Narrative:

After flying together for three days; we were unable to develop much of a shared mental model. I struggled to understand my captain's thought process and often found it to be unusual. From the beginning of our trip; I got the impression that he was someone that was consciously trying to suppress his abrasive personality; which would later periodically show itself throughout our trip. I found these issues to be both frustrating and distracting. I was often lagging in our risk mitigation simply because of the atmosphere in the flight deck. In an attempt to be professional and get along; I tried to be compliant and follow his lead. At the end of our last flight; we were dealing with thunderstorms. As we approached our destination; the storms were over and around the airport. Approach control told us to expect runway xx because of the wind direction and position of the storm cells. Approach reported that the storm was moving off the airport to the east. The ATIS was reporting 10 miles visibility. Because we were expecting improving conditions; we briefed the visual approach backed up by the RNAV (GPS) xx. We had to fly an extended downwind; to get around the storm cells; which led to a long final approach. As we joined the final approach the weather began to deteriorate again. We continued to approach the airport. Approach control began giving weather updates. I suggested that we adjust our minimums from field elevation to LNAV/VNAV minimums as a precaution. My captain agreed. As we continued to approach the airport; the weather continued to get worse. The last report; that I recall; was 1 1/4 miles visibility with wind gusting to 29 knots. Foolishly; we continued the approach. As we approached minimums; it became clear that we would have difficulty seeing the airport. Even though I was flying an autopilot coupled approach; my captain began instructing me multiple times to make sure I stayed on the glide-path. I found his unnecessary coaching non-standard; distracting; unprofessional and degrading. We reached minimums. We were in heavy rain and I had nothing in sight. Therefore; I executed a go-around. I was shocked at my captain's outward display of displeasure and irritation that I initiated a go-around. He sighed; then disgustingly stated; 'you had the runway right in front of you!' never in my 21 year career have I had a captain respond so inappropriately to a go-around. I was distracted and frustrated. As approach control vectored us out and back around; the wind and weather continued to shift and change. We set up and briefed the ILS CAT ii to runway xyl. My captain flew the approach in significantly better weather and we landed uneventfully. The more I reflect back on our first approach; the more things I realize we did wrong. Also; despite the company's efforts; there is still a reluctance to execute a go-around. More and continued emphasis is needed. With thunderstorms in the area; we should have completed a full instrument approach briefing; even though the initial expectation was for the weather to be VFR and improving. If we had done that; we would have been more aware that the weather had moved below our minimums of 1 3/8 miles for the approach. There were many warning signs that should have indicated that we needed to discontinue the approach. However; we continued for all the wrong reasons. It was the end of a long day on the third day of a long trip. There was a desire to finish flying with someone you do not enjoy working with. Never developing a shared mental model was both distracting and frustrating. Trying to be compliant and follow my captain's lead; to prevent conflict; kept me from speaking up. I should have stated that; I don't think we should continue; we need to break this approach off; let the weather improve; and come back around more prepared; which; by default; was what ultimately occurred. However; the approach never should have begun. Unfortunately; there are still captains out there that do not create a positive atmosphere in the flight deck. Because of that our risk management was at a low level throughout our trip. Continued emphasis is needed with more scenario based training.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 First Officer reported experiencing difficult CRM during a trip.

Narrative: After flying together for three days; we were unable to develop much of a shared mental model. I struggled to understand my Captain's thought process and often found it to be unusual. From the beginning of our trip; I got the impression that he was someone that was consciously trying to suppress his abrasive personality; which would later periodically show itself throughout our trip. I found these issues to be both frustrating and distracting. I was often lagging in our risk mitigation simply because of the atmosphere in the flight deck. In an attempt to be professional and get along; I tried to be compliant and follow his lead. At the end of our last flight; we were dealing with thunderstorms. As we approached our destination; the storms were over and around the airport. Approach Control told us to expect Runway XX because of the wind direction and position of the storm cells. Approach reported that the storm was moving off the airport to the east. The ATIS was reporting 10 miles visibility. Because we were expecting improving conditions; we briefed the visual approach backed up by the RNAV (GPS) XX. We had to fly an extended downwind; to get around the storm cells; which led to a long final approach. As we joined the final approach the weather began to deteriorate again. We continued to approach the airport. Approach Control began giving weather updates. I suggested that we adjust our minimums from field elevation to LNAV/VNAV minimums as a precaution. My Captain agreed. As we continued to approach the airport; the weather continued to get worse. The last report; that I recall; was 1 1/4 miles visibility with wind gusting to 29 knots. Foolishly; we continued the approach. As we approached minimums; it became clear that we would have difficulty seeing the airport. Even though I was flying an autopilot coupled approach; my Captain began instructing me multiple times to make sure I stayed on the glide-path. I found his unnecessary coaching non-standard; distracting; unprofessional and degrading. We reached minimums. We were in heavy rain and I had nothing in sight. Therefore; I executed a go-around. I was shocked at my Captain's outward display of displeasure and irritation that I initiated a go-around. He sighed; then disgustingly stated; 'You had the runway right in front of you!' Never in my 21 year career have I had a Captain respond so inappropriately to a go-around. I was distracted and frustrated. As Approach Control vectored us out and back around; the wind and weather continued to shift and change. We set up and briefed the ILS CAT II to Runway XYL. My Captain flew the approach in significantly better weather and we landed uneventfully. The more I reflect back on our first approach; the more things I realize we did wrong. Also; despite the Company's efforts; there is still a reluctance to execute a go-around. More and continued emphasis is needed. With thunderstorms in the area; we should have completed a full instrument approach briefing; even though the initial expectation was for the weather to be VFR and improving. If we had done that; we would have been more aware that the weather had moved below our minimums of 1 3/8 miles for the approach. There were many warning signs that should have indicated that we needed to discontinue the approach. However; we continued for all the wrong reasons. It was the end of a long day on the third day of a long trip. There was a desire to finish flying with someone you do not enjoy working with. Never developing a shared mental model was both distracting and frustrating. Trying to be compliant and follow my Captain's lead; to prevent conflict; kept me from speaking up. I should have stated that; I don't think we should continue; we need to break this approach off; let the weather improve; and come back around more prepared; which; by default; was what ultimately occurred. However; the approach never should have begun. Unfortunately; there are still captains out there that do not create a positive atmosphere in the flight deck. Because of that our risk management was at a low level throughout our trip. Continued emphasis is needed with more scenario based training.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.