Narrative:

Inbound to the VOR, from the east, center gave us holding instructions. Prior to reaching the VOR, center cleared us for the VOR DME B approach. Center did not specify which IAF or a specific route between the VOR and the IAF. I suggested the north IAF since it provided about 10 mi to descend and configure whereas the south IAF provided only about 3 mi, the captain agreed. Over the VOR, we turned to intercept the 076 degree right with the intention of beginning the approach from the north IAF (076/17), I advised center of these intentions. As we intercepted the 076 outbnd, center told us to maintain 14000', I acknowledged, and we leveled off at 14000'. The approach plate shows an altitude of 10000' on the arc. Approaching the arc, the captain said to me 'we're cleared to ten when on the arc?' I said 'no, we have to maintain 14.' the engineer and I did the approach checklist. The captain turned to intercept the arc. Rolling out on the arc, he started to descend out of 14000'. I said 'maintain fourteen,' thinking he was just off his altitude. He continued down. I said, 'she (the controller) told us to maintain fourteen.' he said 'no, she said we're cleared down when on the arc.' by this time, we're passing through 13300', when the controller asked us to confirm we were maintaining 14000'. He started to climb at a little less than 1000 FPM. He had set the percent N1. I said 'maybe we should climb up a little faster, there may be another airplane around here.' he left the power where it was and leveled off at 14000'. After intercepting the final approach course, the controller cleared us out of 14000'. Too late to make it down to the MDA before the map resulting in a missed approach. During this entire time the AC frequency was very busy. When the controller told us to maintain fourteen, I naturally assumed it was for traffic, and expected the restriction to be lifted when on the arc. I knew there was a commuter in the area, but I didn't know exactly where or at what altitude. When we were approaching the arc, I was somewhat busy with a company required approach checklist and with an advisory call to unicom, so there was the possibility that I could have missed a center call lifting the altitude restriction. However, I had left my ATC communication switch on at all times, and was very doubtful that had happened. What really bothers me about this is not what the captain did, but whether or not I should have taken the aircraft away from him. I still haven't resolved this. I had never met this captain before. All 3 of us (captain, me and the engineer) seemed to get along well, before and after the incident. I don't know why he wouldn't listen to me when I told him to maintain fourteen, or at least give me a few seconds to check with the controller before he started down.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ALT DEVIATION ALT EXCURSION.

Narrative: INBND TO THE VOR, FROM THE E, CTR GAVE US HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS. PRIOR TO REACHING THE VOR, CTR CLRED US FOR THE VOR DME B APCH. CTR DID NOT SPECIFY WHICH IAF OR A SPECIFIC RTE BTWN THE VOR AND THE IAF. I SUGGESTED THE N IAF SINCE IT PROVIDED ABOUT 10 MI TO DSND AND CONFIGURE WHEREAS THE S IAF PROVIDED ONLY ABOUT 3 MI, THE CAPT AGREED. OVER THE VOR, WE TURNED TO INTERCEPT THE 076 DEG R WITH THE INTENTION OF BEGINNING THE APCH FROM THE N IAF (076/17), I ADVISED CTR OF THESE INTENTIONS. AS WE INTERCEPTED THE 076 OUTBND, CTR TOLD US TO MAINTAIN 14000', I ACKNOWLEDGED, AND WE LEVELED OFF AT 14000'. THE APCH PLATE SHOWS AN ALT OF 10000' ON THE ARC. APCHING THE ARC, THE CAPT SAID TO ME 'WE'RE CLRED TO TEN WHEN ON THE ARC?' I SAID 'NO, WE HAVE TO MAINTAIN 14.' THE ENGINEER AND I DID THE APCH CHKLIST. THE CAPT TURNED TO INTERCEPT THE ARC. ROLLING OUT ON THE ARC, HE STARTED TO DSND OUT OF 14000'. I SAID 'MAINTAIN FOURTEEN,' THINKING HE WAS JUST OFF HIS ALT. HE CONTINUED DOWN. I SAID, 'SHE (THE CTLR) TOLD US TO MAINTAIN FOURTEEN.' HE SAID 'NO, SHE SAID WE'RE CLRED DOWN WHEN ON THE ARC.' BY THIS TIME, WE'RE PASSING THROUGH 13300', WHEN THE CTLR ASKED US TO CONFIRM WE WERE MAINTAINING 14000'. HE STARTED TO CLB AT A LITTLE LESS THAN 1000 FPM. HE HAD SET THE PERCENT N1. I SAID 'MAYBE WE SHOULD CLB UP A LITTLE FASTER, THERE MAY BE ANOTHER AIRPLANE AROUND HERE.' HE LEFT THE PWR WHERE IT WAS AND LEVELED OFF AT 14000'. AFTER INTERCEPTING THE FINAL APCH COURSE, THE CTLR CLRED US OUT OF 14000'. TOO LATE TO MAKE IT DOWN TO THE MDA BEFORE THE MAP RESULTING IN A MISSED APCH. DURING THIS ENTIRE TIME THE AC FREQ WAS VERY BUSY. WHEN THE CTLR TOLD US TO MAINTAIN FOURTEEN, I NATURALLY ASSUMED IT WAS FOR TFC, AND EXPECTED THE RESTRICTION TO BE LIFTED WHEN ON THE ARC. I KNEW THERE WAS A COMMUTER IN THE AREA, BUT I DIDN'T KNOW EXACTLY WHERE OR AT WHAT ALT. WHEN WE WERE APCHING THE ARC, I WAS SOMEWHAT BUSY WITH A COMPANY REQUIRED APCH CHKLIST AND WITH AN ADVISORY CALL TO UNICOM, SO THERE WAS THE POSSIBILITY THAT I COULD HAVE MISSED A CTR CALL LIFTING THE ALT RESTRICTION. HOWEVER, I HAD LEFT MY ATC COM SWITCH ON AT ALL TIMES, AND WAS VERY DOUBTFUL THAT HAD HAPPENED. WHAT REALLY BOTHERS ME ABOUT THIS IS NOT WHAT THE CAPT DID, BUT WHETHER OR NOT I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN THE ACFT AWAY FROM HIM. I STILL HAVEN'T RESOLVED THIS. I HAD NEVER MET THIS CAPT BEFORE. ALL 3 OF US (CAPT, ME AND THE ENGINEER) SEEMED TO GET ALONG WELL, BEFORE AND AFTER THE INCIDENT. I DON'T KNOW WHY HE WOULDN'T LISTEN TO ME WHEN I TOLD HIM TO MAINTAIN FOURTEEN, OR AT LEAST GIVE ME A FEW SECS TO CHK WITH THE CTLR BEFORE HE STARTED DOWN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.