Narrative:

I flew an ILS approach and landed on runway 14L. As we approached a turnoff, the captain took control of the aircraft and we exited at the first high speed taxiway east of runway 18. Simultaneously tower advised us to hold short of runway 8L, which I acknowledged. As the captain braked the aircraft to a stop, the tower made another transmission to the effect of hold short of the next intersection, which I again acknowledged. We (the captain and I) both looked for and did not see any sign designating this as 9L. I looked far right and did see one aircraft, but did not perceive it to be moving. As I looked down at my airfield diagram (which I had out), the captain released brakes and started forward. Simultaneously, the captain, tower and I recognized the error. The captain advanced power to expedite the crossing and I advised tower as soon as we cleared. In retrospect, it was the second transmission from tower which spoke of the next intersection that confused us and set the events in motion. Supplemental information from acn 170920: the captain and copilot were unsure of our location on the field, as they were unable to see a taxiway marker. The tower's instructions were not clear, and it was difficult to get a xmissions in to inquire because the frequency was clobbered. The captain and copilot concluded incorrectly that the tower had instructed them to hold short of the next intersection, and so we crossed 9L west/O clearance. The WX and vol of aircraft traffic, and radio congestion were contributing factors, as well as the lack of taxiway marker at that intersection. Supplemental information from acn 171329: he entered 9L when we were crossing 4L at 70-80 KTS. First officer noticed and initiated an abort. Air carrier X was clear of runway when we exited approximately 3500' down the runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT UNAUTH RWY CROSSING CAUSES ACR MLG TKOF ABORT AT ORD ON A FOGGY MORNING.

Narrative: I FLEW AN ILS APCH AND LANDED ON RWY 14L. AS WE APCHED A TURNOFF, THE CAPT TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND WE EXITED AT THE FIRST HIGH SPD TXWY E OF RWY 18. SIMULTANEOUSLY TWR ADVISED US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 8L, WHICH I ACKNOWLEDGED. AS THE CAPT BRAKED THE ACFT TO A STOP, THE TWR MADE ANOTHER XMISSION TO THE EFFECT OF HOLD SHORT OF THE NEXT INTXN, WHICH I AGAIN ACKNOWLEDGED. WE (THE CAPT AND I) BOTH LOOKED FOR AND DID NOT SEE ANY SIGN DESIGNATING THIS AS 9L. I LOOKED FAR RIGHT AND DID SEE ONE ACFT, BUT DID NOT PERCEIVE IT TO BE MOVING. AS I LOOKED DOWN AT MY AIRFIELD DIAGRAM (WHICH I HAD OUT), THE CAPT RELEASED BRAKES AND STARTED FORWARD. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE CAPT, TWR AND I RECOGNIZED THE ERROR. THE CAPT ADVANCED PWR TO EXPEDITE THE XING AND I ADVISED TWR AS SOON AS WE CLRED. IN RETROSPECT, IT WAS THE SECOND XMISSION FROM TWR WHICH SPOKE OF THE NEXT INTXN THAT CONFUSED US AND SET THE EVENTS IN MOTION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 170920: THE CAPT AND COPLT WERE UNSURE OF OUR LOCATION ON THE FIELD, AS THEY WERE UNABLE TO SEE A TXWY MARKER. THE TWR'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT CLR, AND IT WAS DIFFICULT TO GET A XMISSIONS IN TO INQUIRE BECAUSE THE FREQ WAS CLOBBERED. THE CAPT AND COPLT CONCLUDED INCORRECTLY THAT THE TWR HAD INSTRUCTED THEM TO HOLD SHORT OF THE NEXT INTXN, AND SO WE CROSSED 9L W/O CLRNC. THE WX AND VOL OF ACFT TFC, AND RADIO CONGESTION WERE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS, AS WELL AS THE LACK OF TXWY MARKER AT THAT INTXN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 171329: HE ENTERED 9L WHEN WE WERE XING 4L AT 70-80 KTS. F/O NOTICED AND INITIATED AN ABORT. ACR X WAS CLR OF RWY WHEN WE EXITED APPROX 3500' DOWN THE RWY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.