Missed approach altitude was raised at gcn and implemented without briefing controllers on the chang...

Narrative:

The missed approach altitude for the ILS/DME runway 3 approach at gcn was raised from 8500 to 1000', effective 10/18/90. Apparently no one advised lax ARTCC, and specifically area D personnel who are responsible for controling that area were not briefed on the change. The change resulted from a recent flight check inspection. A sharp-eyed airspace and procedures specialist noticed the new altitude, but didn't directly notify the area D supervisor in charge. A controller, in passing, noticed the note made by the airspace specialist, and brought it to the attention of the supervisor in charge. Explanations for the change were sought but not found until a call to the regional fifo was completed the following morning, 10/18/90. The procedure became effective before then, at XA00 local time on 10/18/90. A stopgap plan of briefing controllers and using special phraseology was initiated by the supervisor in charge. The situation has not been completely resolved as of XJ25, 10/18/90. Shouldn't there be an advance notification of the facility and controllers involved in a procedure change? What's the facility/regional policy in this regard? Who dropped the ball in this case? What's a reasonable amount of time to be advised and prepared for a procedural change?

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MISSED APCH ALT WAS RAISED AT GCN AND IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT BRIEFING CTLRS ON THE CHANGE.

Narrative: THE MISSED APCH ALT FOR THE ILS/DME RWY 3 APCH AT GCN WAS RAISED FROM 8500 TO 1000', EFFECTIVE 10/18/90. APPARENTLY NO ONE ADVISED LAX ARTCC, AND SPECIFICALLY AREA D PERSONNEL WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR CTLING THAT AREA WERE NOT BRIEFED ON THE CHANGE. THE CHANGE RESULTED FROM A RECENT FLT CHK INSPECTION. A SHARP-EYED AIRSPACE AND PROCS SPECIALIST NOTICED THE NEW ALT, BUT DIDN'T DIRECTLY NOTIFY THE AREA D SUPVR IN CHARGE. A CTLR, IN PASSING, NOTICED THE NOTE MADE BY THE AIRSPACE SPECIALIST, AND BROUGHT IT TO THE ATTN OF THE SUPVR IN CHARGE. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE CHANGE WERE SOUGHT BUT NOT FOUND UNTIL A CALL TO THE REGIONAL FIFO WAS COMPLETED THE FOLLOWING MORNING, 10/18/90. THE PROC BECAME EFFECTIVE BEFORE THEN, AT XA00 LCL TIME ON 10/18/90. A STOPGAP PLAN OF BRIEFING CTLRS AND USING SPECIAL PHRASEOLOGY WAS INITIATED BY THE SUPVR IN CHARGE. THE SITUATION HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETELY RESOLVED AS OF XJ25, 10/18/90. SHOULDN'T THERE BE AN ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF THE FAC AND CTLRS INVOLVED IN A PROC CHANGE? WHAT'S THE FAC/REGIONAL POLICY IN THIS REGARD? WHO DROPPED THE BALL IN THIS CASE? WHAT'S A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME TO BE ADVISED AND PREPARED FOR A PROCEDURAL CHANGE?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	160055
Time
Date	199010
Day	Wed
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	atc facility : gcn
State Reference	AZ
Person 1
Affiliation	government : faa
Function	controller : radar
Qualification	controller : radar
Experience	controller military : 4 controller radar : 7
ASRS Report	160055
Person 2
Affiliation	government : faa
Qualification	controller : radar
Events
Anomaly	other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other controllera
Resolutory Action	none taken : detected after the fact
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	ATC Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Intra Facility Coordination Failure other

Missed approach altitude was raised at gcn and implemented without briefing controllers on the change.