Narrative:

We were filed on and flying the ANCHR4 arrival into den. On the low center sector; we were instructed to descend via the KIPPR5; despite never receiving a formal route amendment. This threw me off; so we quickly re-programmed. We set up and briefed for runway 16L. On contact with den approach; we were assigned runway 16R. My first officer (first officer) and I reprogrammed and re-briefed. We were instructed to intercept the runway 16R localizer very far out. ATC left us high and had us intercept at 12;000 ft.; so I was task saturated with getting down to meet the mandatory 10;000 ft. Restrictions at shred and sakic. Because we were outside the service volume of the runway 16R localizer; and because the crj-200 is so poor at capturing a localizer with any sort of wind; I elected to intercept the localizer in 'white needles' and switch to green once we were established and within the service volume. In navigation mode with FMS annunciated on the FMA; the autopilot flew a very shallow intercept to join the extended centerline. ATC told us we had intercepted the runway 16L localizer (we had not) and gave us a new vector for runway 16R. I verified that runway 16R was in the FMS. I disconnected the autopilot; referenced the blue 'preview needles'; and flew the approach. While centered on the blue localizer needles; the overlaying 'white needle' FMS course indicated that we were right of course. These sources were conflicting; but I flew visually and with the localizer needles to the runway.I feel that this would not have happened if I was not left high; behind the airplane; and task saturated by den ATC. The lack of standard communication and attention to detail in the center sector left me confused; because were cleared to descend via an arrival that we were not yet cleared on. Then; on the approach sector; we had to quickly reprogram to runway 16R because there is no way to figure out what runway to expect going into den. It is seemingly random. Then; I was startled by flying into moderate precipitation that ATC had not advised us of. Then; we were vectored to join a localizer nearly 30 miles out from the runway. I believe the CDI may not have yet switched to terminal sensitivity because we were so far out. This would explain the underwhelming intercept. Den center and approach should be more proactive with verifying that an aircraft is on the correct arrival and advising them of what runway to expect ahead of time. We also should have better procedures or equipment in the crj; which is at times incapable of intercepting a ground-based localizer. It is no wonder that our numbers of course deviations in den are staggering; especially with the construction forcing arrivals on close parallel runways 16R/16R. We did everything right - complying with mandatory altitude restrictions when left in no position to easily comply with them; properly identifying a runway change as a threat and correctly reprogramming the box; and 'going with the flow' when denver center told us to descend via an arrival we hadn't briefed; been cleared on; or programmed. Despite our best efforts we still ended up as yet another possible course deviation on approach in den.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 Captain reported receiving late changes to their arrival STAR and approach runway. Due the conflicting signals from ground based NAVAIDS and aircraft FMS pilot chose to hand fly a visual approach to the correct runway.

Narrative: We were filed on and flying the ANCHR4 arrival into DEN. On the low Center sector; we were instructed to descend via the KIPPR5; despite never receiving a formal route amendment. This threw me off; so we quickly re-programmed. We set up and briefed for Runway 16L. On contact with DEN Approach; we were assigned Runway 16R. My FO (First Officer) and I reprogrammed and re-briefed. We were instructed to intercept the Runway 16R localizer very far out. ATC left us high and had us intercept at 12;000 ft.; so I was task saturated with getting down to meet the mandatory 10;000 ft. restrictions at SHRED and SAKIC. Because we were outside the service volume of the Runway 16R localizer; and because the CRJ-200 is so poor at capturing a localizer with any sort of wind; I elected to intercept the localizer in 'white needles' and switch to green once we were established and within the service volume. In NAV mode with FMS annunciated on the FMA; the autopilot flew a very shallow intercept to join the extended centerline. ATC told us we had intercepted the Runway 16L localizer (we had not) and gave us a new vector for Runway 16R. I verified that Runway 16R was in the FMS. I disconnected the autopilot; referenced the blue 'preview needles'; and flew the approach. While centered on the blue localizer needles; the overlaying 'white needle' FMS course indicated that we were right of course. These sources were conflicting; but I flew visually and with the localizer needles to the runway.I feel that this would not have happened if I was not left high; behind the airplane; and task saturated by DEN ATC. The lack of standard communication and attention to detail in the Center sector left me confused; because were cleared to descend via an arrival that we were not yet cleared on. Then; on the approach sector; we had to quickly reprogram to Runway 16R because there is no way to figure out what runway to expect going into DEN. It is seemingly random. Then; I was startled by flying into moderate precipitation that ATC had not advised us of. Then; we were vectored to join a localizer nearly 30 miles out from the runway. I believe the CDI may not have yet switched to terminal sensitivity because we were so far out. This would explain the underwhelming intercept. DEN Center and Approach should be more proactive with verifying that an aircraft is on the correct arrival and advising them of what runway to expect ahead of time. We also should have better procedures or equipment in the CRJ; which is at times incapable of intercepting a ground-based localizer. It is no wonder that our numbers of course deviations in DEN are staggering; especially with the construction forcing arrivals on close parallel Runways 16R/16R. We did everything right - complying with mandatory altitude restrictions when left in no position to easily comply with them; properly identifying a runway change as a threat and correctly reprogramming the box; and 'going with the flow' when Denver Center told us to descend via an arrival we hadn't briefed; been cleared on; or programmed. Despite our best efforts we still ended up as yet another possible course deviation on approach in DEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.