Narrative:

Flew trip as scheduled. Commuted in from ZZZ1 before the flight. Had adequate rest in ZZZ1 (6-8 hours) in the evening before commuting to ZZZ2. Leg 1: jumpseat; ZZZ2-ZZZ. I slept 2.5 hours on the way to ZZZ. Leg 2: operated; I was the pilot monitoring. During taxi to runway; received level 1 alert messages: 'autopilot single' and 'no autoland.' referenced QRH procedures. Both messages; the procedures were the same. Code = 'maintenance.' consequences = 'none.' taxi and takeoff continued. I was the pilot monitoring for the flight. During climb out phase; autopilot was off. Captain felt higher than normal elevator nose down control forces. After flap/slat retraction; the plane continued to exhibit cyclical fore/aft 'porpoise-like' movement involving nose down pushing forces; which were countered by the captain; the pilot flying. We used the autopilot disconnect switches on the yokes to verify the autopilot was disconnected. 'Ap off' was displayed on pfd. Captain told me to [request priority handling] and vectors for a long straight-in approach to runway 10 at ZZZ (other runway was closed) while he continued to fly the aircraft and maintain aircraft control. With center; I [requested priority handling]; stated 'mayday' and requested vectors to runway 10; and told ATC we were experiencing flight control malfunctions.we did not receive any level 3; 2; 1/0 alerts; nor did any of the 'non-alert' messages in the QRH pertain to this situation. We did not dump fuel (not needed). We used the long approach and the time over the water to configure the aircraft and determine if there were any controllability issues at the slower approach speed. Airplane was still controllable; although the constant nose-down pushing forces remained present throughout the entire flight. ACARS divert was sent; as well as the landing performance request. FMC was configured for straight in ILS approach to 10. During landing phase; I helped guard the controls due to the large nose down forces. Landed safely and taxied clear. Cancelled [priority handling]; although aircraft rescue and firefighting followed us to the ramp due to possible hot brakes.additional notes and observations: first and most importantly; there needs to be a company checklist in place whenever a crew [receives priority handling] for what happens afterwards! I feel like I have been twisted and turned upside down after this event and have no idea where to go. I was rescheduled more than 5 times after this event to include line check with a check airman. The crew should be put into immediate rest; allowed to decompress and process; and then dead-headed home; without worry of a flight or a check ride.1) trying to find anything specific in our manuals is one of the most difficult and time consuming activities I have ever done. If you do not type the phrase into the search engine perfectly; you will not find what you need. Also; bookmarks disappear as well as notes and highlights with all the incessant and non-stop changes to our manuals. For instance; it took me almost 30 minutes to find the specific phrase the captain needed for the write up. It had been moved; and moved again in the fom.2) indications from the cfds (centralized fault display system) show the previous crew began to have malfunctions at approximately 1;900 feet on their arrival into ZZZ. We were not aware of this. There was also a previous write-up in the logbook with similar malfunctions.3) company training is phenomenal with regards to the simulator and learning muscle memory. However; our manuals and the constant changing of company procedures and moving of information around in the manuals contributes to the confusion.4) a suggestion is to only allow changes to the manuals 2 times per year. This would allow us to gain a familiarity with where everything is located; and hopefully; end the ever present confusion of 'where was the written again? Or where can I find that?' it is so frustrating trying to use our manuals now.5) I will have to develop my own way of searching through the manuals; to include probably printing the specific pages to have available instantaneously.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier flight crew reported a flight control problem resulted in a return to the departure airport.

Narrative: Flew trip as scheduled. commuted in from ZZZ1 before the flight. Had adequate rest in ZZZ1 (6-8 hours) in the evening before commuting to ZZZ2. Leg 1: jumpseat; ZZZ2-ZZZ. I slept 2.5 hours on the way to ZZZ. Leg 2: operated; I was the pilot monitoring. During taxi to runway; received level 1 alert messages: 'Autopilot Single' and 'No Autoland.' Referenced QRH procedures. Both messages; the procedures were the same. Code = 'MAINT.' Consequences = 'NONE.' Taxi and takeoff continued. I was the pilot monitoring for the flight. During climb out phase; autopilot was off. Captain felt higher than normal elevator nose down control forces. After flap/slat retraction; the plane continued to exhibit cyclical fore/aft 'porpoise-like' movement involving nose down pushing forces; which were countered by the Captain; the pilot flying. We used the autopilot disconnect switches on the yokes to verify the autopilot was disconnected. 'AP OFF' was displayed on PFD. Captain told me to [request priority handling] and vectors for a long straight-in approach to runway 10 at ZZZ (other runway was closed) while he continued to fly the aircraft and maintain aircraft control. With Center; I [requested priority handling]; stated 'mayday' and requested vectors to runway 10; and told ATC we were experiencing flight control malfunctions.We did not receive any level 3; 2; 1/0 alerts; nor did any of the 'non-alert' messages in the QRH pertain to this situation. We did not dump fuel (not needed). We used the long approach and the time over the water to configure the aircraft and determine if there were any controllability issues at the slower approach speed. Airplane was still controllable; although the constant nose-down pushing forces remained present throughout the entire flight. ACARS divert was sent; as well as the landing performance request. FMC was configured for straight in ILS approach to 10. During landing phase; I helped guard the controls due to the large nose down forces. Landed safely and taxied clear. Cancelled [priority handling]; although Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting followed us to the ramp due to possible hot brakes.Additional notes and observations: First and most importantly; there needs to be a company checklist in place whenever a crew [receives priority handling] for what happens afterwards! I feel like I have been twisted and turned upside down after this event and have no idea where to go. I was rescheduled more than 5 times after this event to include line check with a check airman. The crew should be put into immediate rest; allowed to decompress and process; and then dead-headed home; without worry of a flight or a check ride.1) Trying to find anything specific in our manuals is one of the most difficult and time consuming activities I have ever done. If you do not type the phrase into the search engine perfectly; you will not find what you need. Also; bookmarks disappear as well as notes and highlights with all the incessant and non-stop changes to our manuals. For instance; it took me almost 30 minutes to find the specific phrase the captain needed for the write up. It had been moved; and moved again in the FOM.2) Indications from the CFDS (Centralized Fault Display System) show the previous crew began to have malfunctions at approximately 1;900 feet on their arrival into ZZZ. We were not aware of this. There was also a previous write-up in the logbook with similar malfunctions.3) Company training is phenomenal with regards to the simulator and learning muscle memory. However; our manuals and the constant changing of company procedures and moving of information around in the manuals contributes to the confusion.4) A suggestion is to only allow changes to the manuals 2 times per year. This would allow us to gain a familiarity with where everything is located; and hopefully; end the ever present confusion of 'where was the written again? Or where can I find that?' It is so frustrating trying to use our manuals now.5) I will have to develop my own way of searching through the manuals; to include probably printing the specific pages to have available instantaneously.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.