Narrative:

This report concerns the nose abatement takeoff procedures in use at sna/orange county airport. On the above date, I flew as a captain on a scheduled airline flight from sna to san francisco. We took off on runway 19R and were cleared via a musel 5 SID to the en route fix. Shortly before we received our takeoff clearance, a light aircraft was cleared for takeoff on the parallel runway 19L. After we began our initial climb, I was surprised at the high nose attitude we had to maintain to follow the noise abatement profile. It is very difficult to see aircraft directly ahead, particularly the light aircraft that had taken off ahead of us. While this particular aircraft did not present any hazard at the time, it was apparent to me that there were elements that degraded safety by following a proximity such as this. The high nose angle during the initial climb (25 degree) makes it very difficult if not impossible in some cases, to see traffic ahead of you. Typical reduced visibility conditions and considerable light aircraft traffic in and around this airport, make this condition particularly hazardous. The nose abatement we must fly at sna takes a great deal of attention to comply with, so as not to set off the noise meters. It is very different than the profiles we fly at other airports. This condition is further aggravated by a glass cockpit/high tech aircraft with a 2 man crew, all this leaves less time to look out the window for traffic. The flap retraction schedule is unique to this procedure at sna. It requires carrying takeoff flaps to 3000' rather than the usual 1000'. It also requires using a derated climb thrust with the flaps down from 1000-3000', rather than the standard climb thrust at 1000', acceleration, and clean up. Sna also has a non-standard engine failure procedure because of the noise abatement profile. While guidelines are discussed about what to do in a special sna airport page, I believe a great deal of confusion would result in an actual engine failure occurred. We are trained to follow closely a standard engine failure takeoff profile. This is only modified by terrain considerations at a few airports. When an engine fails on takeoff it I a very high workload situation that requires many things be done correctly. The procedure at sna would make this maneuver particularly difficult. I would like to summarize with some general (non-operational) comments that are pertinent to this report. All the large airline aircraft I observed at sna were stage 3 airplanes. These are the quietest jet transports flying. This airport further requires that these aircraft fly highly irregular and potentially dangerous takeoff profiles to comply with its stringent noise requirements. Additionally, this airport requires compliance with these requirements or individual airlines are threatened with the loss of some of their allocated slots (beat the noise meter). This may promote competitive flying among pilots from different airlines and cause them to fly procedures they are uncomfortable with, but are reluctant to report because of the penalty their airline would pay. This is a situation that should not continue at this airport nor be allowed to spread to others.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FO REPORTING PROTESTS NOISE ABATEMENT PROC FOR TKOF AND DEP FROM SNA, CA.

Narrative: THIS RPT CONCERNS THE NOSE ABATEMENT TKOF PROCS IN USE AT SNA/ORANGE COUNTY ARPT. ON THE ABOVE DATE, I FLEW AS A CAPT ON A SCHEDULED AIRLINE FLT FROM SNA TO SAN FRANCISCO. WE TOOK OFF ON RWY 19R AND WERE CLRED VIA A MUSEL 5 SID TO THE ENRTE FIX. SHORTLY BEFORE WE RECEIVED OUR TKOF CLRNC, A LIGHT ACFT WAS CLRED FOR TKOF ON THE PARALLEL RWY 19L. AFTER WE BEGAN OUR INITIAL CLB, I WAS SURPRISED AT THE HIGH NOSE ATTITUDE WE HAD TO MAINTAIN TO FOLLOW THE NOISE ABATEMENT PROFILE. IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO SEE ACFT DIRECTLY AHEAD, PARTICULARLY THE LIGHT ACFT THAT HAD TAKEN OFF AHEAD OF US. WHILE THIS PARTICULAR ACFT DID NOT PRESENT ANY HAZARD AT THE TIME, IT WAS APPARENT TO ME THAT THERE WERE ELEMENTS THAT DEGRADED SAFETY BY FOLLOWING A PROX SUCH AS THIS. THE HIGH NOSE ANGLE DURING THE INITIAL CLB (25 DEG) MAKES IT VERY DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE IN SOME CASES, TO SEE TFC AHEAD OF YOU. TYPICAL REDUCED VISIBILITY CONDITIONS AND CONSIDERABLE LIGHT ACFT TFC IN AND AROUND THIS ARPT, MAKE THIS CONDITION PARTICULARLY HAZARDOUS. THE NOSE ABATEMENT WE MUST FLY AT SNA TAKES A GREAT DEAL OF ATTN TO COMPLY WITH, SO AS NOT TO SET OFF THE NOISE METERS. IT IS VERY DIFFERENT THAN THE PROFILES WE FLY AT OTHER ARPTS. THIS CONDITION IS FURTHER AGGRAVATED BY A GLASS COCKPIT/HIGH TECH ACFT WITH A 2 MAN CREW, ALL THIS LEAVES LESS TIME TO LOOK OUT THE WINDOW FOR TFC. THE FLAP RETRACTION SCHEDULE IS UNIQUE TO THIS PROC AT SNA. IT REQUIRES CARRYING TKOF FLAPS TO 3000' RATHER THAN THE USUAL 1000'. IT ALSO REQUIRES USING A DERATED CLB THRUST WITH THE FLAPS DOWN FROM 1000-3000', RATHER THAN THE STANDARD CLB THRUST AT 1000', ACCELERATION, AND CLEAN UP. SNA ALSO HAS A NON-STANDARD ENG FAILURE PROC BECAUSE OF THE NOISE ABATEMENT PROFILE. WHILE GUIDELINES ARE DISCUSSED ABOUT WHAT TO DO IN A SPECIAL SNA ARPT PAGE, I BELIEVE A GREAT DEAL OF CONFUSION WOULD RESULT IN AN ACTUAL ENG FAILURE OCCURRED. WE ARE TRAINED TO FOLLOW CLOSELY A STANDARD ENG FAILURE TKOF PROFILE. THIS IS ONLY MODIFIED BY TERRAIN CONSIDERATIONS AT A FEW ARPTS. WHEN AN ENG FAILS ON TKOF IT I A VERY HIGH WORKLOAD SITUATION THAT REQUIRES MANY THINGS BE DONE CORRECTLY. THE PROC AT SNA WOULD MAKE THIS MANEUVER PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT. I WOULD LIKE TO SUMMARIZE WITH SOME GENERAL (NON-OPERATIONAL) COMMENTS THAT ARE PERTINENT TO THIS RPT. ALL THE LARGE AIRLINE ACFT I OBSERVED AT SNA WERE STAGE 3 AIRPLANES. THESE ARE THE QUIETEST JET TRANSPORTS FLYING. THIS ARPT FURTHER REQUIRES THAT THESE ACFT FLY HIGHLY IRREGULAR AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TKOF PROFILES TO COMPLY WITH ITS STRINGENT NOISE REQUIREMENTS. ADDITIONALLY, THIS ARPT REQUIRES COMPLIANCE WITH THESE REQUIREMENTS OR INDIVIDUAL AIRLINES ARE THREATENED WITH THE LOSS OF SOME OF THEIR ALLOCATED SLOTS (BEAT THE NOISE METER). THIS MAY PROMOTE COMPETITIVE FLYING AMONG PLTS FROM DIFFERENT AIRLINES AND CAUSE THEM TO FLY PROCS THEY ARE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH, BUT ARE RELUCTANT TO RPT BECAUSE OF THE PENALTY THEIR AIRLINE WOULD PAY. THIS IS A SITUATION THAT SHOULD NOT CONTINUE AT THIS ARPT NOR BE ALLOWED TO SPREAD TO OTHERS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.