Narrative:

Climbing through approximately 15;000 ft the C hydraulic qty EICAS message illuminated. Checked the status page and the C hydraulic quantity was dropping quickly. Turned off the C hydraulic pumps without the checklist in attempt to stop the leak. Requested to level at 19;000 to diagnose. First officer [first officer] took the flying and ATC duties and I worked with the international relief officer to accomplish checklists. The C hydraulic system press EICAS was now illuminated. ATC was advised of our problem and provided delaying vectors. [Notified ATC.] we began with the C hydraulic qty checklist; which was the initial alert we had gotten. That directed us to the to the C hydraulic system press checklist. We read and accomplished that checklist. We concluded that continuing to ZZZ1 was not practical and a return was necessary. Dispatch contact was first via ACARS to quickly tell him of our loss of the C hydraulic system and our thoughts to return for landing. We also told him of our plan to dump about 10;000 lbs of fuel. Then a phone patch was established and we discussed all of the previous and perhaps landing at ZZZ2 for a longer runway. ZZZ xxl landing distance was only 8207 ft and the wind was a slight quartering tailwind when we took off. Dispatcher provided landing data for 22L [and] xxr. ATC offered xxr with the full ILS. With a calculated required landing distance of 5800 ft and xxr having 9560 ft available the winds were now a headwind the decision was made to land ZZZ xxr. Permission was given from center to dump fuel. Dispatch was notified and we ran the fuel dumping checklist. Flight attendants were now advised of the emergency. During the test briefing I told them a normal landing was planned and not to prep for evacuation but mentally review the procedures. The passenger announcement was now made. When the decision was made to return to ZZZ; [center] ATC cleared us to hold at intersection on the zzzzz arrival. We held for approximately another hour and a half to burn around 21;000 lbs of fuel to reach max landing weight of 350;000 lbs. During the hold time; dispatcher continued to provide us with the necessary support by arranging emergency equipment; ATC priority and ZZZ operations coordination. While in holding we reviewed the checklists several times and numerous check-in's were made with the flight attendants. At least one additional PA announcement. Left the hold at 350;000 lbs and accomplished the alternate gear and alternate flap extension checklists. A normal landing was made and with the reserve brakes and steering we were able to easily make the turnoff under our own power and taxi to gate. After block in a full cockpit and cabin crew debrief was performed. The deplaning passengers were very understanding and supportive of the safety decision to return. This flight attendant crew under the purser xx_33 xx_21 was outstanding from the onset. It was their caring and attentive attitude that lead to a calm and cooperative demeanor of the passengers. This crew is a fine example of the true spirit the company strives for. A maintenance debrief was conducted. The technicians said the adp was leaking. They asked us if we had conferenced with [maintenance]. I had not considered this option because I felt that the loss of the C hydraulic system was a clear situation that continued ETOPS flight was not an option and the written checklists were precisely all the guidance we needed to conduct a safe flight. I debriefed only with the [chief pilot] as the dispatch shift had changed. However; the pilot/ dispatcher communication and cooperation was textbook and exactly as you would expect it to be handled. In retrospect there are several takeaways for me from this experience. First is the false sense of time available. In our training environment; time and fuel are always critical resources. Usually once an emergency happens; it is resolved and you are back on the ground within 45 minutes. In this emergency we had just departed and the amount of fuel we had; created excess time available. There was no urgency to land or make hasty decisions. Despite this fact; I still think the mindset was to accomplish all tasks as soon as possible. As a result of this misconception; I think I chose to dump fuel early thinking it would expedite the landing. When in fact after the dump we still had to burn 20;000 lbs. I think a better decision would have been to hold off on this checklist and perform it at a later time and perhaps a different location. I still believe dumping the fuel was the right thing to do. It saved another hour of airborne holding which may have reduced some anxiety that the passengers may have been feeling. That all being said; everything did go like a training scenario. We all felt prepared and comfortable with the checklists and the duties required of us. This is truly a credit to our training center and all of the dedicated individuals who selflessly teach and help to maintain our flying skills every year. Thank you.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: 767 flight crew reported a hydraulic system failure and the steps taken to get the aircraft on the ground safely.

Narrative: Climbing through approximately 15;000 ft the C HYD QTY EICAS message illuminated. Checked the status page and the C HYD quantity was dropping quickly. Turned off the C HYD pumps without the checklist in attempt to stop the leak. Requested to level at 19;000 to diagnose. F/O [First Officer] took the flying and ATC duties and I worked with the IRO to accomplish checklists. The C HYD SYS PRESS EICAS was now illuminated. ATC was advised of our problem and provided delaying vectors. [Notified ATC.] We began with the C HYD QTY checklist; which was the initial alert we had gotten. That directed us to the to the C HYD SYS PRESS checklist. We read and accomplished that checklist. We concluded that continuing to ZZZ1 was not practical and a return was necessary. Dispatch contact was first via ACARS to quickly tell him of our loss of the C HYD SYS and our thoughts to return for landing. We also told him of our plan to dump about 10;000 lbs of fuel. Then a phone patch was established and we discussed all of the previous and perhaps landing at ZZZ2 for a longer runway. ZZZ XXL landing distance was only 8207 ft and the wind was a slight quartering tailwind when we took off. Dispatcher provided landing data for 22L [and] XXR. ATC offered XXR with the full ILS. With a calculated required landing distance of 5800 ft and XXR having 9560 ft available the winds were now a headwind the decision was made to land ZZZ XXR. Permission was given from Center to dump fuel. Dispatch was notified and we ran the fuel dumping checklist. Flight Attendants were now advised of the emergency. During the test briefing I told them a normal landing was planned and not to prep for evacuation but mentally review the procedures. The passenger announcement was now made. When the decision was made to return to ZZZ; [Center] ATC cleared us to hold at intersection on the ZZZZZ Arrival. We held for approximately another hour and a half to burn around 21;000 lbs of fuel to reach max landing weight of 350;000 lbs. During the hold time; Dispatcher continued to provide us with the necessary support by arranging emergency equipment; ATC priority and ZZZ Operations coordination. While in holding we reviewed the checklists several times and numerous check-in's were made with the flight attendants. At least one additional PA announcement. Left the hold at 350;000 lbs and accomplished the alternate gear and alternate flap extension checklists. A normal landing was made and with the reserve brakes and steering we were able to easily make the turnoff under our own power and taxi to gate. After block in a full cockpit and cabin crew debrief was performed. The deplaning passengers were very understanding and supportive of the safety decision to return. This flight attendant crew under the Purser XX_33 XX_21 was outstanding from the onset. It was their caring and attentive attitude that lead to a calm and cooperative demeanor of the passengers. This crew is a fine example of the true spirit the company strives for. A maintenance debrief was conducted. The technicians said the ADP was leaking. They asked us if we had conferenced with [Maintenance]. I had not considered this option because I felt that the loss of the C hydraulic SYS was a clear situation that continued ETOPS flight was not an option and the written checklists were precisely all the guidance we needed to conduct a safe flight. I debriefed only with the [Chief Pilot] as the Dispatch shift had changed. However; the Pilot/ Dispatcher communication and cooperation was textbook and exactly as you would expect it to be handled. In retrospect there are several takeaways for me from this experience. First is the false sense of time available. In our training environment; time and fuel are always critical resources. Usually once an emergency happens; it is resolved and you are back on the ground within 45 minutes. In this emergency we had just departed and the amount of fuel we had; created excess time available. There was no urgency to land or make hasty decisions. Despite this fact; I still think the mindset was to accomplish all tasks ASAP. As a result of this misconception; I think I chose to dump fuel early thinking it would expedite the landing. When in fact after the dump we still had to burn 20;000 lbs. I think a better decision would have been to hold off on this checklist and perform it at a later time and perhaps a different location. I still believe dumping the fuel was the right thing to do. It saved another hour of airborne holding which may have reduced some anxiety that the passengers may have been feeling. That all being said; everything did go like a training scenario. We all felt prepared and comfortable with the checklists and the duties required of us. This is truly a credit to our training center and all of the dedicated individuals who selflessly teach and help to maintain our flying skills every year. Thank you.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.