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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 165972 |
Time | |
Date | 199009 |
Day | Sat |
Local Time Of Day | 0001 To 0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : msp airport : fra |
State Reference | MN |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Mixed |
Light | Dawn |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : edff tower : sna |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Widebody Transport |
Navigation In Use | Other |
Flight Phase | other other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | other personnel |
Qualification | other |
ASRS Report | 165972 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : far |
Independent Detector | other other : unspecified |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Flight diverted to an illegal alternate airport after talking to station agents who were mistaken for dispatchers. Please see attached narrative for chain of events. Please see other side for human performance considerations: captain failed to follow company procedure and far's by contacting fra gate agents instead of flight dispatch via sto radio. Crew then illustrated total void of understanding operational control by allowing a gate agent to divert the flight to cgn. There is no dispatch office in fra. Agents are unlicensed, untrained and unauthorized to exercise operational control. This is a direct violation of far's. Crew training, especially captain upgrade training appears to be inadequate. It is difficult for joint responsibility to be exercised when a captain is so oblivious as to who exercises it with him. Lax enforcement and a willingness to ignore these incidents are also making a contribution to this problem. FAA lacks qualified dispatchers who understand the system and insist on standards. Flight ETA-fra XA16Z. Flight had been rereleased with alternate of muc. At XA13Z, (prior to ETA) received a message form fra operations that flight had been assigned a 1 hour hold and was diverting to cgn (not his alternate) for fuel. Flight dispatch was not contacted. Proceeded to and landed at cgn west/O dispatch approval. (I was able to ascertain WX, NOTAMS and field conditions were ok prior to his arrival.) have not talked with flight crew yet, so unable to determine if 'fra dispatch' is a factor here. Callback conversation with dispatcher (at same office as reporter) revealed the following: when asked, he described aircraft/dispatcher communications in europe. It is a high frequency circuit to stockholm radio where they make a patch to a long distance phone circuit to the dispatch office. He said that normally a connection could be made in less than 5 mins. He did mention the low esteem some flight crews seem to hold for the necessity of dispatch services.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACFT BOUND FOR FRA DIVERTS TO CGN FOR FUEL WITHOUT CONTACTING DISPATCH AND OBTAINING AN AMENDED RELEASE.
Narrative: FLT DIVERTED TO AN ILLEGAL ALTERNATE ARPT AFTER TALKING TO STATION AGENTS WHO WERE MISTAKEN FOR DISPATCHERS. PLEASE SEE ATTACHED NARRATIVE FOR CHAIN OF EVENTS. PLEASE SEE OTHER SIDE FOR HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: CAPT FAILED TO FOLLOW COMPANY PROC AND FAR'S BY CONTACTING FRA GATE AGENTS INSTEAD OF FLT DISPATCH VIA STO RADIO. CREW THEN ILLUSTRATED TOTAL VOID OF UNDERSTANDING OPERATIONAL CTL BY ALLOWING A GATE AGENT TO DIVERT THE FLT TO CGN. THERE IS NO DISPATCH OFFICE IN FRA. AGENTS ARE UNLICENSED, UNTRAINED AND UNAUTH TO EXERCISE OPERATIONAL CTL. THIS IS A DIRECT VIOLATION OF FAR'S. CREW TRNING, ESPECIALLY CAPT UPGRADE TRNING APPEARS TO BE INADEQUATE. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR JOINT RESPONSIBILITY TO BE EXERCISED WHEN A CAPT IS SO OBLIVIOUS AS TO WHO EXERCISES IT WITH HIM. LAX ENFORCEMENT AND A WILLINGNESS TO IGNORE THESE INCIDENTS ARE ALSO MAKING A CONTRIBUTION TO THIS PROB. FAA LACKS QUALIFIED DISPATCHERS WHO UNDERSTAND THE SYS AND INSIST ON STANDARDS. FLT ETA-FRA XA16Z. FLT HAD BEEN RERELEASED WITH ALTERNATE OF MUC. AT XA13Z, (PRIOR TO ETA) RECEIVED A MESSAGE FORM FRA OPS THAT FLT HAD BEEN ASSIGNED A 1 HR HOLD AND WAS DIVERTING TO CGN (NOT HIS ALTERNATE) FOR FUEL. FLT DISPATCH WAS NOT CONTACTED. PROCEEDED TO AND LANDED AT CGN W/O DISPATCH APPROVAL. (I WAS ABLE TO ASCERTAIN WX, NOTAMS AND FIELD CONDITIONS WERE OK PRIOR TO HIS ARR.) HAVE NOT TALKED WITH FLT CREW YET, SO UNABLE TO DETERMINE IF 'FRA DISPATCH' IS A FACTOR HERE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH DISPATCHER (AT SAME OFFICE AS RPTR) REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: WHEN ASKED, HE DESCRIBED ACFT/DISPATCHER COMS IN EUROPE. IT IS A HIGH FREQ CIRCUIT TO STOCKHOLM RADIO WHERE THEY MAKE A PATCH TO A LONG DISTANCE PHONE CIRCUIT TO THE DISPATCH OFFICE. HE SAID THAT NORMALLY A CONNECTION COULD BE MADE IN LESS THAN 5 MINS. HE DID MENTION THE LOW ESTEEM SOME FLT CREWS SEEM TO HOLD FOR THE NECESSITY OF DISPATCH SVCS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.