Narrative:

Just after confirmation from the fas (flight attendants) that they had secured the cabin as requested and were seated due to expected turbulence on the arrival I was notified we had a medical emergency in progress. At that point I informed the first officer (first officer) of the situation PF (pilot flying); and asked him to take comm 1; inform ATC; and do his best to avoid weather and turbulence since we would now have people up in the cabin during the descent do to the event in progress. He acknowledged and I began the stat-md connection procedure and coordination with the fas. Unfortunately the fas were having a rough time getting their medical headset connected and finding a doctor onboard. The passenger was unconscious with a very low breath and heart rate. By the time the fas were able to respond to stat-md we had already transitioned through the arinc sector and a new patch had to be made again. When the new patch was made the flight attendant could not communicate on the headset and decide to put the headset on the doctor assisting.this caused a complete 'lock up' of the comm due to the doctor of course not knowing our procedures and keeping the transmit button depressed causing a hot mic. Stat md was trying to give us instructions but were inaudible due to the blocked frequency. After repeated attempts of calling the fas over the intercom and even PA announcements; the doctor was finally removed from the headset so we could make a plan of action with stat-md and dispatch. I immediately made contact with the fas and requested to not put the doctor on the headset again and I can relay if needed which is standard operating procedure. At that point of conversation I heard the autopilot disconnect; and felt a semi abrupt pitch up of the aircraft. Immediately I observed the first officer hand flying the aircraft at a 2;000 FPM climb through FL360 with power at idle and speedbrakes deployed. Airspeed was close to over speed indication.I made a call out of airspeed and inquired what was going on. First officer stated he had an updraft and was preventing an overspeed. I aggressively called for him to lower the nose observing the airspeed decreasing rapidly and the engines now near idle. The first officer immediately lowered the nose and regained control of the aircraft. After control was assumed and he reconnected the autopilot; I went back to dealing with the emergency medical issue and inquiring the first officer what happened. He was descending to FL240 from FL400 when he said we hit an updraft. We were in moderate turbulence the entire time but I did not observe much airspeed fluctuations that would aggravate airspeed that bad. I notified center of the climb during the descent due to an updraft at that point we were given another crossing restriction.now back in the green; I was trying to get landing data and ATIS for a low-vis approach into ZZZ. We were experiencing difficulties due to ACARS no comm through the weather and 2-wire going up and down with service. At that point I observed the first officer once again near overspeed and made the callout. He corrected speed and was complaining it was the aircraft. Trying to figure out what was going on I noted the descent page had be set at 320 kts. I immediately corrected the setting to 280 (turbulent penetration speed) and explained you can't set an airspeed that high and not expect an overspeed especially since we had been in moderate turbulence the entire time. I asked ATC to waive the next crossing restriction so we could slow appropriately and we continued safely to ZZZ. While debriefing the event we talked about task saturation and what had happened. I never got an answer if he had reset the descent page to that high of an airspeed. During cruise we set at econ at CI40.preventative measures: I believe the first officer felt like we needed to expedite the arrival due to the medical which caused both near overspeed events and the climb during a descent. As pm (pilot monitoring) I was never informed of the new setting and missed seeing it due totask saturation dealing with the medical emergency communication issue. The ci was set normal and we were econ setting; which is what leads me to believe this theory. Also the flight attendant putting an untrained doctor on our medical headset blocked our comm 2; which really escalated the medical emergency especially since we were dealing with inclement weather and turbulence at the same time. I have never ran in to this situation. I believe task saturation and additive conditions caused a breakdown in our CRM putting the flight in a situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier Captain reported FO expediting arrival with priority medical and over sped the aircraft.

Narrative: Just after confirmation from the FAs (Flight Attendants) that they had secured the cabin as requested and were seated due to expected turbulence on the arrival I was notified we had a medical emergency in progress. At that point I informed the FO (First Officer) of the situation PF (Pilot Flying); and asked him to take COMM 1; inform ATC; and do his best to avoid weather and turbulence since we would now have people up in the cabin during the descent do to the event in progress. He acknowledged and I began the STAT-MD connection procedure and coordination with the FAs. Unfortunately the FAs were having a rough time getting their medical headset connected and finding a Doctor onboard. The Passenger was unconscious with a very low breath and heart rate. By the time the FAs were able to respond to STAT-MD we had already transitioned through the ARINC sector and a new patch had to be made again. When the new patch was made the FA could not communicate on the headset and decide to put the headset on the Doctor assisting.This caused a complete 'lock up' of the COMM due to the Doctor of course not knowing our procedures and keeping the transmit button depressed causing a hot mic. Stat MD was trying to give us instructions but were inaudible due to the blocked frequency. After repeated attempts of calling the FAs over the intercom and even PA announcements; the Doctor was finally removed from the headset so we could make a plan of action with STAT-MD and Dispatch. I immediately made contact with The FAs and requested to not put the Doctor on the headset again and I can relay if needed which is standard operating procedure. At that point of conversation I heard the autopilot disconnect; and felt a semi abrupt pitch up of the aircraft. Immediately I observed the FO hand flying the aircraft at a 2;000 FPM climb through FL360 with power at idle and speedbrakes deployed. Airspeed was close to over speed indication.I made a call out of airspeed and inquired what was going on. FO stated he had an updraft and was preventing an overspeed. I aggressively called for him to lower the nose observing the airspeed decreasing rapidly and the engines now near idle. The FO immediately lowered the nose and regained control of the aircraft. After control was assumed and he reconnected the autopilot; I went back to dealing with the emergency medical issue and inquiring the FO what happened. He was descending to FL240 from FL400 when he said we hit an updraft. We were in moderate turbulence the entire time but I did not observe much airspeed fluctuations that would aggravate airspeed that bad. I notified Center of the climb during the descent due to an updraft at that point we were given another crossing restriction.Now back in the green; I was trying to get landing data and ATIS for a low-vis approach into ZZZ. We were experiencing difficulties due to ACARS NO COMM through the weather and 2-wire going up and down with service. At that point I observed the FO once again near overspeed and made the callout. He corrected speed and was complaining it was the aircraft. Trying to figure out what was going on I noted the descent page had be set at 320 kts. I immediately corrected the setting to 280 (turbulent penetration speed) and explained you can't set an airspeed that high and not expect an overspeed especially since we had been in moderate turbulence the entire time. I asked ATC to waive the next crossing restriction so we could slow appropriately and we continued safely to ZZZ. While debriefing the event we talked about task saturation and what had happened. I never got an answer if he had reset the descent page to that high of an airspeed. During cruise we set at ECON at CI40.Preventative Measures: I believe the FO felt like we needed to expedite the arrival due to the medical which caused both near overspeed events and the climb during a descent. As PM (Pilot Monitoring) I was never informed of the new setting and missed seeing it due totask saturation dealing with the medical emergency communication issue. The CI was set normal and we were ECON setting; which is what leads me to believe this theory. Also the FA putting an untrained Doctor on our medical headset blocked our COMM 2; which really escalated the medical emergency especially since we were dealing with inclement weather and turbulence at the same time. I have never ran in to this situation. I believe task saturation and additive conditions caused a breakdown in our CRM putting the flight in a situation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.