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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1656601 |
Time | |
Date | 201906 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | SJC.Airport |
State Reference | CA |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Instrument |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 390 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Conflict Ground Conflict Critical Ground Incursion Runway |
Narrative:
As we taxied for takeoff to hold short runway 30R at sjc and switched to tower frequency; I noticed there was an aircraft on final for runway 30R. To let that aircraft know that I had them in sight and recognized that they were going to land on 30R instead of the normal 30L; I turned off my taxi lights; holding short of the runway. Seconds later; sjc tower cleared us for takeoff from runway 30R! I exclaimed to the first officer (first officer) 'this guy is on final to 30R!' just then the aircraft on final told the tower that they were landing on 30R. There was no immediate response from the tower; so my first officer transmitted on tower frequency that we were going to hold short of runway 30R. As we watched the landing aircraft fly past our cockpit; while holding short of the runway; sjc tower again cleared us for takeoff on 30R! Not line up and wait but cleared for takeoff! The landing aircraft again chimed in that they had just landed and were rolling out on 30R. Our clearance then changed to line up and wait and after the landing aircraft cleared the runway; we were then given a third takeoff clearance. We accepted that one and departed without further incident.the procedures in effect to prevent runway incursions at our airline and at the landing aircraft's airline obviously worked well in this case. I don't know what ATC's procedures are; but situational awareness appears to have broken down a bit this time. The aircraft on final was obviously cleared to land on 30R before we switched to tower frequency. Perhaps there was a controller change in the interim or some other distraction occurring in the tower. In any case a potentially hazardous clearance was issued twice in one scenario.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737 Captain reported being cleared for takeoff with an aircraft on short final on the same runway.
Narrative: As we taxied for takeoff to hold short Runway 30R at SJC and switched to Tower frequency; I noticed there was an aircraft on final for Runway 30R. To let that aircraft know that I had them in sight and recognized that they were going to land on 30R instead of the normal 30L; I turned off my taxi lights; holding short of the runway. Seconds later; SJC Tower cleared us for takeoff from Runway 30R! I exclaimed to the FO (First Officer) 'This guy is on final to 30R!' Just then the aircraft on final told the Tower that they were landing on 30R. There was no immediate response from the Tower; so my FO transmitted on Tower frequency that we were going to hold short of Runway 30R. As we watched the landing aircraft fly past our cockpit; while holding short of the runway; SJC Tower again cleared us for takeoff on 30R! Not line up and wait but cleared for takeoff! The landing aircraft again chimed in that they had just landed and were rolling out on 30R. Our clearance then changed to line up and wait and after the landing aircraft cleared the runway; we were then given a third takeoff clearance. We accepted that one and departed without further incident.The procedures in effect to prevent runway incursions at our airline and at the landing aircraft's airline obviously worked well in this case. I don't know what ATC's procedures are; but situational awareness appears to have broken down a bit this time. The aircraft on final was obviously cleared to land on 30R before we switched to Tower frequency. Perhaps there was a Controller change in the interim or some other distraction occurring in the Tower. In any case a potentially hazardous clearance was issued twice in one scenario.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.