Narrative:

At iah, after a destination, aircraft and F/a change, I departed for jackson. I was the PF. Light turbulence and icing were encountered. Jackson WX was obtained. Visibility approachs to runway 33L were being used and suggested. I was in VMC below 4000' MSL. The entire jackson area was visible. There were rain showers with lightning surrounding the area. We briefed extensively on the airport, surrounding airports, method of navigation and approachs. I was on an assigned heading, at 2600' MSL, and approximately 10 mi from jackson international when I was cleared for a visibility approach to runway 33L. I oriented myself using jackson VOR DME, and what I believed was jackson international beacon and cambel field beacon. I did not have a sectional chart. What I was actually looking at was hawkins field and jackson international off in the distance. Hawkins field is approximately 7 mi from jackson international. I clearly idented a northwest oriented runway I mistakenly took for jan runway 33L. I entered a standard pattern and turning base leg and switched navigation from jan VOR to jan ILS runway 33L. This procedure was briefed in range. I had jan runway 15R in the ADF. On final the adr was a little off. The G/south was out and the localizer was not sensing properly. We believed and discussed various reasons for the irregularity. Other visibility cues reinforced our belief we were on final at jan. I was actual on final at hawkins (runway 34). Shortly after T/D we realized we had landed at the wrong airport. I exited the runway. We informed ATC and dispatch, and began to arrange accommodations for the passenger. Supplemental information from acn 162600: on the landing roll, we realized our mistake by the runway end #, but elected to land as the safest course of action. We cleared the runway and established communications with jackson radio and our company, and advised them of our situation. The passenger were deplaned and bussed home. We were relieved of duty and sent for debriefing at houston. I believe this incident occurred because of many contributing factors: our first time flying to jackson, approach and tower being closed, and our failure to realize the small clues that didn't add up. The ILS and G/south didn't work, but reasoned to be turned off or set for reverse approach segment. And the deciding factor, the runway heading, matched and we believed it--our failure to realize the cards were stacking up against us. Hopefully something can be learned for this. My suggestion is to be more skeptical in unknown areas and not to fail to see the entire picture.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF MDT APCHING JAN LANDED WRONG ARPT (HKS).

Narrative: AT IAH, AFTER A DEST, ACFT AND F/A CHANGE, I DEPARTED FOR JACKSON. I WAS THE PF. LIGHT TURB AND ICING WERE ENCOUNTERED. JACKSON WX WAS OBTAINED. VIS APCHS TO RWY 33L WERE BEING USED AND SUGGESTED. I WAS IN VMC BELOW 4000' MSL. THE ENTIRE JACKSON AREA WAS VISIBLE. THERE WERE RAIN SHOWERS WITH LIGHTNING SURROUNDING THE AREA. WE BRIEFED EXTENSIVELY ON THE ARPT, SURROUNDING ARPTS, METHOD OF NAV AND APCHS. I WAS ON AN ASSIGNED HDG, AT 2600' MSL, AND APPROX 10 MI FROM JACKSON INTL WHEN I WAS CLRED FOR A VIS APCH TO RWY 33L. I ORIENTED MYSELF USING JACKSON VOR DME, AND WHAT I BELIEVED WAS JACKSON INTL BEACON AND CAMBEL FIELD BEACON. I DID NOT HAVE A SECTIONAL CHART. WHAT I WAS ACTUALLY LOOKING AT WAS HAWKINS FIELD AND JACKSON INTL OFF IN THE DISTANCE. HAWKINS FIELD IS APPROX 7 MI FROM JACKSON INTL. I CLEARLY IDENTED A NW ORIENTED RWY I MISTAKENLY TOOK FOR JAN RWY 33L. I ENTERED A STANDARD PATTERN AND TURNING BASE LEG AND SWITCHED NAV FROM JAN VOR TO JAN ILS RWY 33L. THIS PROC WAS BRIEFED IN RANGE. I HAD JAN RWY 15R IN THE ADF. ON FINAL THE ADR WAS A LITTLE OFF. THE G/S WAS OUT AND THE LOC WAS NOT SENSING PROPERLY. WE BELIEVED AND DISCUSSED VARIOUS REASONS FOR THE IRREGULARITY. OTHER VIS CUES REINFORCED OUR BELIEF WE WERE ON FINAL AT JAN. I WAS ACTUAL ON FINAL AT HAWKINS (RWY 34). SHORTLY AFTER T/D WE REALIZED WE HAD LANDED AT THE WRONG ARPT. I EXITED THE RWY. WE INFORMED ATC AND DISPATCH, AND BEGAN TO ARRANGE ACCOMMODATIONS FOR THE PAX. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 162600: ON THE LNDG ROLL, WE REALIZED OUR MISTAKE BY THE RWY END #, BUT ELECTED TO LAND AS THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION. WE CLRED THE RWY AND ESTABLISHED COMS WITH JACKSON RADIO AND OUR COMPANY, AND ADVISED THEM OF OUR SITUATION. THE PAX WERE DEPLANED AND BUSSED HOME. WE WERE RELIEVED OF DUTY AND SENT FOR DEBRIEFING AT HOUSTON. I BELIEVE THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED BECAUSE OF MANY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: OUR FIRST TIME FLYING TO JACKSON, APCH AND TWR BEING CLOSED, AND OUR FAILURE TO REALIZE THE SMALL CLUES THAT DIDN'T ADD UP. THE ILS AND G/S DIDN'T WORK, BUT REASONED TO BE TURNED OFF OR SET FOR REVERSE APCH SEGMENT. AND THE DECIDING FACTOR, THE RWY HDG, MATCHED AND WE BELIEVED IT--OUR FAILURE TO REALIZE THE CARDS WERE STACKING UP AGAINST US. HOPEFULLY SOMETHING CAN BE LEARNED FOR THIS. MY SUGGESTION IS TO BE MORE SKEPTICAL IN UNKNOWN AREAS AND NOT TO FAIL TO SEE THE ENTIRE PICTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.