Narrative:

The flight referenced was conducted from ft myers to detroit. The aircraft was operating on an IFR flight plan. The flight was conducted in a routine fashion until the descent was initiated. At that point 2 factors had a detrimental effect on the safety of the flight. The first was the first officer's total incompetence in the aircraft. The descent and approach were handled exclusively by the captain including flying the aircraft, handling the radio and preparing for a minimums approach. Due to inclement WX at the destination (yip) the aircraft was diverted to dtw. This alternate was inadvertently left off of the flight plan due to the captain's preoccupation with all of the other preflight items. The safety of the final approach was compromised due to the first officer's lack of knowledge and currency. I believe part 91 should be revised to require that an first officer in a turbo-jet show at least some proficiency level in acting as a crew member. Even the taxi-in to the FBO was confusing due to the first officer not being able to transmit to the captain valid taxi instructions referencing the taxi chart. The other factor was dtw TRACON's demands to the captain for constant airspeed changes requiring confign changes on a tight ILS approach. The first approach was missed due to the failure of the marker beacon receiver and the inability to establish a stabilized approach. On the second approach a minimum fuel situation was declared to ATC. Even after this declaration ATC insisted upon airspeed changes that jeopardized the establishment of a stabilized approach. The captain informed ATC of this and established approach at the appropriate speed. The ILS was completed and the aircraft was landed safely. Other then confusion taxiing in due to the previously mentioned factor, the flight was cleared out routinely. Upon calling TRACON the captain was chastised by the supervisor for not following the controller's speed recommendations. The final approach speed is the captain's discretion and responsibility. Perhaps ATC has become used to airliners flying coupled approachs. A 25 yr old has to be hand-flown to the T/D on an ILS. This requires precise speed and attitude control. Perhaps a fly-a-controller program involving older fuel-thirsty turbo jets would be beneficial. The most valuable thing is that the captain learned, that even though his first officer was his boss and owner of the aircraft, limitations and good judgement should prevail no matter who is sitting in the right seat or in a comfy radar room on the ground.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF SMT JET ON APCH YIP PROTESTS SPEED CHANGES REQUESTED BY APCH CTLR. MADE MISSED APCH. FLEW NEXT APCH BY HAND AT STABILIZED SPEED AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT.

Narrative: THE FLT REFERENCED WAS CONDUCTED FROM FT MYERS TO DETROIT. THE ACFT WAS OPERATING ON AN IFR FLT PLAN. THE FLT WAS CONDUCTED IN A ROUTINE FASHION UNTIL THE DSNT WAS INITIATED. AT THAT POINT 2 FACTORS HAD A DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON THE SAFETY OF THE FLT. THE FIRST WAS THE F/O'S TOTAL INCOMPETENCE IN THE ACFT. THE DSNT AND APCH WERE HANDLED EXCLUSIVELY BY THE CAPT INCLUDING FLYING THE ACFT, HANDLING THE RADIO AND PREPARING FOR A MINIMUMS APCH. DUE TO INCLEMENT WX AT THE DEST (YIP) THE ACFT WAS DIVERTED TO DTW. THIS ALTERNATE WAS INADVERTENTLY LEFT OFF OF THE FLT PLAN DUE TO THE CAPT'S PREOCCUPATION WITH ALL OF THE OTHER PREFLT ITEMS. THE SAFETY OF THE FINAL APCH WAS COMPROMISED DUE TO THE F/O'S LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AND CURRENCY. I BELIEVE PART 91 SHOULD BE REVISED TO REQUIRE THAT AN F/O IN A TURBO-JET SHOW AT LEAST SOME PROFICIENCY LEVEL IN ACTING AS A CREW MEMBER. EVEN THE TAXI-IN TO THE FBO WAS CONFUSING DUE TO THE F/O NOT BEING ABLE TO XMIT TO THE CAPT VALID TAXI INSTRUCTIONS REFERENCING THE TAXI CHART. THE OTHER FACTOR WAS DTW TRACON'S DEMANDS TO THE CAPT FOR CONSTANT AIRSPD CHANGES REQUIRING CONFIGN CHANGES ON A TIGHT ILS APCH. THE FIRST APCH WAS MISSED DUE TO THE FAILURE OF THE MARKER BEACON RECEIVER AND THE INABILITY TO ESTABLISH A STABILIZED APCH. ON THE SECOND APCH A MINIMUM FUEL SITUATION WAS DECLARED TO ATC. EVEN AFTER THIS DECLARATION ATC INSISTED UPON AIRSPD CHANGES THAT JEOPARDIZED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STABILIZED APCH. THE CAPT INFORMED ATC OF THIS AND ESTABLISHED APCH AT THE APPROPRIATE SPD. THE ILS WAS COMPLETED AND THE ACFT WAS LANDED SAFELY. OTHER THEN CONFUSION TAXIING IN DUE TO THE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED FACTOR, THE FLT WAS CLRED OUT ROUTINELY. UPON CALLING TRACON THE CAPT WAS CHASTISED BY THE SUPVR FOR NOT FOLLOWING THE CTLR'S SPD RECOMMENDATIONS. THE FINAL APCH SPD IS THE CAPT'S DISCRETION AND RESPONSIBILITY. PERHAPS ATC HAS BECOME USED TO AIRLINERS FLYING COUPLED APCHS. A 25 YR OLD HAS TO BE HAND-FLOWN TO THE T/D ON AN ILS. THIS REQUIRES PRECISE SPD AND ATTITUDE CTL. PERHAPS A FLY-A-CTLR PROGRAM INVOLVING OLDER FUEL-THIRSTY TURBO JETS WOULD BE BENEFICIAL. THE MOST VALUABLE THING IS THAT THE CAPT LEARNED, THAT EVEN THOUGH HIS F/O WAS HIS BOSS AND OWNER OF THE ACFT, LIMITATIONS AND GOOD JUDGEMENT SHOULD PREVAIL NO MATTER WHO IS SITTING IN THE RIGHT SEAT OR IN A COMFY RADAR ROOM ON THE GND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.