Narrative:

The flight started off two hours and 13 minutes late departing from the gate due to a late inbound aircraft; two unrelated maintenance write-ups and a disruptive passenger. Both the captain and first officer had spent the extra time between arriving to the airport and the arrival of the aircraft in the flight planning area reviewing the flight plan as well as reviewing the maintenance log and most of all the MEL that existed on the aircraft due to an inoperative engine anti-ice cowl valve. The captain and first officer carefully reviewed the procedures; limitations and restrictions associated with the MEL and the first officer took notes on a yoke card to make sure all procedures were followed. During this the captain had debated refusal of the aircraft; as he was concerned about the potential of an existing write-up of the left fuel gauge potentially losing its readout of the quantity. Combined with the potential for uneven fuel burn due to the MEL on the left engine anti-ice cowl the captain was concerned about having to do a precautionary divert during the flight if the fuel gauge went blank and fuel balance could not be determined. After a discussion with the dispatcher; both the captain and the first officer felt comfortable with the plan and proceeded to the gate to see what the mechanics onboard the aircraft who were working on the inbound write-ups had to say.after the aircraft was boarded and all the briefings were completed; the flight deck crew completed their checklists and called for pushback from the gate. The aircraft was pushed to a spot in the alley where a cross-bleed start could be accomplished and both engines were started in accordance with the MEL and the supplementary procedure for a cross-bleed start. The aircraft taxied out to runway xx at intersection X. All checklists were accomplished and other than performing a normal thrust takeoff per the MEL; the takeoff was normal and uneventful as planned.right about at acceleration altitude of 818 ft. MSL as the first officer was calling for the thrust reduction by using VNAV (something that was briefed prior due to the late night with fewer aircraft and the likelihood of ZZZ TRACON offering a higher altitude very quickly as they often do) the aircraft began to bang very loudly and the first officer felt the aircraft begin to yaw and roll to the right. The first officer who was the pilot flying stopped the yaw and roll using the left rudder and began to call out the single engine profile from the position in the profile the flight had reached. Obviously; the ability to recall exactly what happened in those short few moments when the engine first started having compressor stalls is very hard to recall and it cannot be overemphasized enough how much was happening at once. The need prioritize flying the aircraft became the primary focus; especially for the pilot flying. There was some confusion with the altitude that was assigned vs. What was set in the window however ATC did not seem to worry as long as the aircraft remained at or above 2;500 ft. MSL. Once the aircraft was cleaned up and the initial qrc was run the right engine was back at idle and the crew was able to divide tasks so the first officer was flying and talking to ATC while the captain ran the QRH and communicated in and out of the aircraft.overall; CRM was a focus for the remainder of the flight as the first officer continued to keep the captain aware of their position and altitude relative to the ZZZ airport while the captain kept the first officer in the loop on his progress in the QRH and the decisions he was making. The crew chose not to shut down the right engine as the compressor stall had gone away and the only indication of a problem with the right engine was the recorded 900-degree itt over temp. N1; N2 and N3 were all rotating at idle normally from the crew's perspective. The crew chose to leave the right engine a t idle and perform a single engine landing. CRM was at its highest when initial decisions of auto-brake use and runway choice for example were revised after the crew discussed the initial decision. The aircraft left ATC vectors to begin a right 12-mile base leg at 2;500 feet for the ILS runway xx. The aircraft landed at flaps 20 in the single engine configuration with the left engine operating normally and the right engine at idle with auto brakes of two. The controls were transferred to the captain on the base leg and the captain performed the landing. The captain intentionally flew the aircraft visually slightly below glideslope in order to take full advantage of the full touchdown distance with the unusual configuration. The left reverser was opened to full and the captain immediately started manually braking the aircraft to a taxi speed. The aircraft exited at the end of the runway where rescue vehicles met the aircraft to inspect for any condition that would not allow for a safe taxi back to the gate. Once the all clear was given the aircraft was taxied back to the gate safely and deplaned normally through the jet way.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 First Officer reported that a compressor stall shortly after takeoff resulted in a return to the departure airport.

Narrative: The flight started off two hours and 13 minutes late departing from the gate due to a late inbound aircraft; two unrelated maintenance write-ups and a disruptive passenger. Both the Captain and First Officer had spent the extra time between arriving to the airport and the arrival of the aircraft in the flight planning area reviewing the flight plan as well as reviewing the maintenance log and most of all the MEL that existed on the aircraft due to an inoperative engine anti-ice cowl valve. The Captain and First Officer carefully reviewed the procedures; limitations and restrictions associated with the MEL and the First Officer took notes on a yoke card to make sure all procedures were followed. During this the Captain had debated refusal of the aircraft; as he was concerned about the potential of an existing write-up of the left fuel gauge potentially losing its readout of the quantity. Combined with the potential for uneven fuel burn due to the MEL on the left engine anti-ice cowl the Captain was concerned about having to do a precautionary divert during the flight if the fuel gauge went blank and fuel balance could not be determined. After a discussion with the Dispatcher; both the Captain and the First Officer felt comfortable with the plan and proceeded to the gate to see what the mechanics onboard the aircraft who were working on the inbound write-ups had to say.After the aircraft was boarded and all the briefings were completed; the flight deck crew completed their checklists and called for pushback from the gate. The aircraft was pushed to a spot in the alley where a cross-bleed start could be accomplished and both engines were started in accordance with the MEL and the supplementary procedure for a cross-bleed start. The aircraft taxied out to Runway XX at intersection X. All checklists were accomplished and other than performing a normal thrust takeoff per the MEL; the takeoff was normal and uneventful as planned.Right about at acceleration altitude of 818 ft. MSL as the First Officer was calling for the thrust reduction by using VNAV (something that was briefed prior due to the late night with fewer aircraft and the likelihood of ZZZ TRACON offering a higher altitude very quickly as they often do) the aircraft began to bang very loudly and the First Officer felt the aircraft begin to yaw and roll to the right. The First Officer who was the pilot flying stopped the yaw and roll using the left rudder and began to call out the single engine profile from the position in the profile the flight had reached. Obviously; the ability to recall exactly what happened in those short few moments when the engine first started having compressor stalls is very hard to recall and it cannot be overemphasized enough how much was happening at once. The need prioritize flying the aircraft became the primary focus; especially for the pilot flying. There was some confusion with the altitude that was assigned vs. what was set in the window however ATC did not seem to worry as long as the aircraft remained at or above 2;500 ft. MSL. Once the aircraft was cleaned up and the initial QRC was run the right engine was back at idle and the crew was able to divide tasks so the First Officer was flying and talking to ATC while the Captain ran the QRH and communicated in and out of the aircraft.Overall; CRM was a focus for the remainder of the flight as the First Officer continued to keep the Captain aware of their position and altitude relative to the ZZZ airport while the Captain kept the First Officer in the loop on his progress in the QRH and the decisions he was making. The crew chose not to shut down the right engine as the compressor stall had gone away and the only indication of a problem with the right engine was the recorded 900-degree ITT over temp. N1; N2 and N3 were all rotating at idle normally from the crew's perspective. The crew chose to leave the right engine a t idle and perform a single engine landing. CRM was at its highest when initial decisions of auto-brake use and runway choice for example were revised after the crew discussed the initial decision. The aircraft left ATC vectors to begin a right 12-mile base leg at 2;500 feet for the ILS Runway XX. The aircraft landed at flaps 20 in the single engine configuration with the left engine operating normally and the right engine at idle with auto brakes of two. The controls were transferred to the Captain on the base leg and the Captain performed the landing. The Captain intentionally flew the aircraft visually slightly below glideslope in order to take full advantage of the full touchdown distance with the unusual configuration. The left reverser was opened to full and the Captain immediately started manually braking the aircraft to a taxi speed. The aircraft exited at the end of the runway where rescue vehicles met the aircraft to inspect for any condition that would not allow for a safe taxi back to the gate. Once the all clear was given the aircraft was taxied back to the gate safely and deplaned normally through the jet way.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.