Narrative:

The flight to ramp inter-phone; in addition to APU were on MEL. Before we began boarding I made sure to talk with ramp agents; and ask who was going to do the push; and worked out hand signals and how we would coordinate the push without verbal communication. We also made clear about needing to start at the gate.after completing before start below the line; I signaled to the ramp to start engine 2. Ramp gave clearance to start the engine; so I began the engine start. Then the first officer asked if we needed to release brakes first for capture; so I then motioned about the walk around and brakes; where the ramp agent gave the hand signals for walk around complete and to release brakes. I released the brakes as the engine continued starting.after completing both engine starts at the gate; we got our clearance to push; and after relaying the hand signals to ramp who started to push; I began the after start flow; released the control lock and advanced the condition levers. The first officer said something; and I brought the props back to feather before they spun up fully.due to the combination of mels; first flight of the day; and not taking the time to really think about how the combination of mels would interact; I made several errors that I made sure to learn from and remedy; since we kept the plane for another 2 legs. The nonstandard flow of starting at the gate while not having coms; I fell back on a spin out start where the brakes are left set until ready to taxi. When I asked to start the engine before getting the brakes released; the ramp quickly affirmed 2 was clear to start; even though they had not signaled that the walk around was complete. The next starts later that day; I made sure to verbalize the normal communication that I would typically have with the tug for myself; and confirmed the walk around was complete.after getting both engines started and getting the push communicated; I released the control lock and pushed the condition levers forward. The first officer immediately queried my action; and I brought the condition lever back to feather and re-engaged the gust lock. I believe this was also due to the rote reaction of it feeling like a spin out style departure. I believe if I had considered the unusual combination of multiple mels and briefed the threats; and had briefed going through the normal flow where the usual steps would be missing; I could have methodically completed the starts with no errors. The next 2 starts I did this and had no issues. I felt like not releasing the brake was an error that might have been caught by ramp; but was definitely trapped by the first officer; and the first officer also did a great job catching me advancing the condition levers prematurely. I feel like possibly me getting flustered about the brake release probably didn't help me avoid the second error. The push continued normally and there were no other issues with the flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Q400 Captain reported that distraction and confusion over MEL items resulted in an improper start procedure.

Narrative: The flight to ramp inter-phone; in addition to APU were on MEL. Before we began boarding I made sure to talk with ramp agents; and ask who was going to do the push; and worked out hand signals and how we would coordinate the push without verbal communication. We also made clear about needing to start at the gate.After completing before start below the line; I signaled to the ramp to start engine 2. Ramp gave clearance to start the engine; so I began the engine start. Then the First Officer asked if we needed to release brakes first for capture; so I then motioned about the walk around and brakes; where the ramp agent gave the hand signals for walk around complete and to release brakes. I released the brakes as the engine continued starting.After completing both engine starts at the gate; we got our clearance to push; and after relaying the hand signals to ramp who started to push; I began the after start flow; released the control lock and advanced the condition levers. The First Officer said something; and I brought the props back to feather before they spun up fully.Due to the combination of MELs; first flight of the day; and not taking the time to really think about how the combination of MELs would interact; I made several errors that I made sure to learn from and remedy; since we kept the plane for another 2 legs. The nonstandard flow of starting at the gate while not having coms; I fell back on a spin out start where the brakes are left set until ready to taxi. When I asked to start the engine before getting the brakes released; the ramp quickly affirmed 2 was clear to start; even though they had not signaled that the walk around was complete. The next starts later that day; I made sure to verbalize the normal communication that I would typically have with the tug for myself; and confirmed the walk around was complete.After getting both engines started and getting the push communicated; I released the control lock and pushed the condition levers forward. The First Officer immediately queried my action; and I brought the condition lever back to feather and re-engaged the gust lock. I believe this was also due to the rote reaction of it feeling like a spin out style departure. I believe if I had considered the unusual combination of multiple MELs and briefed the threats; and had briefed going through the normal flow where the usual steps would be missing; I could have methodically completed the starts with no errors. The next 2 starts I did this and had no issues. I felt like not releasing the brake was an error that might have been caught by ramp; but was definitely trapped by the First Officer; and the First Officer also did a great job catching me advancing the condition levers prematurely. I feel like possibly me getting flustered about the brake release probably didn't help me avoid the second error. The push continued normally and there were no other issues with the flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.