Narrative:

The aircraft was at an intransit stop. While their maintenance worked on the #2 engine for an indicator problem. Later when I was in operations I was informed that the problem had been found and corrected. Upon returning to the aircraft the cowl was down (#2 engine). I went to the cockpit where the logbook had been signed off by maintenance. I performed the cockpit setup. The outside intransit stop walk around (abbreviated preflight) was then done. #2 engine had freight in front of it. An inspection from the rear of #2 and a quick look under the engine, the cowl for #2 engine appeared closed. On takeoff the #2 engine cowl separated from the aircraft. We did not know of the loss until our arrival at jfk. Other factors I now know in retrospect. The mechanic was called to work on another aircraft as he was ready to fasten the cowl. The logbook had been signed off prior to the work being completed. Combination of factors from my perspective. All trips are all night freight. I was on my 3RD flying night of this trip. I had 36 hours off duty prior to the trip. I slept 8 hours the night before the trip but had only a 2 hour nap during the 9 hours before the flight started. The trip is planned for 12 1/2 hours on duty (7 hours flying broken by 5 1/2 hours ground time at 2 intransit stops). I had been on duty for 7 1/2 hours upon returning to the aircraft in dayton. I believe my mind set was such that I did not expect to find anything wrong with the aircraft at dayton. This was due in part to having completely preflted the aircraft at its original starting point, knowing all was working well on the aircraft at arrival in dayton, and knowing the people working on the aircraft, and having faith in them and their ability. I also believe my judgement was clouded by the general fatigue of all night flying having been awake for 12 hours at this time. Corrective actions: cowls, panels, doors, etc, should not be closed until they are going to be secured. They should be red flagged if there is any doubt of being seen. Logbooks signed off only after all work is completed. A preflight should pay special attention to any areas where work has been done. Combating the complacency that can develop requires a constant vigil. Everyone has to try to watch for signs of becoming too relaxed and comfortable with the task and to remain aware of what the outcomes could be. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter participated in the boeing study. Feels he should have been more thorough on the walk around since he was aware maintenance had performed work on the engine. Would like to see the practice of pulling a mechanic off a job that is not finished stopped.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NUMBER 2 ENGINE COWL CAME OFF ON TKOF.

Narrative: THE ACFT WAS AT AN INTRANSIT STOP. WHILE THEIR MAINT WORKED ON THE #2 ENG FOR AN INDICATOR PROB. LATER WHEN I WAS IN OPS I WAS INFORMED THAT THE PROB HAD BEEN FOUND AND CORRECTED. UPON RETURNING TO THE ACFT THE COWL WAS DOWN (#2 ENG). I WENT TO THE COCKPIT WHERE THE LOGBOOK HAD BEEN SIGNED OFF BY MAINT. I PERFORMED THE COCKPIT SETUP. THE OUTSIDE INTRANSIT STOP WALK AROUND (ABBREVIATED PREFLT) WAS THEN DONE. #2 ENG HAD FREIGHT IN FRONT OF IT. AN INSPECTION FROM THE REAR OF #2 AND A QUICK LOOK UNDER THE ENG, THE COWL FOR #2 ENG APPEARED CLOSED. ON TKOF THE #2 ENG COWL SEPARATED FROM THE ACFT. WE DID NOT KNOW OF THE LOSS UNTIL OUR ARR AT JFK. OTHER FACTORS I NOW KNOW IN RETROSPECT. THE MECH WAS CALLED TO WORK ON ANOTHER ACFT AS HE WAS READY TO FASTEN THE COWL. THE LOGBOOK HAD BEEN SIGNED OFF PRIOR TO THE WORK BEING COMPLETED. COMBINATION OF FACTORS FROM MY PERSPECTIVE. ALL TRIPS ARE ALL NIGHT FREIGHT. I WAS ON MY 3RD FLYING NIGHT OF THIS TRIP. I HAD 36 HOURS OFF DUTY PRIOR TO THE TRIP. I SLEPT 8 HOURS THE NIGHT BEFORE THE TRIP BUT HAD ONLY A 2 HOUR NAP DURING THE 9 HOURS BEFORE THE FLT STARTED. THE TRIP IS PLANNED FOR 12 1/2 HOURS ON DUTY (7 HOURS FLYING BROKEN BY 5 1/2 HOURS GND TIME AT 2 INTRANSIT STOPS). I HAD BEEN ON DUTY FOR 7 1/2 HOURS UPON RETURNING TO THE ACFT IN DAYTON. I BELIEVE MY MIND SET WAS SUCH THAT I DID NOT EXPECT TO FIND ANYTHING WRONG WITH THE ACFT AT DAYTON. THIS WAS DUE IN PART TO HAVING COMPLETELY PREFLTED THE ACFT AT ITS ORIGINAL STARTING POINT, KNOWING ALL WAS WORKING WELL ON THE ACFT AT ARR IN DAYTON, AND KNOWING THE PEOPLE WORKING ON THE ACFT, AND HAVING FAITH IN THEM AND THEIR ABILITY. I ALSO BELIEVE MY JUDGEMENT WAS CLOUDED BY THE GENERAL FATIGUE OF ALL NIGHT FLYING HAVING BEEN AWAKE FOR 12 HOURS AT THIS TIME. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: COWLS, PANELS, DOORS, ETC, SHOULD NOT BE CLOSED UNTIL THEY ARE GOING TO BE SECURED. THEY SHOULD BE RED FLAGGED IF THERE IS ANY DOUBT OF BEING SEEN. LOGBOOKS SIGNED OFF ONLY AFTER ALL WORK IS COMPLETED. A PREFLT SHOULD PAY SPECIAL ATTN TO ANY AREAS WHERE WORK HAS BEEN DONE. COMBATING THE COMPLACENCY THAT CAN DEVELOP REQUIRES A CONSTANT VIGIL. EVERYONE HAS TO TRY TO WATCH FOR SIGNS OF BECOMING TOO RELAXED AND COMFORTABLE WITH THE TASK AND TO REMAIN AWARE OF WHAT THE OUTCOMES COULD BE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR PARTICIPATED IN THE BOEING STUDY. FEELS HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE THOROUGH ON THE WALK AROUND SINCE HE WAS AWARE MAINT HAD PERFORMED WORK ON THE ENG. WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE PRACTICE OF PULLING A MECH OFF A JOB THAT IS NOT FINISHED STOPPED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.