Narrative:

My last student for the day, having flown with 3 others previous, commented about the amount of fuel in the aircraft being low. I had her turn on the master and I checked the gauge. They indicated just under 1/2 tank left and just over 1/4 tank right. We were only gong up for a 40-50 min flight and I gave the go ahead to fly as is. We took off and went to do some ground-reference maneuvers. About 1/2 hour into the flight the engine stared to sound rough. I decided to head back to wiscasset at that time. I also had been watching the fuel gauges closely during the flight and especially during rough engine. They had dropped a little indicating fuel consumption, but were still not below 1/4 tank on each side. I called my company's unicom 122.8 to alert them the engine was running rough. Very soon after the engine quit completely. I took the aircraft at this time, set up at 60-65 KTS (best glide). We were about 10 mi north of wiscasset airport. I had field in sight, but my judgement was it was unreachable. I selected a field to land in the called my company on 122.8 with my mayday. I had checked the gauges after engine failure and they were still indicating fuel. I then figured it was some other problem than fuel. I landed in the field in what I could judge was the best direction. It was an approach with the fewest trees and obstacles. It was away from the owner's house, and it was into the wind. It was, however, a slight uphill grade that I couldn't detect from the air. The ground was a bit soft and upon T/D the nose wheel of the aircraft broke loose. We skidded in that position about 50' before coming to a complete stop. The fuel valve was already off (done during emergency landing procedures), but the ignition and master were still on. I radioed to my company that we were both down and safe, and that the aircraft was damaged. I then turned off the master and the ignition, and we both exited the aircraft. After the fact, during the investigation it was let known to me that little fuel was drained from the wing tank, and that the probable cause was fuel starvation due to inadequate fuel. Further research into the hobbs times of the aircraft indicate this to be true, and investigation is still pending. My go, no-go judgement was based on the readings from my fuel gauges and from the imagined time of use since last refueling. I had calculated (in my mind) total flight time since refueling to be approximately 2.5 hours. I had however forgotten 1 flight which made the total time of 3.4, very close to the 4 hour limit of the aircraft (not including VFR fuel requirement). I had not visually checked the tanks due to no stop or handle on the struts and (stupidly!) the feeling of little time to waste doing so. (I had been running behind all day.) I feel now that a visibility check still might not have changed my judgement (hard to tell the different between 1/2 and 1/4 tank visually), but I also feel that if I had checked and seen tanks that low I would have refueled at that time. Corrective actions being taken now are, never trusting a student preflight if not there to watch over. Always checking tanks visually (and all other preflight procedures), and personally I don't think I will be able to fly an aircraft west/O full tanks at takeoff, again. As for what I would tell other pilots from what I learned would be (and I stress). 1) never rely solely on your fuel gauges. Visually check tanks and figure relationship of visibility check, to guess then decide, using all data, how much to trust reading of gauges. 2) don't let schedules or time stress you into a bad judgement call. 3) don't let structural differences let you get lazy on your preflight (no step to check tanks--so get a stool or a ladder.)

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INSTRUCTOR WITH SPI RUNS OUT OF FUEL. EMERGENCY LNDG.

Narrative: MY LAST STUDENT FOR THE DAY, HAVING FLOWN WITH 3 OTHERS PREVIOUS, COMMENTED ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF FUEL IN THE ACFT BEING LOW. I HAD HER TURN ON THE MASTER AND I CHKED THE GAUGE. THEY INDICATED JUST UNDER 1/2 TANK LEFT AND JUST OVER 1/4 TANK RIGHT. WE WERE ONLY GONG UP FOR A 40-50 MIN FLT AND I GAVE THE GO AHEAD TO FLY AS IS. WE TOOK OFF AND WENT TO DO SOME GND-REF MANEUVERS. ABOUT 1/2 HR INTO THE FLT THE ENG STARED TO SOUND ROUGH. I DECIDED TO HEAD BACK TO WISCASSET AT THAT TIME. I ALSO HAD BEEN WATCHING THE FUEL GAUGES CLOSELY DURING THE FLT AND ESPECIALLY DURING ROUGH ENG. THEY HAD DROPPED A LITTLE INDICATING FUEL CONSUMPTION, BUT WERE STILL NOT BELOW 1/4 TANK ON EACH SIDE. I CALLED MY COMPANY'S UNICOM 122.8 TO ALERT THEM THE ENG WAS RUNNING ROUGH. VERY SOON AFTER THE ENG QUIT COMPLETELY. I TOOK THE ACFT AT THIS TIME, SET UP AT 60-65 KTS (BEST GLIDE). WE WERE ABOUT 10 MI N OF WISCASSET ARPT. I HAD FIELD IN SIGHT, BUT MY JUDGEMENT WAS IT WAS UNREACHABLE. I SELECTED A FIELD TO LAND IN THE CALLED MY COMPANY ON 122.8 WITH MY MAYDAY. I HAD CHKED THE GAUGES AFTER ENG FAILURE AND THEY WERE STILL INDICATING FUEL. I THEN FIGURED IT WAS SOME OTHER PROB THAN FUEL. I LANDED IN THE FIELD IN WHAT I COULD JUDGE WAS THE BEST DIRECTION. IT WAS AN APCH WITH THE FEWEST TREES AND OBSTACLES. IT WAS AWAY FROM THE OWNER'S HOUSE, AND IT WAS INTO THE WIND. IT WAS, HOWEVER, A SLIGHT UPHILL GRADE THAT I COULDN'T DETECT FROM THE AIR. THE GND WAS A BIT SOFT AND UPON T/D THE NOSE WHEEL OF THE ACFT BROKE LOOSE. WE SKIDDED IN THAT POS ABOUT 50' BEFORE COMING TO A COMPLETE STOP. THE FUEL VALVE WAS ALREADY OFF (DONE DURING EMER LNDG PROCS), BUT THE IGNITION AND MASTER WERE STILL ON. I RADIOED TO MY COMPANY THAT WE WERE BOTH DOWN AND SAFE, AND THAT THE ACFT WAS DAMAGED. I THEN TURNED OFF THE MASTER AND THE IGNITION, AND WE BOTH EXITED THE ACFT. AFTER THE FACT, DURING THE INVESTIGATION IT WAS LET KNOWN TO ME THAT LITTLE FUEL WAS DRAINED FROM THE WING TANK, AND THAT THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS FUEL STARVATION DUE TO INADEQUATE FUEL. FURTHER RESEARCH INTO THE HOBBS TIMES OF THE ACFT INDICATE THIS TO BE TRUE, AND INVESTIGATION IS STILL PENDING. MY GO, NO-GO JUDGEMENT WAS BASED ON THE READINGS FROM MY FUEL GAUGES AND FROM THE IMAGINED TIME OF USE SINCE LAST REFUELING. I HAD CALCULATED (IN MY MIND) TOTAL FLT TIME SINCE REFUELING TO BE APPROX 2.5 HRS. I HAD HOWEVER FORGOTTEN 1 FLT WHICH MADE THE TOTAL TIME OF 3.4, VERY CLOSE TO THE 4 HR LIMIT OF THE ACFT (NOT INCLUDING VFR FUEL REQUIREMENT). I HAD NOT VISUALLY CHKED THE TANKS DUE TO NO STOP OR HANDLE ON THE STRUTS AND (STUPIDLY!) THE FEELING OF LITTLE TIME TO WASTE DOING SO. (I HAD BEEN RUNNING BEHIND ALL DAY.) I FEEL NOW THAT A VIS CHK STILL MIGHT NOT HAVE CHANGED MY JUDGEMENT (HARD TO TELL THE DIFFERENT BTWN 1/2 AND 1/4 TANK VISUALLY), BUT I ALSO FEEL THAT IF I HAD CHKED AND SEEN TANKS THAT LOW I WOULD HAVE REFUELED AT THAT TIME. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BEING TAKEN NOW ARE, NEVER TRUSTING A STUDENT PREFLT IF NOT THERE TO WATCH OVER. ALWAYS CHKING TANKS VISUALLY (AND ALL OTHER PREFLT PROCS), AND PERSONALLY I DON'T THINK I WILL BE ABLE TO FLY AN ACFT W/O FULL TANKS AT TKOF, AGAIN. AS FOR WHAT I WOULD TELL OTHER PLTS FROM WHAT I LEARNED WOULD BE (AND I STRESS). 1) NEVER RELY SOLELY ON YOUR FUEL GAUGES. VISUALLY CHK TANKS AND FIGURE RELATIONSHIP OF VIS CHK, TO GUESS THEN DECIDE, USING ALL DATA, HOW MUCH TO TRUST READING OF GAUGES. 2) DON'T LET SCHEDULES OR TIME STRESS YOU INTO A BAD JUDGEMENT CALL. 3) DON'T LET STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES LET YOU GET LAZY ON YOUR PREFLT (NO STEP TO CHK TANKS--SO GET A STOOL OR A LADDER.)

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.