Air carrier captain reported flight crew communication breakdown on initial climb regarding departur...

Narrative:

My first officer (first officer) was making the takeoff. We briefed the takeoff on runway 1 and it was VMC. I told my first officer make the turn prior to the potomac. At vr; he rotated and kept going straight through 400 feet. I stated; you need to turn. With his eyes inside he said; 'LNAV has not engaged.' I stated again to turn left and he started a 10 degree turn to the left. By this time I could not see the potomac so I said louder to turn left. I could see his eyes focused making sure LNAV is engaging. As he increased the angle of bank to 15 I said more angle. By this time; I could not see the potomac.when we arrived in ZZZ; I spoke to him about it and he was insisting that he didn't understand to turn and was watching for LNAV. I asked him if he saw the potomac on the right and he didn't know. His eyes were inside the cockpit the whole time. I said; 'aircraft have flown north of the potomac waiting for LNAV to engage. It's important to stay south of the potomac verses following LNAV.'I think back to when I was first flying [another aircraft] and how my instructors always stated in VMC make sure you see the potomac on your right. That is definitely not being taught at [company].our training at [company] is too focused on LNAV engagement while weak on flying out of dca. It was a clear day and we should always keep the potomac on our right through 2000 feet.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier Captain reported flight crew communication breakdown on initial climb regarding departure route.

Narrative: My FO (First Officer) was making the takeoff. We briefed the takeoff on runway 1 and it was VMC. I told my FO make the turn prior to the Potomac. At VR; he rotated and kept going straight through 400 feet. I stated; you need to turn. With his eyes inside he said; 'LNAV has not engaged.' I stated again to turn left and he started a 10 degree turn to the left. By this time I could not see the Potomac so I said louder to turn left. I could see his eyes focused making sure LNAV is engaging. As he increased the angle of bank to 15 I said more angle. By this time; I could not see the Potomac.When we arrived in ZZZ; I spoke to him about it and he was insisting that he didn't understand to turn and was watching for LNAV. I asked him if he saw the Potomac on the right and he didn't know. His eyes were inside the cockpit the whole time. I said; 'Aircraft have flown north of the Potomac waiting for LNAV to engage. It's important to stay south of the Potomac verses following LNAV.'I think back to when I was first flying [another aircraft] and how my instructors always stated in VMC make sure you see the Potomac on your right. That is definitely not being taught at [company].Our training at [company] is too focused on LNAV engagement while weak on flying out of DCA. It was a clear day and we should always keep the Potomac on our right through 2000 feet.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	1601043
Time
Date	201812
Local Time Of Day	1201-1800
Place
Locale Reference	DCA.Airport
State Reference	DC
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	Large Transport Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	Takeoff
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Function	Captain Pilot Not Flying
Qualification	Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Instrument
Experience	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 275 Flight Crew Total 6925 Flight Crew Type 4466
Events
Anomaly	Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Air carrier captain reported flight crew communication breakdown on initial climb regarding departure route.