Narrative:

This is how the flight from portland to san jose developed as best as I can remember: prior to PIC arriving; I voiced my concerns about the automatic-pressurization being inoperative to the flight attendants and told then that if the captain elected to accept the airplane to expect difficulty with ears popping. Boarding began as the PIC arrived on the flight deck. The flight was booked full with 70 passenger and a flight deck jumpseater. I reviewed the WX and maintenance write-ups with the captain; telling him only 9 days earlier I had flown this airplane with the same discrepancy and wasn't really comfortable operating in busy airspace at night with this system inoperative. On top of that; WX at sjc was forecast to be 2 SM; broken overcast 500 ft with temporary 1/2 SM visibility and fog. PIC elected to take the aircraft anyway; putting me in a difficult position. I wanted to walk off the airplane as my gut was telling me this was not a good situation to be in. Shortly after we pushed back; we got a 'flap power' caution light and the flaps would not extend when the lever was pushed. (This also had been previously written up by maintenance this same day as they taxied it over from our hangar to the gate.) fault was cleared; we taxied to runway 10R at pdx. The PIC was the PF. Maintenance personnel left the pressurization switch in 'dump' mode; neither one of us noticed; and on climb out I noticed the cabin was not pressurizing. I switched it to manual mode and tried to keep the cabin pressure master warning from going off as we climbed through 10000 ft MSL. Seconds later; the #2 dc generator caution light illuminated; indications all showing the generator had failed (also having been written up previously on this aircraft and replaced). As PNF; I accomplished the checklist and helped the PF prepare for the return to pdx. Normal landing under day VMC occurred after only 21 mins airborne. These are the factors I consider most important in preventing future incidents like this one: 1) poor common sense in dispatch/company maintenance: that aircraft should never have been dispatched for the flight. Too many previous write-ups; obviously rushed out of the hangar. High workload with the automatic-pressurization system being inoperative on top of being dispatched into busy airspace with bad WX at the destination. 2) poor judgement of PIC/first officer: the PIC never should have accepted this airplane in the condition it was in given all the known write-ups. The first officer should have gone with his gut feeling; especially since a very similar situation occurred only 9 days previous in the same aircraft. The MEL needs to be changed to allow manual pressurization only for day VMC flts to reposition the aircraft to a maintenance base for discrepancy correction.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FO OF DH8 FEELS WORKLOAD BECAME OVERWHELMING DURING FLT TO SJC WITH INOP AUTO PRESSURIZATION SYS COUPLED UNCOOPERATIVE PIC. SUBSEQUENT GENERATOR FAILURE FOLLOWING TKOF RESULTS IN A RETURN TO THE DEP ARPT.

Narrative: THIS IS HOW THE FLT FROM PORTLAND TO SAN JOSE DEVELOPED AS BEST AS I CAN REMEMBER: PRIOR TO PIC ARRIVING; I VOICED MY CONCERNS ABOUT THE AUTO-PRESSURIZATION BEING INOP TO THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND TOLD THEN THAT IF THE CAPT ELECTED TO ACCEPT THE AIRPLANE TO EXPECT DIFFICULTY WITH EARS POPPING. BOARDING BEGAN AS THE PIC ARRIVED ON THE FLT DECK. THE FLT WAS BOOKED FULL WITH 70 PAX AND A FLT DECK JUMPSEATER. I REVIEWED THE WX AND MAINT WRITE-UPS WITH THE CAPT; TELLING HIM ONLY 9 DAYS EARLIER I HAD FLOWN THIS AIRPLANE WITH THE SAME DISCREPANCY AND WASN'T REALLY COMFORTABLE OPERATING IN BUSY AIRSPACE AT NIGHT WITH THIS SYS INOP. ON TOP OF THAT; WX AT SJC WAS FORECAST TO BE 2 SM; BROKEN OVCST 500 FT WITH TEMPORARY 1/2 SM VISIBILITY AND FOG. PIC ELECTED TO TAKE THE ACFT ANYWAY; PUTTING ME IN A DIFFICULT POS. I WANTED TO WALK OFF THE AIRPLANE AS MY GUT WAS TELLING ME THIS WAS NOT A GOOD SIT TO BE IN. SHORTLY AFTER WE PUSHED BACK; WE GOT A 'FLAP PWR' CAUTION LIGHT AND THE FLAPS WOULD NOT EXTEND WHEN THE LEVER WAS PUSHED. (THIS ALSO HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN UP BY MAINT THIS SAME DAY AS THEY TAXIED IT OVER FROM OUR HANGAR TO THE GATE.) FAULT WAS CLRED; WE TAXIED TO RWY 10R AT PDX. THE PIC WAS THE PF. MAINT PERSONNEL LEFT THE PRESSURIZATION SWITCH IN 'DUMP' MODE; NEITHER ONE OF US NOTICED; AND ON CLBOUT I NOTICED THE CABIN WAS NOT PRESSURIZING. I SWITCHED IT TO MANUAL MODE AND TRIED TO KEEP THE CABIN PRESSURE MASTER WARNING FROM GOING OFF AS WE CLBED THROUGH 10000 FT MSL. SECONDS LATER; THE #2 DC GENERATOR CAUTION LIGHT ILLUMINATED; INDICATIONS ALL SHOWING THE GENERATOR HAD FAILED (ALSO HAVING BEEN WRITTEN UP PREVIOUSLY ON THIS ACFT AND REPLACED). AS PNF; I ACCOMPLISHED THE CHKLIST AND HELPED THE PF PREPARE FOR THE RETURN TO PDX. NORMAL LNDG UNDER DAY VMC OCCURRED AFTER ONLY 21 MINS AIRBORNE. THESE ARE THE FACTORS I CONSIDER MOST IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING FUTURE INCIDENTS LIKE THIS ONE: 1) POOR COMMON SENSE IN DISPATCH/COMPANY MAINT: THAT ACFT SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN DISPATCHED FOR THE FLT. TOO MANY PREVIOUS WRITE-UPS; OBVIOUSLY RUSHED OUT OF THE HANGAR. HIGH WORKLOAD WITH THE AUTO-PRESSURIZATION SYS BEING INOP ON TOP OF BEING DISPATCHED INTO BUSY AIRSPACE WITH BAD WX AT THE DEST. 2) POOR JUDGEMENT OF PIC/FO: THE PIC NEVER SHOULD HAVE ACCEPTED THIS AIRPLANE IN THE CONDITION IT WAS IN GIVEN ALL THE KNOWN WRITE-UPS. THE FO SHOULD HAVE GONE WITH HIS GUT FEELING; ESPECIALLY SINCE A VERY SIMILAR SIT OCCURRED ONLY 9 DAYS PREVIOUS IN THE SAME ACFT. THE MEL NEEDS TO BE CHANGED TO ALLOW MANUAL PRESSURIZATION ONLY FOR DAY VMC FLTS TO REPOSITION THE ACFT TO A MAINT BASE FOR DISCREPANCY CORRECTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.