Narrative:

I was working a shift at the ARTCC. I have been certified in the area less than one year. I was placed in an unsafe and negligent situation by management during this shift. Our area should have had 13 fully certified controllers on this night to run the operation at capacity. That night; there were 7. Of the 7 controllers working that night; I was the only one not offered two hours of call in overtime on the front of my shift. There is supposed to be two controllers scheduled for the [evening] shift in order to cover the area before the midnight shifts come in. That night; there were zero [evening] controllers. This meant that I was the only one eligible to be forced to work an extra hour. My shift on the next day was a [morning] so per the 9 hour rule; I was also not eligible to stay. The operations manager ordered me to stay; and I was ordered to have my following shift moved back an hour to accommodate. Since this was a direct order from my OM; I complied. There were only two controllers left. The other controller was working a 10 hour day and stayed with me until the last minute his shift was over to not exceed 10 hours. Traffic was very heavy; not just for one of the area's newest controllers; it was heavy traffic for the most seasoned controller as well. This left me; by myself; working the entire area. Every position; every frequency; every airplane was in my control. To tell you my workload was overwhelming would be an understatement. To put me in this situation was pure negligence. It was an absolute safety issue to myself and more important the flying public. I was working so many airplanes by myself with no one available for assistance as I needed it; that I was forced to place the adjacent center in the hold for two of my airport's arrivals. I could not see my data blocks as they were over-lapping and had no assistance to help me. I had instrument arrivals into airports that we service using 2 different frequencies; while also working traffic climbing from other airports; and all overflights that were all on 2 other frequencies. Shortly after placing the adjacent center in the hold; I was advised by my supervisor that my operations manager is telling me I have to run arrivals because there 'is no in trail restriction...' an in trail restriction is the least of my concerns at this point. Ensuring that two B737s don't collide was my only concern at this point. I firmly believe that the request for me to take the other center out of the hold knowing my workload and again being by myself with no assistance; was negligent on the part of the supervisor and operations manager. The entire area was my operation and I did not take the center out of the hold because I wasn't going to let management bully me into an even more unsafe situation that they already placed me in. I really; really needed a second set of eyes to make sure I was addressing all traffic conflicts and there was no one available. I was left alone and I was offered no protections by management. They placed me in a situation I personally believe to be undeniably not safe for the flying public. I invite you to watch the situation I was placed in. Please again note that I was working all of those airplanes by myself; with no assistance available to me. There needs to be accountability and consequences when situations become unsafe; especially when they are avoidable and placed upon me due to negligent decisions by management. I have one job when I show up to work; ensure that the flying public get through my sector safely. On this shift due to decisions made and also lack of decision making by my management team; I was unable to perform my one function. I was let down by the people who are there to protect me. For that; they made my sector (the whole area) unsafe to fly through. Mitigating risks when staffing is not just critical; but beyond critical is the most important function of a manager. I'd say that having one controller running the whole area at a busy time of the night is beyond critical. Decisions must be made to always protect the safety of the flying public. We cannot let in trail restrictions; time based metering; staffing; sector configurations or anything of the sort dictate how safe we are going to be in any given time. None of that matters if two airplanes collide. The families of the victims will not care that 6 people used sick leave; because it truly does not matter. They will be left wondering: 'why didn't the airplanes go where the controllers are staffed properly?' valid question. Also; '6 people called in sick; so what? Call in 6 people to cover'. Again; valid statement. Problem is; we are all working 6 days a week; with a lot of 10 hour days mixed in. There is no one to call in. So; my main recommendation is for management to mitigate risks associated with staffing problems by protecting their controllers; protecting their airspace; and most importantly protecting the flying public.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: New York Center Controller reported at the end of a night shift they had an overwhelming workload and put an adjacent facility into holding because they were forced to work the entire area airspace combined due to lack of staffing.

Narrative: I was working a shift at the ARTCC. I have been certified in the area less than one year. I was placed in an unsafe and negligent situation by management during this shift. Our area should have had 13 fully certified controllers on this night to run the operation at capacity. That night; there were 7. Of the 7 controllers working that night; I was the only one not offered two hours of call in overtime on the front of my shift. There is supposed to be two controllers scheduled for the [evening] shift in order to cover the area before the midnight shifts come in. That night; there were zero [evening] controllers. This meant that I was the only one eligible to be forced to work an extra hour. My shift on the next day was a [morning] so per the 9 hour rule; I was also not eligible to stay. The Operations Manager ordered me to stay; and I was ordered to have my following shift moved back an hour to accommodate. Since this was a direct order from my OM; I complied. There were only two controllers left. The other Controller was working a 10 hour day and stayed with me until the last minute his shift was over to not exceed 10 hours. Traffic was very heavy; not just for one of the area's newest controllers; it was heavy traffic for the most seasoned controller as well. This left me; by myself; working the entire area. Every position; every frequency; every airplane was in my control. To tell you my workload was overwhelming would be an understatement. To put me in this situation was pure negligence. It was an absolute safety issue to myself and more important the flying public. I was working so many airplanes by myself with no one available for assistance as I needed it; that I was forced to place the adjacent Center in the hold for two of my airport's arrivals. I could not see my data blocks as they were over-lapping and had no assistance to help me. I had instrument arrivals into airports that we service using 2 different frequencies; while also working traffic climbing from other airports; and all overflights that were all on 2 other frequencies. Shortly after placing the adjacent Center in the hold; I was advised by my Supervisor that my Operations Manager is telling me I have to run arrivals because there 'is no in trail restriction...' An in trail restriction is the least of my concerns at this point. Ensuring that two B737s don't collide was my only concern at this point. I firmly believe that the request for me to take the other Center out of the hold knowing my workload and again being by myself with no assistance; was negligent on the part of the Supervisor and Operations Manager. The entire area was my operation and I did not take the Center out of the hold because I wasn't going to let management bully me into an even more unsafe situation that they already placed me in. I really; really needed a second set of eyes to make sure I was addressing all traffic conflicts and there was no one available. I was left alone and I was offered no protections by management. They placed me in a situation I personally believe to be undeniably not safe for the flying public. I invite you to watch the situation I was placed in. Please again note that I was working all of those airplanes by myself; with no assistance available to me. There needs to be accountability and consequences when situations become unsafe; especially when they are avoidable and placed upon me due to negligent decisions by management. I have one job when I show up to work; ensure that the flying public get through my sector safely. On this shift due to decisions made and also lack of decision making by my management team; I was unable to perform my one function. I was let down by the people who are there to protect me. For that; they made my sector (the whole area) unsafe to fly through. Mitigating risks when staffing is not just critical; but beyond critical is the most important function of a manager. I'd say that having one controller running the whole area at a busy time of the night is beyond critical. Decisions must be made to always protect the safety of the flying public. We cannot let in trail restrictions; time based metering; staffing; sector configurations or anything of the sort dictate how safe we are going to be in any given time. None of that matters if two airplanes collide. The families of the victims will not care that 6 people used sick leave; because it truly does not matter. They will be left wondering: 'Why didn't the airplanes go where the controllers are staffed properly?' Valid question. Also; '6 people called in sick; so what? Call in 6 people to cover'. Again; valid statement. Problem is; we are all working 6 days a week; with a lot of 10 hour days mixed in. There is no one to call in. So; my main recommendation is for management to mitigate risks associated with staffing problems by protecting their controllers; protecting their airspace; and most importantly protecting the flying public.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.