Narrative:

Flight operating from ZZZ to ZZZ1. Starting the flight; both captain and first officer had to study and review MEL procedures for the main cabin door indication being in-op on the ECAM door page. Coupled with this non-standard maintenance item; the crew also learned that ACARS for the airbus fleet was inoperative. This meant that the flight crew was unable to receive a flight close out; takeoff numbers; or contact operations. Take off numbers had to be received through calling dispatch via cellphone. We were also requested to radio in our out and off times to operations once airborne; adding to the pilot workload. Once at cruise; the flight operated without issue.upon arrival into ZZZ1 while on the zzzzz RNAV arrival; the captain radioed into operations requesting gate. The flight crew was told to go to gate xx. The remainder of the arrival and approach into runway xxl went without issue.on landing the flight crew exited runway xxl at taxiway east. ATC instructed us to hold short of [runway] xxc and monitor tower on [frequency]. The flight crew were then told to cross [runway] xxc and hold short [runway] xxr. After a short hold; we were told to cross runway xxr and contact ground.the flight crew crossed runway xxr at taxiway east. Upon exiting the runway; the flight crew contacted ground and turned right on taxiway B and started taxiing south to the terminal. The crew were instructed to taxi via taxiway b-g-a to spot xy. The flight crew was confused by this taxi instruction since it is both non-standard taxi route and the crew were unfamiliar with spot xy. Thinking that this may be a taxi to a hard stand or cargo spot and that our gate assignment had changed; the first officer contacted (airline) operations again to confirm our gate. The crew were told that our gate was still xx and that the gate was open. Both captain and first officer reviewed their charts to locate spot xy. The crew checked both the 20-9 and 20-9B charts; and were unable to locate where spot xy was located on the airport. During the flight crews confusion with the taxi instruction and the controller; the flight crew missed taxi way G while taxiing south on taxiway B. When the crew queried ATC for help and clarification on the taxi; we received no response. The flight crew elected to stop on the taxiway. After some time; the pilots were told we missed taxiway G and to stand by. At this time; aircraft Y was the only traffic on taxiway B or a; and no traffic was crossing the runway. When the controller finally got back to the flight crew; they were angrily told to taxi via B to spot xz; which is standard; and that the crew needed to copy a phone number for a possible pilot deviation. As the crew continued its taxi to spot xz; it had to stop again to finish copying the phone number before it could contact ramp control for permission to enter. Once the crew was able to contact ramp control; they were told to hold on the west line at xa; another very non-standard taxi route. The crew asked what this taxi was for; ramp said that our gate was occupied. The crew instructed ramp control that operations said our gate was open. Ramp said that gate xb was still occupied; which was not flight's (number) gate. There must have been a miscommunication between [company]'s ramp operations and ground control. The crew instructed the controller that its gate was xx; and was told to taxi to the gate via spot xz. When at the gate; the flight crew reviewed all of the available taxi charts. The flight crew were only able to find spot xy on the low visibility taxi charts. Which are not required to be out during VMC conditions. Also; spot xy is a non-standard point for which ATC to send aircraft. This non-standard taxi and operations and ground control not being able to communicate our gate assignment helped lead to this taxi deviation.it is in the pilots' opinion that there several factors that led to this taxi deviation. First being this was anon-standard taxi route that is not commonplace at ZZZ1 airport. Also; the flight crew was instructed to taxi to spot xy which while also non-standard; was not on any on the standard charts used during VMC operations. The only chart that spot xy is published is on the low visibly taxi charts; which is not standard to be used during VMC operations. Giving non-standard control instruction is not conducive to safe operations and can and will lead to confusion.also (airline) operations was not able to communicate our gate location to ground. This may have led ground control to believe that flight (number) was supposed to be at a different gate that was occupied. This may be what prompted ground control to give the flight crew the non-standard taxi route.another factor was that ground control was not able to communicate in a timely manner when the flight crew was querying them for clarification on our route. Also; when the crew was able to communicate with ground control; the controller was more concerned with giving us a number and telling us multiple time of the pilot deviation. The crew was unable to contact ramp control when needed; and had to stop the aircraft.further issues the led to confusion was our ACARS being inoperative. This meant the on the ground; pilots were having to work multiple frequencies at the same time. At the time of the deviation; the first officer was communicating on ground control for the aircrafts route; [company] operations for clarification on our gate assignment and switching ramp control for the aircrafts entry point into the ramp. All of this while trying to navigate the non-standard taxi route; and assisting the captain in the safe taxi of the aircraft.finally; when the flight was confused with the non-standard taxi route it would have been better to stop and wait for the ground control to get back to us with clarification on the taxi route; however long that may be.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Flight crew reports that inoperative ACARS resulted in excessive workload and subsequent errors during taxi at destination airport.

Narrative: Flight operating from ZZZ to ZZZ1. Starting the flight; both Captain and First Officer had to study and review MEL procedures for the Main cabin door indication being in-op on the ECAM door page. Coupled with this non-standard maintenance item; the crew also learned that ACARS for the Airbus fleet was inoperative. This meant that the flight crew was unable to receive a flight close out; takeoff numbers; or contact Operations. Take off numbers had to be received through calling Dispatch via cellphone. We were also requested to radio in our out and off times to Operations once airborne; adding to the pilot workload. Once at cruise; the flight operated without issue.Upon arrival into ZZZ1 while on the ZZZZZ RNAV arrival; the Captain radioed into Operations requesting gate. The flight crew was told to go to Gate XX. The remainder of the arrival and approach into Runway XXL went without issue.On landing the flight crew exited runway XXL at Taxiway E. ATC instructed us to hold short of [Runway] XXC and monitor Tower on [frequency]. The flight crew were then told to cross [Runway] XXC and hold short [Runway] XXR. After a short hold; we were told to cross Runway XXR and contact Ground.The flight crew crossed Runway XXR at taxiway E. Upon exiting the runway; the flight crew contacted Ground and turned right on Taxiway B and started taxiing south to the terminal. The crew were instructed to taxi via taxiway B-G-A to Spot XY. The flight crew was confused by this taxi instruction since it is both non-standard taxi route and the crew were unfamiliar with Spot XY. Thinking that this may be a taxi to a hard stand or cargo spot and that our gate assignment had changed; the First Officer contacted (airline) Operations again to confirm our gate. The crew were told that our gate was still XX and that the gate was open. Both Captain and First Officer reviewed their charts to locate Spot XY. The crew checked both the 20-9 and 20-9B charts; and were unable to locate where Spot XY was located on the airport. During the flight crews confusion with the taxi instruction and the controller; the flight crew missed taxi way G while taxiing south on Taxiway B. When the crew queried ATC for help and clarification on the taxi; we received no response. The flight crew elected to stop on the taxiway. After some time; the pilots were told we missed taxiway G and to stand by. At this time; Aircraft Y was the only traffic on Taxiway B or A; and no traffic was crossing the runway. When the Controller finally got back to the flight crew; they were angrily told to taxi via B to Spot XZ; which is standard; and that the crew needed to copy a phone number for a possible pilot deviation. As the crew continued its taxi to Spot XZ; it had to stop again to finish copying the phone number before it could contact Ramp Control for permission to enter. Once the crew was able to contact Ramp Control; they were told to hold on the W line at XA; another very non-standard taxi route. The crew asked what this taxi was for; Ramp said that our gate was occupied. The crew instructed Ramp control that Operations said our gate was open. Ramp said that Gate XB was still occupied; which was not Flight's (number) gate. There must have been a miscommunication between [Company]'s Ramp Operations and Ground Control. The crew instructed the Controller that its gate was XX; and was told to taxi to the gate via spot XZ. When at the gate; the flight crew reviewed all of the available taxi charts. The flight crew were only able to find Spot XY on the Low Visibility taxi charts. Which are not required to be out during VMC conditions. Also; Spot XY is a non-standard point for which ATC to send aircraft. This non-standard taxi and Operations and Ground Control not being able to communicate our gate assignment helped lead to this taxi deviation.It is in the pilots' opinion that there several factors that led to this taxi deviation. First being this was anon-standard taxi route that is not commonplace at ZZZ1 airport. Also; the flight crew was instructed to taxi to Spot XY which while also non-standard; was not on any on the standard charts used during VMC operations. The only chart that Spot XY is published is on the low visibly taxi charts; which is not standard to be used during VMC Operations. Giving non-standard control instruction is not conducive to safe operations and can and will lead to confusion.Also (airline) Operations was not able to communicate our gate location to Ground. This may have led Ground Control to believe that Flight (number) was supposed to be at a different gate that was occupied. This may be what prompted Ground Control to give the flight crew the non-standard taxi route.Another factor was that Ground Control was not able to communicate in a timely manner when the flight crew was querying them for clarification on our route. Also; when the crew was able to communicate with Ground Control; the Controller was more concerned with giving us a number and telling us multiple time of the pilot deviation. The crew was unable to contact Ramp control when needed; and had to stop the aircraft.Further issues the led to confusion was our ACARS being inoperative. This meant the on the ground; pilots were having to work multiple frequencies at the same time. At the time of the deviation; the First Officer was communicating on Ground Control for the aircrafts route; [Company] Operations for clarification on our gate assignment and switching ramp control for the aircrafts entry point into the ramp. All of this while trying to navigate the non-standard taxi route; and assisting the Captain in the safe taxi of the aircraft.Finally; when the flight was confused with the non-standard taxi route it would have been better to stop and wait for the Ground Control to get back to us with clarification on the taxi route; however long that may be.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.