Narrative:

While being vectored onto the localizer course for runway 28L at pit; we were queried by pittsburgh approach as to why we were 10 mi right of course. When we contacted approach we thought that we would be assigned (or had been assigned) runway 28R. We had briefed and prepared for that approach. Once we found that we had made an error and had selected the ILS runway 28R frequency; we quickly tried to set in the ILS runway 28L frequency. We were just about to level off at 3000 ft MSL and the first officer was the PF. He is type rated and has approximately 300 hours in type and we have approximately 7 hours flight time together as a crew. Approach control stated that was not a problem and offered us the ILS runway 28R. I replied that we would just prefer to be re-vectored to runway 28L and that we were set up properly for that runway. I suddenly noticed that we were descending and made an altitude deviation call to the first officer at 2850 ft MSL. He said that he was correcting. The aircraft continued descending and I again made an altitude deviation call at 2750 ft MSL. At that point; the first officer threw up his hands and stated; 'your airplane!' I quickly grabbed the controls and began to apply power and establish a nose-up attitude of approximately 12 degrees. When I assumed control; the aircraft was descending at 1200 FPM. Before the descent was arrested; the aircraft taws alerted; 'terrain; terrain! Pull up!' I regained control of the aircraft; and approach began to re-vector us for the approach. They never queried our altdevs. We were re-vectored for the approach and I completed it without further deviations. The errors on the part of the crew by myself not properly setting up for the proper approach we were assigned would have stopped the error that caused our distraction of having to tune to the proper frequency. As captain; I should have more closely monitored the fact that my first officer was distraction by me tuning the radio rather than maintaining aircraft control. I could not have anticipated the fact that he would simply throw up his hands and not maintain control of the yoke; however. After the flight; we debriefed the situation. What we did wrong and how we could stop errors of this kind from occurring in the future. We also discussed the fact that we should not have preconceived notions about what runway and approach we were going to be assigned and that we both should be more vigilant in the future. I also briefed him that if he was having a problem maintaining control or was in doubt of the aircraft attitude of confign; to say so and to vocalize his concerns.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CONFUSION IN COCKPIT OF LR35 REGARDING RWY IN USE AND DISTR CAUSED BY RETUNING RADIOS RESULTS IN ALTDEV AND CFTT APCHING PIT.

Narrative: WHILE BEING VECTORED ONTO THE LOC COURSE FOR RWY 28L AT PIT; WE WERE QUERIED BY PITTSBURGH APCH AS TO WHY WE WERE 10 MI R OF COURSE. WHEN WE CONTACTED APCH WE THOUGHT THAT WE WOULD BE ASSIGNED (OR HAD BEEN ASSIGNED) RWY 28R. WE HAD BRIEFED AND PREPARED FOR THAT APCH. ONCE WE FOUND THAT WE HAD MADE AN ERROR AND HAD SELECTED THE ILS RWY 28R FREQ; WE QUICKLY TRIED TO SET IN THE ILS RWY 28L FREQ. WE WERE JUST ABOUT TO LEVEL OFF AT 3000 FT MSL AND THE FO WAS THE PF. HE IS TYPE RATED AND HAS APPROX 300 HRS IN TYPE AND WE HAVE APPROX 7 HRS FLT TIME TOGETHER AS A CREW. APCH CTL STATED THAT WAS NOT A PROB AND OFFERED US THE ILS RWY 28R. I REPLIED THAT WE WOULD JUST PREFER TO BE RE-VECTORED TO RWY 28L AND THAT WE WERE SET UP PROPERLY FOR THAT RWY. I SUDDENLY NOTICED THAT WE WERE DSNDING AND MADE AN ALTDEV CALL TO THE FO AT 2850 FT MSL. HE SAID THAT HE WAS CORRECTING. THE ACFT CONTINUED DSNDING AND I AGAIN MADE AN ALTDEV CALL AT 2750 FT MSL. AT THAT POINT; THE FO THREW UP HIS HANDS AND STATED; 'YOUR AIRPLANE!' I QUICKLY GRABBED THE CTLS AND BEGAN TO APPLY PWR AND ESTABLISH A NOSE-UP ATTITUDE OF APPROX 12 DEGS. WHEN I ASSUMED CTL; THE ACFT WAS DSNDING AT 1200 FPM. BEFORE THE DSCNT WAS ARRESTED; THE ACFT TAWS ALERTED; 'TERRAIN; TERRAIN! PULL UP!' I REGAINED CTL OF THE ACFT; AND APCH BEGAN TO RE-VECTOR US FOR THE APCH. THEY NEVER QUERIED OUR ALTDEVS. WE WERE RE-VECTORED FOR THE APCH AND I COMPLETED IT WITHOUT FURTHER DEVS. THE ERRORS ON THE PART OF THE CREW BY MYSELF NOT PROPERLY SETTING UP FOR THE PROPER APCH WE WERE ASSIGNED WOULD HAVE STOPPED THE ERROR THAT CAUSED OUR DISTR OF HAVING TO TUNE TO THE PROPER FREQ. AS CAPT; I SHOULD HAVE MORE CLOSELY MONITORED THE FACT THAT MY FO WAS DISTR BY ME TUNING THE RADIO RATHER THAN MAINTAINING ACFT CTL. I COULD NOT HAVE ANTICIPATED THE FACT THAT HE WOULD SIMPLY THROW UP HIS HANDS AND NOT MAINTAIN CTL OF THE YOKE; HOWEVER. AFTER THE FLT; WE DEBRIEFED THE SITUATION. WHAT WE DID WRONG AND HOW WE COULD STOP ERRORS OF THIS KIND FROM OCCURRING IN THE FUTURE. WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT WE SHOULD NOT HAVE PRECONCEIVED NOTIONS ABOUT WHAT RWY AND APCH WE WERE GOING TO BE ASSIGNED AND THAT WE BOTH SHOULD BE MORE VIGILANT IN THE FUTURE. I ALSO BRIEFED HIM THAT IF HE WAS HAVING A PROB MAINTAINING CTL OR WAS IN DOUBT OF THE ACFT ATTITUDE OF CONFIGN; TO SAY SO AND TO VOCALIZE HIS CONCERNS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.