Narrative:

At 5;000 feet MSL; 20 miles from the airport at 250 knots; a flight attendant notified me of an ill passenger who had been in the lavatory for 40 minutes. She believed the passenger needed emergency medical attention. I returned to the frequency and advised the first officer of the situation and that I was going to ask ATC to arrange for EMS to meet the flight. ATC acknowledged our request and gave us a vector for runts and cleared us direct to the fix. As the first officer was programming the FMC for the new clearance; I said; 'we're going to be high; I'll slow you down;' as I selected the speed bug to the masi up bug. The first officer acknowledged what I had done and I verified runts on the legs page. The first officer executed the change and selected LNAV. As he was doing so; ATC cleared us to 3;000 feet. The first officer immediately called for flaps 1 because we could see that we had some excess energy; but the situation remained manageable. Just below 4;000 feet ATC asked if we had the field in sight. I asked the first officer if he had the airport and he said he did. I called the field in sight to ATC and he cleared us for a visual approach. I felt we still had extra energy but did not say anything because I felt the situation was easily recoverable with speed brakes or landing gear. The first officer then selected direct hobel on the FMC; asked for verification and executed the change. We were then immediately high on the VNAV profile. The first officer called for flaps 5. Speed was about 200 knots and I thought we needed flaps 10/speedbrakes/landing gear. Again; I didn't say anything because I didn't want to be thought of as a micromanaging captain. A few miles before hobel I finally said; 'gear?' and the first officer called for the landing gear. By then we definitely had excess energy. The autopilot overshot the final in the turn over hobel and the first officer disengaged it and flew manually. I focused my attention inside the cockpit on glideslope proximity and airspeed. We were configured at 1;000'= feet but a little fast. I didn't call for a go-around because I was concerned about the ill passenger and we were correcting nicely. At 500 feet we were stable and I looked up to see that we were aligned with runway 31R (the wrong runway). I called for a go-around. The go-around was poorly flown and I (finally) became much more directive; giving the first officer headings and altitudes. We were cleared for closed left traffic. The first officer configured early and got the aircraft slowed to 170 KIAS; but he was aware that he was descending quickly through 1;200 feet AGL much too early. I then took control of the aircraft; leveled off at 1;200 feet AGL and got the aircraft completely configured and on speed. We completed the before landing checklist and I stabilized the aircraft on the glideslope and localizer. Just above 1;000 feet AGL; I gave the aircraft back to the first officer. The subsequent final approach and landing was within company limits. I should have been much clearer much sooner that we were carrying extra energy. Later; I should have been far more directive in getting the aircraft slowed and configured. When the situation first happened; before I said anything to ATC about the ill passenger; I should have said; 'let's not rush this; take your time and do this right.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B-737 Captain reported having to execute a go-around after expediting the approach due to an ill passenger.

Narrative: At 5;000 feet MSL; 20 miles from the airport at 250 knots; a Flight Attendant notified me of an ill passenger who had been in the lavatory for 40 minutes. She believed the passenger needed emergency medical attention. I returned to the frequency and advised the First Officer of the situation and that I was going to ask ATC to arrange for EMS to meet the flight. ATC acknowledged our request and gave us a vector for RUNTS and cleared us direct to the fix. As the First Officer was programming the FMC for the new clearance; I said; 'We're going to be high; I'll slow you down;' as I selected the Speed bug to the MASI UP bug. The First Officer acknowledged what I had done and I verified RUNTS on the LEGS page. The First Officer executed the change and selected LNAV. As he was doing so; ATC cleared us to 3;000 feet. The First Officer immediately called for flaps 1 because we could see that we had some excess energy; but the situation remained manageable. Just below 4;000 feet ATC asked if we had the field in sight. I asked the First Officer if he had the airport and he said he did. I called the field in sight to ATC and he cleared us for a visual approach. I felt we still had extra energy but did not say anything because I felt the situation was easily recoverable with speed brakes or landing gear. The First Officer then selected direct HOBEL on the FMC; asked for verification and executed the change. We were then immediately high on the VNAV profile. The First Officer called for flaps 5. Speed was about 200 knots and I thought we needed flaps 10/speedbrakes/landing gear. Again; I didn't say anything because I didn't want to be thought of as a micromanaging Captain. A few miles before HOBEL I finally said; 'Gear?' and the First Officer called for the landing gear. By then we definitely had excess energy. The autopilot overshot the final in the turn over HOBEL and the First Officer disengaged it and flew manually. I focused my attention inside the cockpit on glideslope proximity and airspeed. We were configured at 1;000'= feet but a little fast. I didn't call for a go-around because I was concerned about the ill passenger and we were correcting nicely. At 500 feet we were stable and I looked up to see that we were aligned with Runway 31R (the wrong runway). I called for a go-around. The go-around was poorly flown and I (finally) became much more directive; giving the First Officer headings and altitudes. We were cleared for closed left traffic. The First Officer configured early and got the aircraft slowed to 170 KIAS; but he was aware that he was descending quickly through 1;200 feet AGL much too early. I then took control of the aircraft; leveled off at 1;200 feet AGL and got the aircraft completely configured and on Speed. We completed the Before Landing Checklist and I stabilized the aircraft on the glideslope and localizer. Just above 1;000 feet AGL; I gave the aircraft back to the First Officer. The subsequent final approach and landing was within Company limits. I should have been much clearer much sooner that we were carrying extra energy. Later; I should have been far more directive in getting the aircraft slowed and configured. When the situation first happened; before I said anything to ATC about the ill passenger; I should have said; 'Let's not rush this; take your time and do this right.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.