Narrative:

The flight occurred on jan/mon/05. The following are the facts as best as I can recall: aircraft was a dash 8 Q400. Dispatched with crew of 4 from sea-mso-fca. First officer was me at 1 yr experience in part 121 operations and equipment. Captain was 4 months to retirement. WX forecast for mso and fca included poor visibility and blowing snow at our ETA. Aircraft was accepted with automatic pressurization inoperative per MEL. (Operation must be conducted in manual mode -- very high workload to maintain proper differential.) I was called out on reserve and was late on arrival; also the 4TH first officer to have flown on this 4-DAY trip. Further flight delay was incurred at sea and mso because of deicing. This is how the flight from missoula to kalispell unfolded as best as I can remember: we departed late from missoula to kalispell due to aircraft deicing with type 1 and type 4 fluids as it was beginning to snow and freezing fog was in the area. We departed from runway 29 and complied with the obstacle clearance departure. Cleared to kalispell via victor 231 at 16000 ft MSL. Due to the poor WX at kalispell; PIC elected to be PF. He had already been on duty for 12 hours and was visibly fatigued and ready to get to the hotel. On climb out; PIC asked for block altitude with direct to smith lake NDB to shortcut the arrival. The entire flight from mso-fca was blocked at 21 mins; and as PNF; I was already entirely overloaded making company calls; getting ATIS; plates; frequencys; checklists and trying to manually operate the outflow valve since our automatic-pressurization capability was inoperative. This was my first time having to operate an aircraft in manual mode. I don't believe I was ever trained to manually operate that system; other than discussions in ground school. Shortly after we leveled off at 16000 ft MSL; the cabin pressurization master warning went off; indicating the cabin pressure had exceeded 10000 ft. I was still immersed in reading the descent and approach checklists as the captain was trying to shortcut the arrival and start down early with the permission of ATC. Both the PF/PNF became absorbed in trying to extinguish the master warning. We were given a descent to the MVA with a heading to join the fca localizer; approach still had not been briefed. WX was reported as 1500 ft overcast and 1 NM visibility with snow. PNF absorbed in trying to maintain proper differential and didn't notice that the PF was over 200 KTS; 10000 ft MSL and only 10 NM from the threshold of runway 2 at fca. We were on the localizer; GS was off the scale below us around 5 mi out; landing checklist still not completed even though the PF had put the gear down while the PNF was still absorbed in trying to manage the pressurization. As soon as the PF asked me what the decision altitude was on final; I realized how high and fast we were. I asked if he wanted me to call a missed approach and get back up with ZLC. He did not reply; and seconds later we broke out high over the touchdown zone at vref +10 KTS. We used the entire runway to come to a stop. These are the factors in consider most important in preventing future incidents like this one: 1) flight schedule: block times are predicated on VFR days; not allowing for time to deice and other WX-related delays -- consequently putting a lot of time pressure on crew as leg after leg after leg is late. PIC also wanted to get done with the day; when in reality he should have refused the aircraft knowing how much that inoperative system contributes to high workload in bad WX. 2) fatigue: after already working a 12 hour duty day; PIC was tired and judgement was impaired. 3) technical as well as CRM inexperience: new first officer; relatively low time in aircraft type; not properly trained on how to operate the pressurization system manually while managing all the other duties of the PNF. Also; first officer didn't question PIC's judgement enough even though he felt uncomfortable with the situation. The first officer should have been alert enough to force things to slow down. 4) poor common sense in dispatch/company maintenance: that aircraft should never have been dispatched for a night flight into IMC with bad winter WX and uncontrolled airspace with the increased workload ofthe pressurization system being inoperative. The MEL needs to be changed! Should be restr to allow manual pressurization only for day VMC flts to a maintenance base for it to be fixed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FO OF DH8 FEELS WORKLOAD BECAME OVERWHELMING DURING FLT TO FCA WITH INOP AUTO PRESSURIZATION SYS COUPLED WITH FATIGUED AND UNCOOPERATIVE PIC.

Narrative: THE FLT OCCURRED ON JAN/MON/05. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE FACTS AS BEST AS I CAN RECALL: ACFT WAS A DASH 8 Q400. DISPATCHED WITH CREW OF 4 FROM SEA-MSO-FCA. FO WAS ME AT 1 YR EXPERIENCE IN PART 121 OPS AND EQUIP. CAPT WAS 4 MONTHS TO RETIREMENT. WX FORECAST FOR MSO AND FCA INCLUDED POOR VISIBILITY AND BLOWING SNOW AT OUR ETA. ACFT WAS ACCEPTED WITH AUTOMATIC PRESSURIZATION INOP PER MEL. (OP MUST BE CONDUCTED IN MANUAL MODE -- VERY HIGH WORKLOAD TO MAINTAIN PROPER DIFFERENTIAL.) I WAS CALLED OUT ON RESERVE AND WAS LATE ON ARR; ALSO THE 4TH FO TO HAVE FLOWN ON THIS 4-DAY TRIP. FURTHER FLT DELAY WAS INCURRED AT SEA AND MSO BECAUSE OF DEICING. THIS IS HOW THE FLT FROM MISSOULA TO KALISPELL UNFOLDED AS BEST AS I CAN REMEMBER: WE DEPARTED LATE FROM MISSOULA TO KALISPELL DUE TO ACFT DEICING WITH TYPE 1 AND TYPE 4 FLUIDS AS IT WAS BEGINNING TO SNOW AND FREEZING FOG WAS IN THE AREA. WE DEPARTED FROM RWY 29 AND COMPLIED WITH THE OBSTACLE CLRNC DEP. CLRED TO KALISPELL VIA VICTOR 231 AT 16000 FT MSL. DUE TO THE POOR WX AT KALISPELL; PIC ELECTED TO BE PF. HE HAD ALREADY BEEN ON DUTY FOR 12 HRS AND WAS VISIBLY FATIGUED AND READY TO GET TO THE HOTEL. ON CLBOUT; PIC ASKED FOR BLOCK ALT WITH DIRECT TO SMITH LAKE NDB TO SHORTCUT THE ARR. THE ENTIRE FLT FROM MSO-FCA WAS BLOCKED AT 21 MINS; AND AS PNF; I WAS ALREADY ENTIRELY OVERLOADED MAKING COMPANY CALLS; GETTING ATIS; PLATES; FREQS; CHKLISTS AND TRYING TO MANUALLY OPERATE THE OUTFLOW VALVE SINCE OUR AUTO-PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY WAS INOP. THIS WAS MY FIRST TIME HAVING TO OPERATE AN ACFT IN MANUAL MODE. I DON'T BELIEVE I WAS EVER TRAINED TO MANUALLY OPERATE THAT SYS; OTHER THAN DISCUSSIONS IN GND SCHOOL. SHORTLY AFTER WE LEVELED OFF AT 16000 FT MSL; THE CABIN PRESSURIZATION MASTER WARNING WENT OFF; INDICATING THE CABIN PRESSURE HAD EXCEEDED 10000 FT. I WAS STILL IMMERSED IN READING THE DSCNT AND APCH CHKLISTS AS THE CAPT WAS TRYING TO SHORTCUT THE ARR AND START DOWN EARLY WITH THE PERMISSION OF ATC. BOTH THE PF/PNF BECAME ABSORBED IN TRYING TO EXTINGUISH THE MASTER WARNING. WE WERE GIVEN A DSCNT TO THE MVA WITH A HDG TO JOIN THE FCA LOC; APCH STILL HAD NOT BEEN BRIEFED. WX WAS RPTED AS 1500 FT OVCST AND 1 NM VISIBILITY WITH SNOW. PNF ABSORBED IN TRYING TO MAINTAIN PROPER DIFFERENTIAL AND DIDN'T NOTICE THAT THE PF WAS OVER 200 KTS; 10000 FT MSL AND ONLY 10 NM FROM THE THRESHOLD OF RWY 2 AT FCA. WE WERE ON THE LOC; GS WAS OFF THE SCALE BELOW US AROUND 5 MI OUT; LNDG CHKLIST STILL NOT COMPLETED EVEN THOUGH THE PF HAD PUT THE GEAR DOWN WHILE THE PNF WAS STILL ABSORBED IN TRYING TO MANAGE THE PRESSURIZATION. AS SOON AS THE PF ASKED ME WHAT THE DECISION ALT WAS ON FINAL; I REALIZED HOW HIGH AND FAST WE WERE. I ASKED IF HE WANTED ME TO CALL A MISSED APCH AND GET BACK UP WITH ZLC. HE DID NOT REPLY; AND SECONDS LATER WE BROKE OUT HIGH OVER THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE AT VREF +10 KTS. WE USED THE ENTIRE RWY TO COME TO A STOP. THESE ARE THE FACTORS IN CONSIDER MOST IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING FUTURE INCIDENTS LIKE THIS ONE: 1) FLT SCHEDULE: BLOCK TIMES ARE PREDICATED ON VFR DAYS; NOT ALLOWING FOR TIME TO DEICE AND OTHER WX-RELATED DELAYS -- CONSEQUENTLY PUTTING A LOT OF TIME PRESSURE ON CREW AS LEG AFTER LEG AFTER LEG IS LATE. PIC ALSO WANTED TO GET DONE WITH THE DAY; WHEN IN REALITY HE SHOULD HAVE REFUSED THE ACFT KNOWING HOW MUCH THAT INOP SYS CONTRIBUTES TO HIGH WORKLOAD IN BAD WX. 2) FATIGUE: AFTER ALREADY WORKING A 12 HR DUTY DAY; PIC WAS TIRED AND JUDGEMENT WAS IMPAIRED. 3) TECHNICAL AS WELL AS CRM INEXPERIENCE: NEW FO; RELATIVELY LOW TIME IN ACFT TYPE; NOT PROPERLY TRAINED ON HOW TO OPERATE THE PRESSURIZATION SYS MANUALLY WHILE MANAGING ALL THE OTHER DUTIES OF THE PNF. ALSO; FO DIDN'T QUESTION PIC'S JUDGEMENT ENOUGH EVEN THOUGH HE FELT UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE SIT. THE FO SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALERT ENOUGH TO FORCE THINGS TO SLOW DOWN. 4) POOR COMMON SENSE IN DISPATCH/COMPANY MAINT: THAT ACFT SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN DISPATCHED FOR A NIGHT FLT INTO IMC WITH BAD WINTER WX AND UNCTLED AIRSPACE WITH THE INCREASED WORKLOAD OFTHE PRESSURIZATION SYS BEING INOP. THE MEL NEEDS TO BE CHANGED! SHOULD BE RESTR TO ALLOW MANUAL PRESSURIZATION ONLY FOR DAY VMC FLTS TO A MAINT BASE FOR IT TO BE FIXED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.