Narrative:

A few minutes after takeoff from ZZZ while climbing through 10;000 feet and in icing conditions; we got left wing a/I and right wing a/I caution messages simultaneously despite the power being set in the climb detent. My captain-upgrade student kept flying and took the radios while I actioned the QRH. After a minute or two; the right wing a/I message extinguished while the left persisted. I switched pages to the appropriate QRH; and we attempted to fix the issue by opening the wing a/I cross bleed but we needed to leave icing conditions. We decided this was only possible by landing somewhere since icing conditions were present from the surface all the way into the high flight levels. We chose ZZZ1 as our divert airport and proceeded to land without further incident. Once in ZZZ1; maintenance decided to have us run engines with them and to do a system ops check; which passed and resulted in the mechanic clearing the discrepancy with a corrective action that said 'ops check good...' skeptical of this technique; I asked the mechanic whether he thought the problem was truly gone; and how likely in his opinion we were to experience the same issue again on the subsequent flight. The reply I got was that an ops check was all he could do at this time; and that his hands were tied because the system had passed the check. Reluctantly; we accepted the aircraft and tried to proceed to [destination]; but climbing through 10;000 feet this time with ice being sensed by the ice detectors we once again got a left wing a/I message. We turned back yet again and landed in ZZZ1 for the second time without further incident. Operational pressure to return aircraft to service as soon as possible without proper troubleshooting. Improve maintenance tracking especially the tracking of serious discrepancies that potentially put aircraft and occupants at risk. Track repeat discrepancies; and ground aircraft that repeatedly have the same serious issues. Add levels of experienced supervision in maintenance control to review actions taken; and determine the airworthiness of an aircraft not just in terms of the maintenance logbook but by considering whether the aircraft is actually safe to fly. As this case clearly shows; there can be a big difference between what the logbook claims is returned to an airworthy condition; and what's really happening. As of late the impression this pilot gets is that maintenance control is willing to accept more risk and experimentation in terms of airworthiness than I am comfortable with. Add to that IMC; icing conditions; and mountainous terrain; and you might see that safety was compromised. With the current climate at this company; I do not feel comfortable refusing an aircraft that maintenance claims is airworthy because I perceive that by doing so I place my continued employment here in jeopardy.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-700 Captain reported diverting to an alternate after receiving L and R WING A/I caution messages. Maintenance at the diversion station signed off the system with 'ops check good;' but the problem recurred after takeoff.

Narrative: A few minutes after takeoff from ZZZ while climbing through 10;000 feet and in icing conditions; we got L WING A/I and R WING A/I Caution messages simultaneously despite the power being set in the climb detent. My Captain-upgrade Student kept flying and took the radios while I actioned the QRH. After a minute or two; the R WING A/I message extinguished while the left persisted. I switched pages to the appropriate QRH; and we attempted to fix the issue by opening the WING A/I CROSS BLEED but we needed to leave icing conditions. We decided this was only possible by landing somewhere since icing conditions were present from the surface all the way into the high flight levels. We chose ZZZ1 as our divert airport and proceeded to land without further incident. Once in ZZZ1; Maintenance decided to have us run engines with them and to do a system ops check; which passed and resulted in the mechanic clearing the discrepancy with a corrective action that said 'ops check good...' Skeptical of this technique; I asked the mechanic whether he thought the problem was truly gone; and how likely in his opinion we were to experience the same issue again on the subsequent flight. The reply I got was that an ops check was all he could do at this time; and that his hands were tied because the system had passed the check. Reluctantly; we accepted the aircraft and tried to proceed to [destination]; but climbing through 10;000 feet this time with ICE being sensed by the ice detectors we once again got a L WING A/I message. We turned back yet again and landed in ZZZ1 for the second time without further incident. Operational pressure to return aircraft to service as soon as possible without proper troubleshooting. Improve maintenance tracking especially the tracking of serious discrepancies that potentially put aircraft and occupants at risk. Track repeat discrepancies; and ground aircraft that repeatedly have the same serious issues. Add levels of experienced supervision in Maintenance Control to review actions taken; and determine the airworthiness of an aircraft not just in terms of the maintenance logbook but by considering whether the aircraft is actually safe to fly. As this case clearly shows; there can be a big difference between what the logbook claims is returned to an airworthy condition; and what's really happening. As of late the impression this pilot gets is that maintenance control is willing to accept more risk and experimentation in terms of airworthiness than I am comfortable with. Add to that IMC; icing conditions; and mountainous terrain; and you might see that safety was compromised. With the current climate at this company; I do not feel comfortable refusing an aircraft that Maintenance claims is airworthy because I perceive that by doing so I place my continued employment here in jeopardy.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.