Narrative:

I had taken an aog (aircraft on ground) squawk -'after selecting the landing gear handle down there is a loud bang in the nose gear area. The nose gear takes a normal amount of time to go down and no associated cas (crew alerting system) messages are visible;' I had applied for a ferry flight in our portal as would be normal. Later that evening I was informed by my maintenance duty manager operations had changed my request to a gear up ferry flight; I did ask why; [the manager] did send me guidance from our fleet supervisor a chart from the chief pilot with a specific chart to follow which I already had but still requested; then I also received a letter from [the aircraft manufacturer] dated to our domicile; fleet program director and vp safety that was not part of [maintenance control] original guidance; but after reading this letter I spoke to the duty manager and explained my stance with this whole issue and placed in the ferry flight line and added a status note.the next day back at work I was ordered personally via e-mail from my fleet supervisor to have tech complete a gear up ferry flight inspection and re-send the [flight check] portal as such this discrepancy clearly meets the gear up ferry criteria developed by [the company]; so I did as I was told.please keep in mind that all of these crew squawks I have taken in the past and phone conversations they said the words such as 'bang; a loud bang; a loud clunk; the bang startled both of us' etc. The letter from [the aircraft manufacturer] as I read it I could not help but notice and question that there are no references of 'loud bang heard/felt etc.' anywhere in either document.I found it very misleading and deceiving for the letter from [the aircraft manufacturer] to merely state 'louder than normal' or 'noisy or desynchronized landing gear extension' this is even more reason for me to scrutinize during my decision making process here in [maintenance control] as now I was not so sure these [aircraft manufacturer] flight ops people even saw the video. I did not take it lightly to write that status note in ferry line; I thought it through completely and my decision was not to fly aircraft gear up. But was overruled over guidance I still do not agree with.I caution flying our aircraft gear up with the known gear such as this particular problem is now seems a calculated risk that is acceptable as a new standard. Industry safety and warning terms come to mind such as the 'dirty dozen.' [the company] 20/20 flight plan safety and goal 'zero mishaps' 'the stop sign goes up after the accident' or 'the 'o' rings will fail below 40 degrees.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Technician reported requesting a gear down ferry flight due to a problem with nose landing gear extend mechanism but is over ridden by Supervisor.

Narrative: I had taken an AOG (Aircraft on Ground) squawk -'After selecting the landing gear handle down there is a loud bang in the nose gear area. The nose gear takes a normal amount of time to go down and no associated CAS (Crew Alerting System) messages are visible;' I had applied for a ferry flight in our portal as would be normal. Later that evening I was informed by my Maintenance Duty Manager operations had changed my request to a gear up ferry flight; I did ask why; [the manager] did send me guidance from our fleet supervisor a chart from the chief pilot with a specific chart to follow which I already had but still requested; then I also received a letter from [the aircraft manufacturer] dated to our domicile; Fleet Program Director and VP Safety that was not part of [Maintenance Control] original guidance; but after reading this letter I spoke to the Duty Manager and explained my stance with this whole issue and placed in the ferry flight line and added a status note.The next day back at work I was ordered personally via e-mail from my Fleet Supervisor to have tech complete a gear up ferry flight inspection and re-send the [Flight Check] portal as such this discrepancy clearly meets the GEAR UP ferry criteria developed by [the company]; so I did as I was told.Please keep in mind that all of these crew squawks I have taken in the past and phone conversations they said the words such as 'bang; a loud bang; a loud clunk; the bang startled both of us' etc. The letter from [the aircraft manufacturer] as I read it I could not help but notice and question that there are no references of 'loud bang heard/felt etc.' anywhere in either document.I found it very misleading and deceiving for the letter from [the aircraft manufacturer] to merely state 'louder than normal' or 'noisy or desynchronized landing gear extension' this is even more reason for me to scrutinize during my decision making process here in [Maintenance Control] as now I was not so sure these [aircraft manufacturer] flight ops people even saw the video. I did not take it lightly to write that status note in ferry line; I thought it through completely and my decision was not to fly aircraft gear up. But was overruled over guidance I still do not agree with.I caution flying our aircraft gear up with the known gear such as this particular problem is now seems a calculated risk that is acceptable as a new standard. Industry safety and warning terms come to mind such as the 'dirty dozen.' [The company] 20/20 flight plan safety and goal 'zero mishaps' 'the stop sign goes up after the accident' or 'the 'o' rings will fail below 40 degrees.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.