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Air carrier dispatcher's complaint about a computer generated flight plan summary that was not consistent with the dispatch release.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 167872 |
| Time | |
| Date | 199101 |
| Day | Sat |
| Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | atc facility : msp |
| State Reference | MN |
| Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
| Environment | |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
| Navigation In Use | Other Other |
| Flight Phase | ground : preflight |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | other personnel |
| Qualification | other |
| ASRS Report | 167872 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | other personnel other |
| Qualification | other other : other |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | other anomaly other |
| Independent Detector | other other : unspecified |
| Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
| Consequence | Other |
| Supplementary | |
| Primary Problem | Airport |
| Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
In the age of automation, computer error is a growing problem. Unfortunately the FAA is not able to inspect or ensure that automation does not compromise safety. The attached flight plan illustrates an error which was transparent to the dispatcher who created it. The company in this case dictates the quality of the automation,, not the dispatcher. This system is an adaptation of the air carrier X flight planning system. The company procedures are driven by productivity, not quality control. Because of the procedures and the exposure of the route database to unlicensed data clerks. This data entry error was allowed to go unchked. The way the system is set up, there is no indication to the dispatcher that the error existed. The far's are becoming obsolete. If the FAA will not accept enforcement of quality control responsibility for automation then the dispatcher should be able to accept or reject automation, based on quality concerns. This is more than justified by the fact that the licensed aircraft dispatcher is ultimately responsible for the safety of the flight. Here we have authority and responsibility being separated. Historically, this proves to result in disaster.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR DISPATCHER'S COMPLAINT ABOUT A COMPUTER GENERATED FLT PLAN SUMMARY THAT WAS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE DISPATCH RELEASE.
Narrative: IN THE AGE OF AUTOMATION, COMPUTER ERROR IS A GROWING PROB. UNFORTUNATELY THE FAA IS NOT ABLE TO INSPECT OR ENSURE THAT AUTOMATION DOES NOT COMPROMISE SAFETY. THE ATTACHED FLT PLAN ILLUSTRATES AN ERROR WHICH WAS TRANSPARENT TO THE DISPATCHER WHO CREATED IT. THE COMPANY IN THIS CASE DICTATES THE QUALITY OF THE AUTOMATION,, NOT THE DISPATCHER. THIS SYS IS AN ADAPTATION OF THE ACR X FLT PLANNING SYS. THE COMPANY PROCS ARE DRIVEN BY PRODUCTIVITY, NOT QUALITY CTL. BECAUSE OF THE PROCS AND THE EXPOSURE OF THE RTE DATABASE TO UNLICENSED DATA CLERKS. THIS DATA ENTRY ERROR WAS ALLOWED TO GO UNCHKED. THE WAY THE SYS IS SET UP, THERE IS NO INDICATION TO THE DISPATCHER THAT THE ERROR EXISTED. THE FAR'S ARE BECOMING OBSOLETE. IF THE FAA WILL NOT ACCEPT ENFORCEMENT OF QUALITY CTL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AUTOMATION THEN THE DISPATCHER SHOULD BE ABLE TO ACCEPT OR REJECT AUTOMATION, BASED ON QUALITY CONCERNS. THIS IS MORE THAN JUSTIFIED BY THE FACT THAT THE LICENSED ACFT DISPATCHER IS ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF THE FLT. HERE WE HAVE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY BEING SEPARATED. HISTORICALLY, THIS PROVES TO RESULT IN DISASTER.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.