Narrative:

I was the captain and the pilot flying on flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. Me and my first [officer] answer my call touch with doing a quick turn out of ZZZ and was initially given the ZZZZZ2 RNAV departure with a south flow. As we were pushing back from the gate; the ground patrol indicated that they had just switched to a north flow as we started engine #xx. We also received a change of departure to the ZZZZZ4 from clearance delivery from the original ZZZZZ2 RNAV departure. We had already updated the departure based on a south flow; and I went to update the departure as my first officer went to update the tps performance data based on the north runway xx. I also was discussing the special 7P procedures for an engine failure and how we would set it up. During all of this discussion; other aircraft were pushing off their gates behind us and we started the #xx engine and set up for a single engine taxi to runway xx. I neglected to have my first officer confirm my FMS entries; and we taxied to runway xx with only 2 aircraft ahead of us. The short line for takeoff prompted me to call for starting the #2 engine and then the taxi checklist. Ground had us cross runway xy and contact tower; who quickly stated to us that we were next for departure. With an aircraft on 2 mile final; tower stated we were cleared for takeoff runway xx; as opposed to stating the first fix on the RNAV departure. We took off and at 400 feet I called navigation. My first officer pushed navigation but the stayed in roll. I stated again for navigation and the same result occurred. I quickly realized we needed an immediate left turn to stay clear of the restricted areas; so I manually made a sharp turn left and started following the river as my first officer tried to get the FMS to engage the flight director. I was visually staying over the river to avoid transgression into any restricted areas. Departure saw that we weren't tracking the ZZZZZ4 like we were supposed to and we eventually asked for and were given a heading and told to climb to 5;000 feet; and that was quickly changed to stop our cling at 4;000 feet. I complied and the controller queried us on what departure we were assigned; and he re-cleared us to fly the ZZZZZ4 lyh transition. By this time; it was apparent to us that the FMS was missing departure SID and transition; so it took a minute or two to re-enter the proper departure. We resumed the departure and then the controller climbed us to 5;000 feet after we had passed some conflicting traffic. By this time; me and my first officer were making sure that we were cleared to a specific fix in the departure and making sure it was entered and activated properly. Once we got up and going on the proper departure and caught up with making sure the aircraft was cleaned up for climb and cruise climb we discussed what must have happened to [start the] problem. I quickly made sure to take ownership of the lack of confirming the new departure waypoints with my first officer during the taxi to the runway xx. I allowed myself to get hurried by ground events and failed to have the final SID confirmed by my first officer. First officer was still very new to the aircraft and I did the cardinal sin of not slowing things down so that we both were satisfied and assured that all preflight and FMS inputs were confirmed calmly prior to accepting a takeoff clearance. I especially felt terrible that I had just put my new first officer in jeopardy and that I wasn't setting the professional example for all flight operations. Later on down the road on our flight to ZZZ1; ATC gave us a number to call regarding a possible flight deviation. When we parked at the gate in ZZZ1 I called the number and kept my phone on speaker with the cockpit door closed so that both myself and my first officer could listen and respond. I spoke with an [employee] and he took my license and contact information and then asked us about the details of the events leading up to this deviation. I told him of our inability to get the FMS to engage the RNAV departure right after takeoff and my actions to stay clear of restricted areas as we worked the problem. He thanked me for the information and indicated that there might be an investigation. He did confirm that we did not penetrate any restricted areas; and that this was a failure to fly the assigned SID. No other aircraft was moved out of our way; as we simply stopped our climb at 4;000 feet per ATC instruction. I feel that the brunt of blame is on my own lack of proper CRM practices; and that in my hurry to get things done on a short taxi I let events drive me; instead of me driving and slowing our events in the cockpit to ensure all items were covered and confirmed. ATC did not clear me for takeoff with the usual SID first fix; which might have alerted me to any missing waypoints; as well. I also had a fitful night of sleep; as my dinner the night before did not agree with me during my normal sleep time in our overnight the night before. I apologized to my first officer for creating this problem and not setting to him the type of example I expected of myself and others. He also felt bad about not stating any concerns ahead of time; and we both agreed that this was one of those 'I won't ever let that happen again!' moments. Follow procedures slow down events when multiple changes impact flight routing and clearances.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-175 flight crew reported incorrect management of FMS resulting in course deviation.

Narrative: I was the Captain and the Pilot Flying on flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. Me and my First [Officer] answer my call touch with doing a quick turn out of ZZZ and was initially given the ZZZZZ2 RNAV departure with a South Flow. As we were pushing back from the gate; the Ground Patrol indicated that they had just switched to a North flow as we started Engine #XX. We also received a change of departure to the ZZZZZ4 from clearance delivery from the original ZZZZZ2 RNAV departure. We had already updated the departure based on a South Flow; and I went to update the departure as my First Officer went to update the TPS performance data based on the North Runway XX. I also was discussing the special 7P procedures for an engine failure and how we would set it up. During all of this discussion; other aircraft were pushing off their gates behind us and we started the #XX engine and set up for a single engine taxi to Runway XX. I neglected to have my First Officer confirm my FMS entries; and we taxied to Runway XX with only 2 aircraft ahead of us. The short line for takeoff prompted me to call for starting the #2 engine and then the Taxi Checklist. Ground had us cross Runway XY and contact Tower; who quickly stated to us that we were next for departure. With an aircraft on 2 mile final; Tower stated we were cleared for takeoff Runway XX; as opposed to stating the first fix on the RNAV departure. We took off and at 400 feet I called NAV. My First Officer pushed NAV but the stayed in ROLL. I stated again for NAV and the same result occurred. I quickly realized we needed an immediate left turn to stay clear of the restricted areas; so I manually made a sharp turn left and started following the river as my First Officer tried to get the FMS to engage the flight director. I was visually staying over the river to avoid transgression into any restricted areas. Departure saw that we weren't tracking the ZZZZZ4 like we were supposed to and we eventually asked for and were given a heading and told to climb to 5;000 feet; and that was quickly changed to stop our cling at 4;000 feet. I complied and the Controller queried us on what departure we were assigned; and he re-cleared us to fly the ZZZZZ4 LYH transition. By this time; it was apparent to us that the FMS was missing departure SID and transition; so it took a minute or two to re-enter the proper departure. We resumed the departure and then the Controller climbed us to 5;000 feet after we had passed some conflicting traffic. By this time; me and my First Officer were making sure that we were cleared to a specific fix in the departure and making sure it was entered and activated properly. Once we got up and going on the proper departure and caught up with making sure the aircraft was cleaned up for climb and cruise climb we discussed what must have happened to [start the] problem. I quickly made sure to take ownership of the lack of confirming the new departure waypoints with my First Officer during the taxi to the Runway XX. I allowed myself to get hurried by ground events and failed to have the final SID confirmed by my First Officer. First Officer was still very new to the aircraft and I did the cardinal sin of not slowing things down so that we both were satisfied and assured that all preflight and FMS inputs were confirmed calmly prior to accepting a takeoff clearance. I especially felt terrible that I had just put my new First Officer in jeopardy and that I wasn't setting the professional example for all flight operations. Later on down the road on our flight to ZZZ1; ATC gave us a number to call regarding a possible flight deviation. When we parked at the gate in ZZZ1 I called the number and kept my phone on speaker with the cockpit door closed so that both myself and my First Officer could listen and respond. I spoke with an [employee] and he took my license and contact information and then asked us about the details of the events leading up to this deviation. I told him of our inability to get the FMS to engage the RNAV departure right after takeoff and my actions to stay clear of restricted areas as we worked the problem. He thanked me for the information and indicated that there might be an investigation. He DID confirm that we did NOT penetrate any restricted areas; and that this was a failure to fly the assigned SID. No other aircraft was moved out of our way; as we simply stopped our climb at 4;000 feet per ATC instruction. I feel that the brunt of blame is on my own lack of proper CRM practices; and that in my hurry to get things done on a short taxi I let events drive me; instead of me driving and slowing our events in the cockpit to ensure all items were covered and confirmed. ATC did not clear me for takeoff with the usual SID first fix; which might have alerted me to any missing waypoints; as well. I also had a fitful night of sleep; as my dinner the night before did not agree with me during my normal sleep time in our overnight the night before. I apologized to my First Officer for creating this problem and not setting to him the type of example I expected of myself and others. He also felt bad about not stating any concerns ahead of time; and we both agreed that this was one of those 'I won't ever let that happen again!' moments. Follow procedures slow down events when multiple changes impact flight routing and clearances.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.