Narrative:

I received an ACARS message from the flight crew at xa:03 indicating that they had a bleed 1 fail message. I acknowledged the message and sent the crew new burn numbers for FL300 with a release amendment 1. I emailed a copy of the ACARS message to maintenance control for their awareness.a few minutes later coordinator a at the ZZZ2 [air carrier base] asked me if we could go to ZZZ3 with the aircraft and pick up a spare aircraft. I believed we had sufficient fuel onboard as we would be landing short of our original destination. Weather was also not a factor. Maintenance operations control indicated to them that aircraft would likely be stranded in ZZZ1 or have to be maintenance ferried out.coordinator a advised me that they were getting conflicting messages from maintenance here at the ZZZ2 and maintenance at the soc. At this point I had no idea that coordinator a here at the ZZZ2 was also communicating with coordinator B at the soc.I sent an ACARS message to the flight advising them of the situation that we may be diverting to ZZZ3 to pick up a spare aircraft and continuing to ZZZ1 as to not have a stranded broken aircraft in ZZZ1. I was finally advised that the plan was to divert to ZZZ3 for the aircraft swap and I sent another ACARS message to the crew asking them to divert to ZZZ3 at xa:48. I sent a fob request to the aircraft to run the fuel burn numbers for the diversion. I went to dispatch monitor and the new leg from ZZZ3 to ZZZ1 had already been built; wiping out the previous leg ZZZ-ZZZ1. This was done by coordinator B at the soc without any communication directly with me. I had no way to run the numbers for the crew or to amend the release on my end. I did send an ACARS message to the crew at xa:55 for release amendment 1 for a change of destination. Later I realized it should have been amendment 2 due to the previous amendment for the fight level change. The aircraft had 9200lbs fob at FL300 and approximately 55NM south of ZZZ3 so I do not feel that it would have been a fuel issue but not being able to confirm it did not sit well with me. The crew completely unaware of this situation.we have had this issue before with coordinators and duty managers building flight legs without communication with the controlling dispatcher. As we are still having issues with this maybe the company could put in place a coordinator procedures manual or a standard operation manual for coordinators as there is no required specified training to be a coordinator as there is for dispatch. If there was a document to guide and or remind the coordinator of steps to take; this might be able to be minimized.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier Dispatcher reported a communication breakdown with MC coordinators regarding handling aircraft mechanical diversion. Reporter recommended the need for an SOP delineating responsibilities of Dispatch and MC coordinators.

Narrative: I received an ACARS message from the flight crew at XA:03 indicating that they had a Bleed 1 fail message. I acknowledged the message and sent the crew new burn numbers for FL300 with a release amendment 1. I emailed a copy of the ACARS message to Maintenance Control for their awareness.A few minutes later Coordinator A at the ZZZ2 [Air Carrier base] asked me if we could go to ZZZ3 with the aircraft and pick up a spare aircraft. I believed we had sufficient fuel onboard as we would be landing short of our original destination. Weather was also not a factor. Maintenance Operations Control indicated to them that aircraft would likely be stranded in ZZZ1 or have to be maintenance ferried out.Coordinator A advised me that they were getting conflicting messages from maintenance here at the ZZZ2 and maintenance at the SOC. At this point I had no idea that coordinator A here at the ZZZ2 was also communicating with coordinator B at the SOC.I sent an ACARS message to the flight advising them of the situation that we may be diverting to ZZZ3 to pick up a spare aircraft and continuing to ZZZ1 as to not have a stranded broken aircraft in ZZZ1. I was finally advised that the plan was to divert to ZZZ3 for the aircraft swap and I sent another ACARS message to the crew asking them to divert to ZZZ3 at XA:48. I sent a FOB request to the aircraft to run the fuel burn numbers for the diversion. I went to Dispatch monitor and the new leg from ZZZ3 to ZZZ1 had already been built; wiping out the previous leg ZZZ-ZZZ1. This was done by coordinator B at the SOC without any communication directly with me. I had no way to run the numbers for the crew or to amend the release on my end. I did send an ACARS message to the crew at XA:55 for release amendment 1 for a change of destination. Later I realized it should have been amendment 2 due to the previous amendment for the Fight Level change. The aircraft had 9200lbs FOB at FL300 and approximately 55NM south of ZZZ3 so I do not feel that it would have been a fuel issue but not being able to confirm it did not sit well with me. The crew completely unaware of this situation.We have had this issue before with coordinators and duty managers building flight legs without communication with the controlling Dispatcher. As we are still having issues with this maybe the company could put in place a Coordinator procedures manual or a standard operation manual for coordinators as there is no required specified training to be a coordinator as there is for Dispatch. If there was a document to guide and or remind the coordinator of steps to take; this might be able to be minimized.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.