Narrative:

Prior to our departure a commuter light transport departed runway 35. I recalled hearing tower giving instructions to a small aircraft departing from another runway just prior to the light transport to turn away after departure so that the light transport could go. The takeoff was normal and at 2000' MSL we were instructed to contact departure control. The captain was flying this leg. We were both looking outside, and I contacted departure control, 'departure, air carrier out of 2000' to maintain 3000'.' departure control came back with '....climb and maintain one zero thousand...' and as I was acknowledging the new clearance I looked inside the cockpit to dial in the new cleared altitude in the altitude alerter. As I looked back outside we were passing 2400' (approximately) MSL and at 12 O'clock just a few hundred ft above us was the small aircraft. At the time I was sure it was an small aircraft a but it may have been an small aircraft B. I yelled 'level off' and simultaneously put my palms on the yolk, ready to shove the nose over in the event the captain did not do so immediately, but I quickly stole a glance inside and the captain was leveling at 2700'. He later told me he had seen the aircraft almost exactly the same time I did and felt he could level off smoothly and we would still be ok, which we were, but the small aircraft could not have been any higher than 3000'. As we cruised under and past the aircraft, I called departure and queried them as to why we hadn't been given the traffic at 12 O'clock that we just about hit. The controller said he had nothing on his scope and handed us off to the center controller. I made the initial call to center, got a response, and at that time told the captain he had the radios, that I was going back to the mht tower controller for a min. I contacted tower and told them of the incident, because this aircraft was only 3-4 mi from the airport. They said they never had the aircraft on the scope either. I later found out, when I called them on a landline from iad, that the tower controller and the departure controller situation next to one another so the tower had heard my initial query about the traffic. The tower supervisor on duty at the time was mr X and I spoke with him at length on the phone after landing at iad. He assured me that the two controllers involved were two of his best. I knew that they were not working this particular aircraft or they would never have cleared us for takeoff. We talked about the previous mentioned aircraft that took off just prior to the light transport and mr X said he didn't believe it was that same aircraft. What had everyone baffled was the fact that this aircraft was not detected on radar. It obviously had no transponder, but it didn't even paint a primary return. This aircraft was not talking to anyone, and if it was in fact at 3000', then it was legal as far as the air traffic area goes. Legal, maybe, smart, definitely not. Suggestions to prevent something like this from happening again. Extend the air traffic area's to the positive control area, not just to 29999.99'. Mandatory xponders on all aircraft. Less frequency changes, heading changes, altitude changes up to 10000'. The workload on a two person airplane is extremely high, and every time a frequency, heading or altitude change is given, one person has to look inside to make the appropriate change to the radios, navigation equipment, or altitude alerter. The person flying the airplane is looking outside but also inside, off and on, and at some point both sets of eyes are bound to be inside. Somewhere along the way the pilot of this small aircraft overflying mht missed some very important information from his instrument. In this day and age, no matter where you are in this country, it just is not wise not to talk to somebody on the ground, especially if you are anywhere near an airport where there are high speed aircraft. It doesn't have to be lax to be dangerous. I'm sure he was just a little shook to see an medium large transport come screaming out from under his nose.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR ON INITIAL CLIMB HAS NMAC WITH SMA.

Narrative: PRIOR TO OUR DEP A COMMUTER LTT DEPARTED RWY 35. I RECALLED HEARING TWR GIVING INSTRUCTIONS TO A SMALL ACFT DEPARTING FROM ANOTHER RWY JUST PRIOR TO THE LTT TO TURN AWAY AFTER DEP SO THAT THE LTT COULD GO. THE TKOF WAS NORMAL AND AT 2000' MSL WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT DEP CTL. THE CAPT WAS FLYING THIS LEG. WE WERE BOTH LOOKING OUTSIDE, AND I CONTACTED DEP CTL, 'DEP, ACR OUT OF 2000' TO MAINTAIN 3000'.' DEP CTL CAME BACK WITH '....CLB AND MAINTAIN ONE ZERO THOUSAND...' AND AS I WAS ACKNOWLEDGING THE NEW CLRNC I LOOKED INSIDE THE COCKPIT TO DIAL IN THE NEW CLRED ALT IN THE ALT ALERTER. AS I LOOKED BACK OUTSIDE WE WERE PASSING 2400' (APPROX) MSL AND AT 12 O'CLOCK JUST A FEW HUNDRED FT ABOVE US WAS THE SMA. AT THE TIME I WAS SURE IT WAS AN SMA A BUT IT MAY HAVE BEEN AN SMA B. I YELLED 'LEVEL OFF' AND SIMULTANEOUSLY PUT MY PALMS ON THE YOLK, READY TO SHOVE THE NOSE OVER IN THE EVENT THE CAPT DID NOT DO SO IMMEDIATELY, BUT I QUICKLY STOLE A GLANCE INSIDE AND THE CAPT WAS LEVELING AT 2700'. HE LATER TOLD ME HE HAD SEEN THE ACFT ALMOST EXACTLY THE SAME TIME I DID AND FELT HE COULD LEVEL OFF SMOOTHLY AND WE WOULD STILL BE OK, WHICH WE WERE, BUT THE SMA COULD NOT HAVE BEEN ANY HIGHER THAN 3000'. AS WE CRUISED UNDER AND PAST THE ACFT, I CALLED DEP AND QUERIED THEM AS TO WHY WE HADN'T BEEN GIVEN THE TFC AT 12 O'CLOCK THAT WE JUST ABOUT HIT. THE CTLR SAID HE HAD NOTHING ON HIS SCOPE AND HANDED US OFF TO THE CTR CTLR. I MADE THE INITIAL CALL TO CTR, GOT A RESPONSE, AND AT THAT TIME TOLD THE CAPT HE HAD THE RADIOS, THAT I WAS GOING BACK TO THE MHT TWR CTLR FOR A MIN. I CONTACTED TWR AND TOLD THEM OF THE INCIDENT, BECAUSE THIS ACFT WAS ONLY 3-4 MI FROM THE ARPT. THEY SAID THEY NEVER HAD THE ACFT ON THE SCOPE EITHER. I LATER FOUND OUT, WHEN I CALLED THEM ON A LANDLINE FROM IAD, THAT THE TWR CTLR AND THE DEP CTLR SIT NEXT TO ONE ANOTHER SO THE TWR HAD HEARD MY INITIAL QUERY ABOUT THE TFC. THE TWR SUPVR ON DUTY AT THE TIME WAS MR X AND I SPOKE WITH HIM AT LENGTH ON THE PHONE AFTER LNDG AT IAD. HE ASSURED ME THAT THE TWO CTLRS INVOLVED WERE TWO OF HIS BEST. I KNEW THAT THEY WERE NOT WORKING THIS PARTICULAR ACFT OR THEY WOULD NEVER HAVE CLRED US FOR TKOF. WE TALKED ABOUT THE PREVIOUS MENTIONED ACFT THAT TOOK OFF JUST PRIOR TO THE LTT AND MR X SAID HE DIDN'T BELIEVE IT WAS THAT SAME ACFT. WHAT HAD EVERYONE BAFFLED WAS THE FACT THAT THIS ACFT WAS NOT DETECTED ON RADAR. IT OBVIOUSLY HAD NO XPONDER, BUT IT DIDN'T EVEN PAINT A PRIMARY RETURN. THIS ACFT WAS NOT TALKING TO ANYONE, AND IF IT WAS IN FACT AT 3000', THEN IT WAS LEGAL AS FAR AS THE ATA GOES. LEGAL, MAYBE, SMART, DEFINITELY NOT. SUGGESTIONS TO PREVENT SOMETHING LIKE THIS FROM HAPPENING AGAIN. EXTEND THE ATA'S TO THE POSITIVE CTL AREA, NOT JUST TO 29999.99'. MANDATORY XPONDERS ON ALL ACFT. LESS FREQ CHANGES, HDG CHANGES, ALT CHANGES UP TO 10000'. THE WORKLOAD ON A TWO PERSON AIRPLANE IS EXTREMELY HIGH, AND EVERY TIME A FREQ, HDG OR ALT CHANGE IS GIVEN, ONE PERSON HAS TO LOOK INSIDE TO MAKE THE APPROPRIATE CHANGE TO THE RADIOS, NAV EQUIP, OR ALT ALERTER. THE PERSON FLYING THE AIRPLANE IS LOOKING OUTSIDE BUT ALSO INSIDE, OFF AND ON, AND AT SOME POINT BOTH SETS OF EYES ARE BOUND TO BE INSIDE. SOMEWHERE ALONG THE WAY THE PLT OF THIS SMA OVERFLYING MHT MISSED SOME VERY IMPORTANT INFO FROM HIS INSTR. IN THIS DAY AND AGE, NO MATTER WHERE YOU ARE IN THIS COUNTRY, IT JUST IS NOT WISE NOT TO TALK TO SOMEBODY ON THE GND, ESPECIALLY IF YOU ARE ANYWHERE NEAR AN ARPT WHERE THERE ARE HIGH SPD ACFT. IT DOESN'T HAVE TO BE LAX TO BE DANGEROUS. I'M SURE HE WAS JUST A LITTLE SHOOK TO SEE AN MLG COME SCREAMING OUT FROM UNDER HIS NOSE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.