply and not fly into the storm, which appeared severe to me with a 'hooked finger,' which I pointed out, in the area we would turn into. (See diagram.) the captain stated if we were going to go into it, it would be an emergency and we would just turn early (a statement I disagreed with, since we could decide to not take off). He told me to 'tell 'em we're going,' and ran the power up. By now I was very apprehensive because computing radar range with VOR DME field position, 5 mi DME would put us in the storm. After takeoff I was relieved to hear departure tell us we could turn at 4000'. I assume this clearance is to keep us out of the addison airport air traffic area just northwest of dal. With the aircraft cleaned up the captain kept a maximum climb rate of 200-210 KIAS to get to 4000' as soon as possible. However, but the time were passing 3000' we were approaching the edge of the storm so he started a right turn early, at about 3500' or so, to the north. As we did we encountered moderate turbulence, heavy rain and a sudden loss of airspeed to about 170 KIAS with climb rate turning into a descent rate of about 700 FPM (downdraft). After a few seconds of attitude control a 210 KT climb of about 1500' (only) was established, so it took a while to get to 4000' even though we had already turned toward the north to avoid the storm. Starting the turn a little early combined with the downdraft, and then the desire to get through the edge of the storm (i.e., continue right turn to the north despite being well below 4000' by now) put us in conflict with the clearance and possibly into the addison airport air traffic area. As a first officer, I should have insisted we not take off since there was not enough room to avoid the storm with the turn clearance requirements placed on us. The reservations I expressed and pointing to the hook in the storm on the radar obviously were not enough to deter this captain, and he knew it when later in the flight he told me, 'I guess we should have stayed on the ground.' it was a rough ride for about 20 or 30 seconds.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG NON ADHERENCE TO ATC CLRNC TRACK HEADING DEVIATION TO AVOID TSTM ACTIVITY.

Narrative: I WAS F/O ON FLT DAL-HOU (CAPT FLYING) NIGHT VMC TKOF RWY 31R AT DAL. APCHING TSTM APPROX 6 MI ON RADAR OFF DEP END (LARGE, CONTOURING). WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF IF WE COULD HOLD OFF OUR TURN TO THE N UNTIL 5 DME OFF DAL VOR. I EXPRESSED MY CONCERN THAT IT WOULD BE AWFULLY TIGHT TO COMPLY AND NOT FLY INTO THE STORM, WHICH APPEARED SEVERE TO ME WITH A 'HOOKED FINGER,' WHICH I POINTED OUT, IN THE AREA WE WOULD TURN INTO. (SEE DIAGRAM.) THE CAPT STATED IF WE WERE GOING TO GO INTO IT, IT WOULD BE AN EMER AND WE WOULD JUST TURN EARLY (A STATEMENT I DISAGREED WITH, SINCE WE COULD DECIDE TO NOT TAKE OFF). HE TOLD ME TO 'TELL 'EM WE'RE GOING,' AND RAN THE PWR UP. BY NOW I WAS VERY APPREHENSIVE BECAUSE COMPUTING RADAR RANGE WITH VOR DME FIELD POS, 5 MI DME WOULD PUT US IN THE STORM. AFTER TKOF I WAS RELIEVED TO HEAR DEP TELL US WE COULD TURN AT 4000'. I ASSUME THIS CLRNC IS TO KEEP US OUT OF THE ADDISON ARPT ATA JUST NW OF DAL. WITH THE ACFT CLEANED UP THE CAPT KEPT A MAX CLB RATE OF 200-210 KIAS TO GET TO 4000' ASAP. HOWEVER, BUT THE TIME WERE PASSING 3000' WE WERE APCHING THE EDGE OF THE STORM SO HE STARTED A RIGHT TURN EARLY, AT ABOUT 3500' OR SO, TO THE N. AS WE DID WE ENCOUNTERED MODERATE TURB, HEAVY RAIN AND A SUDDEN LOSS OF AIRSPD TO ABOUT 170 KIAS WITH CLB RATE TURNING INTO A DSNT RATE OF ABOUT 700 FPM (DOWNDRAFT). AFTER A FEW SECS OF ATTITUDE CTL A 210 KT CLB OF ABOUT 1500' (ONLY) WAS ESTABLISHED, SO IT TOOK A WHILE TO GET TO 4000' EVEN THOUGH WE HAD ALREADY TURNED TOWARD THE N TO AVOID THE STORM. STARTING THE TURN A LITTLE EARLY COMBINED WITH THE DOWNDRAFT, AND THEN THE DESIRE TO GET THROUGH THE EDGE OF THE STORM (I.E., CONTINUE RIGHT TURN TO THE N DESPITE BEING WELL BELOW 4000' BY NOW) PUT US IN CONFLICT WITH THE CLRNC AND POSSIBLY INTO THE ADDISON ARPT ATA. AS A F/O, I SHOULD HAVE INSISTED WE NOT TAKE OFF SINCE THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH ROOM TO AVOID THE STORM WITH THE TURN CLRNC REQUIREMENTS PLACED ON US. THE RESERVATIONS I EXPRESSED AND POINTING TO THE HOOK IN THE STORM ON THE RADAR OBVIOUSLY WERE NOT ENOUGH TO DETER THIS CAPT, AND HE KNEW IT WHEN LATER IN THE FLT HE TOLD ME, 'I GUESS WE SHOULD HAVE STAYED ON THE GND.' IT WAS A ROUGH RIDE FOR ABOUT 20 OR 30 SECS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.