Narrative:

I was in and out of the aircraft three times coordinating [de-icing/anti-ice] (no ground headset communications). As I left the cockpit for the walk around; I heard the first officer calling for a verbal clearance; but did not hear the clearance or read back. After walk around I closed the cabin door; armed; readied the cabin; and returned to the cockpit. First officer explained that clearance delivery changed the flight plan; which was input into the FMC; and confirmed with the captain by stepping through the legs. I was told 10;000 feet was the cleared altitude as set in the MCP. At the same time I was ensuring that our hot (holdover time) application was activated; as we had been treated with type 4. Began towing immediately.taxi distractions. Civilian car stuck on side of taxiway; requiring tug to veer off centerline and coordination to take us onto taxiway a for start. Landing distance assessment. Captain tasked me with calling load control (cell phone) to coordinate closeout. We were approaching the departure point when tower cleared us for takeoff without altitude assignment. Captain requested more time before takeoff to go over recently acquired closeout. Takeoff clearance was cancelled. When ready; takeoff clearance was granted a second time; without an altitude assignment; with tower requesting a PIREP on cloud base. Takeoff uneventful. Tower handed us off to departure; and tower asked for a base report. First officer responded with a [bases] report. Switched to departure. Before check-in; departure was already calling for us to level off at 3000 feet and calling traffic; initially at 3 o'clock and then 9 o'clock. Captain's navigation range was at 5 miles; and traffic was not visible on TCAS. He changed the range so the traffic could be seen at 9-10 o'clock.approaching 3000 feet MSL; in rapid succession; captain hand-flying; TCAS TA traffic alert; ATC call to level at 3000 feet; ATC call of traffic; TCAS RA to descend. First officer and I both called for a descent to 3000 feet. Captain was slow to respond as he and I were looking at the converging traffic. Traffic in sight 9 o'clock high; TCAS RA. We finally started descending at 3800 feet; showing 400 feet separation. Descended to 3000 feet. After RA we descended to 3000 feet and assigned 120 heading. Autopilot was engaged at some point after the RA. Captain did not heading select 120; but instead began a discussion about what happened. I insisted that we needed to turn another 30 degrees to the left to a heading of 120. ATC then told us to fly 110 degrees. I insisted he heading select to the heading. Captain reached up and began turning the airspeed selector to a lower airspeed; thinking he was turning the heading select. I began to give loud and directive inputs to get him to reset the airspeed and instead turn the heading selector. He finally complied. 5 minutes later I found paperwork that appeared to be our departure clearance; which had a handwritten annotation of 3000 feet.captain and first officer had set the wrong departure altitude in the MCP; and were actively flying to the wrong altitude. [I] was not in cockpit when clearance was obtained. Captain and first officer briefed me that clearance had given us a climb altitude that was incorrect. When ACARS printed clearance is not available; all pilots should be present for clearance request and read back.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier flight crew reported climbing above the assigned departure altitude into a confliction with crossing traffic.

Narrative: I was in and out of the aircraft three times coordinating [de-icing/anti-ice] (no ground headset communications). As I left the cockpit for the walk around; I heard the First Officer calling for a verbal clearance; but did not hear the clearance or read back. After walk around I closed the cabin door; armed; readied the cabin; and returned to the cockpit. First Officer explained that Clearance Delivery changed the flight plan; which was input into the FMC; and confirmed with the Captain by stepping through the legs. I was told 10;000 feet was the cleared altitude as set in the MCP. At the same time I was ensuring that our HOT (Holdover Time) application was activated; as we had been treated with Type 4. Began towing immediately.Taxi distractions. Civilian car stuck on side of taxiway; requiring tug to veer off centerline and coordination to take us onto Taxiway A for start. Landing distance assessment. Captain tasked me with calling load control (cell phone) to coordinate closeout. We were approaching the departure point when Tower cleared us for takeoff without altitude assignment. Captain requested more time before takeoff to go over recently acquired closeout. Takeoff clearance was cancelled. When ready; takeoff clearance was granted a second time; without an altitude assignment; with Tower requesting a PIREP on cloud base. Takeoff uneventful. Tower handed us off to Departure; and Tower asked for a base report. First Officer responded with a [bases] report. Switched to Departure. Before check-in; Departure was already calling for us to level off at 3000 feet and calling traffic; initially at 3 o'clock and then 9 o'clock. Captain's NAV range was at 5 miles; and traffic was not visible on TCAS. He changed the range so the traffic could be seen at 9-10 o'clock.Approaching 3000 feet MSL; in rapid succession; Captain hand-flying; TCAS TA traffic alert; ATC call to level at 3000 feet; ATC call of traffic; TCAS RA to descend. First Officer and I both called for a descent to 3000 feet. Captain was slow to respond as he and I were looking at the converging traffic. Traffic in sight 9 o'clock high; TCAS RA. We finally started descending at 3800 feet; showing 400 feet separation. Descended to 3000 feet. After RA we descended to 3000 feet and assigned 120 heading. Autopilot was engaged at some point after the RA. Captain did not Heading Select 120; but instead began a discussion about what happened. I insisted that we needed to turn another 30 degrees to the left to a heading of 120. ATC then told us to fly 110 degrees. I insisted he Heading Select to the heading. Captain reached up and began turning the Airspeed Selector to a lower airspeed; thinking he was turning the Heading Select. I began to give loud and directive inputs to get him to reset the airspeed and instead turn the heading selector. He finally complied. 5 minutes later I found paperwork that appeared to be our departure clearance; which had a handwritten annotation of 3000 feet.Captain and First Officer had set the wrong departure altitude in the MCP; and were actively flying to the wrong altitude. [I] was not in cockpit when clearance was obtained. Captain and First Officer briefed me that clearance had given us a climb altitude that was incorrect. When ACARS printed clearance is not available; all pilots should be present for clearance request and read back.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.